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
**STANDARDS**  
*of*  
**VALUE**  
*for*  
**PROGRAM PLANNING**  
*and*  
**BUILDING**

**PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOOL  
FOR WASHINGTON STAFF  
===== OF BUREAU OF =====  
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS**

WASHINGTON, D. C., OCTOBER 17-20, 1939

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STANDARDS OF VALUE

for

PROGRAM PLANNING AND BUILDING

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Rupert B. Vance  
E. G. Nourse  
Lloyd M. Short  
Joseph S. Davis  
Horace Miner  
Kimball Young

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PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOOL FOR WASHINGTON STAFF

OF BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS

Washington, D. C., October 17-20, 1939

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Bureau of Agricultural Economics

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## PREFACE

Part of the Department of Agriculture's effort "to draw its officials and employees into 'the large councils', to stimulate their interest in the processes of American Democracy, and to indicate the relations of detailed performances to the needs and spirit of American society," (1) a School for workers in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics was held in Washington, October 17 to 20, 1939. Responsibility for the organization and conduct of the program was located in the Division of Program Study and Discussion, with Morris B. Storer in charge, Alva H. Benton and James O. Howard assisting.

In response to requests from members of the Bureau, there is presented in this volume a complete record of the proceedings of this School. Included are: (1) a record of the talks by visiting lecturers, as reported by stenographers and edited by the speakers, and (2) a brief record of the afternoon discussions as formulated by secretaries of the eight groups into which the conference body was divided for purposes of informal discussion.

Planned for intensive study and discussion, by the entire employee body of the Bureau, of fundamental questions relating to "Standards of Values for Agricultural Program Planning and Building," the program followed the general pattern of 59 similar "Schools for Agricultural Workers" which have been conducted since October 1935 by the U.S.D.A. through the Division of Program Study and Discussion, B.A.E., at the request of and in cooperation with various agencies of agricultural and rural life education.

Two of these have been for workers in other federal agricultural agencies, one for the Washington staff of the agricultural Extension Service in October 1935, one for the Washington staff of the Farm Security Administration in February 1939. The rest have been sponsored by State agencies, - for extension workers, vocational agriculture teachers, home economics teachers, A.A.A. committeemen, county planning committeemen, farm organization leaders, County Supervisors of F.S.A., County School Superintendents, W.P.A. adult teachers, business leaders, etc. A complete summary of Schools held before February 1, 1940 is presented on page 125.

The purpose of these Schools, built in general around the question, "What is a desirable national agricultural program?" is education for democracy in agriculture. They aim to encourage independent thinking about the basic social and economic problems of agriculture in our time and to assist with that thinking, to help agricultural workers to a more unified view of the nation's problems and to a stronger sense of the meaning of their routine activities, to increase understanding of the forces that have converged in present agricultural programs and policies, and to lay a base for agricultural land-use planning activities. In other words, the Schools present an invitation to philosophy, an invitation to a probing personal thinking-through of the root problems we face as individuals and as a nation: Where are we? How did we get here?

(1) Charles A. Beard, in Preface to Democracy Has Roots, by M. L.

Wilson, page 12



Where do we want to go? And what's the best way there?

With these ends in view, each School is staffed with six or seven outstanding thinkers in Philosophy, Sociology, Economics, Political Science, History, Anthropology, Education, etc., from the colleges, universities and research institutions of the country. Working on the theory that the truth about basic problems lies somewhere between the contending judgments of honest thinkers on those problems, and that a strong stimulus to independent thinking is provided by the open and mutually respectful meeting of minds with different points of view, every staff is so planned as to include representatives of widely divergent viewpoints, critical of current national policy as well as friendly to it.

Candidates for staff positions are chosen on the basis of close conference between the Division of Program Study and Discussion and leaders of sponsoring agencies. As a general principle, most staff members are selected from leaders in near-at-hand States for the most direct attack on the problems of the region, a few being brought from afar to contribute outside perspective.

The typical program presents lectures on the first day on "Backgrounds," on the second day on "The Place of Government in Modern Society," on the third on "Regionalism, Nationalism and Internationalism," and on the fourth on "Problems of Social Adjustment and Administration."

Special emphasis is placed in these Schools on the discussion features. Typically two hours each afternoon are devoted to discussion of the materials of the morning lectures as they bear on local problems. For the most part this discussion proceeds in small round-table groups of 20 to 30 persons each. These sessions are of, by and for the conferees. They are led by selected members of the conference body, a new leader for each new hour of discussion. The lecturers attend the group meetings but are invited to participate only on a basis of complete equality with the students. Toward getting as nearly universal participation as possible and accomplishing the most balanced and unified and progressive consideration of the problems, the discussion leaders meet in a preliminary training conference for group study and practice of the principles of discussion leadership.

In the typical program, the second afternoon of the School substitutes for the small group discussions an informal panel discussion in general assembly, leading into a free-for-all open forum, the panel being made up of the visiting staff members and an equal number of local leaders.

As has been suggested, Schools have been conducted for the most part on a State-wide basis, in each case for workers in some one agency. There has been a growing tendency, however, to develop Schools on a small district basis, bringing together farmer leaders and field workers from all rural life agencies in twenty county or smaller districts. An opposite tendency has led to joint regional Schools which have brought together outstanding leaders from the principal agricultural agencies in several State regions, such as the Northern and Southern Great Plains.

Attendance has run as high as 500 at single Schools, has averaged 135 at first Schools in particular States. At second and third Schools,



attendance has averaged 230, field workers being joined in conference with leading farm men and women. Total attendance before February 1, 1940 was over 10,000.

In all parts of the country these programs have been associated with a continuing educational program aimed at stimulating rural people to a more active study and discussion of underlying social and economic problems and assisting them in every way possible with their study. This tendency has sprung from a recognition of the universal need, expressed or unexpressed, for such study, and from a sense of the responsibility of the professionally trained leaders in agriculture to serve this need. The reactions of students at the Schools, as surveyed by State leaders, indicate that the Schools contribute valuably to the founding and furtherance of such programs. In the case of the B.A.E. School reviewed in this volume, expressions of interest in a continuing program of related in-service training, punctuated at intervals by other Schools on the same general pattern, have been received from a number of sources, and are at present under consideration.

The services of six Regional Discussion Specialists of the Division of Program Study and Discussion are available for discussion leader training conferences and for other meetings through which these ends might be advanced. In addition the Section has prepared considerable pamphlet literature on the underlying problems to supplement what is already available through State offices.

*Carl F. Taensch*

February 7, 1940.  
Washington, D. C.

Head,  
Division of Program Study and Discussion.





## B A C K G R O U N D S

### MAN AS A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON

Mark A. Graubard

Dr. Taeusch and members of the school: The rapid development of biology in the last hundred years culminated in a movement which is known today as behaviorism. This movement expressed the optimism of a new and youthful science which could boast a few real achievements. Progress had been made in the field of experimental physiology, nerve, brain and muscle physiology, conditioning, tropisms, heredity and general behavior. As a result, people, especially biologists and psychologists, were sufficiently impressed with the findings of these branches of biology to develop the fairly optimistic philosophy that all human behavior could be expressed in terms of physiological and, roughly speaking, biological phenomena. There is no doubt that there was a great deal of justification for this type of approach, because indeed great achievements could be ascribed to the biological sciences at the time of the inception of behavioristic thought. However, it didn't take more than ten or fifteen years, which is far less than it usually takes to observe the limitations of a hope, to realize that human behavior had a number of other unknowns or variables besides those which experimental physiology or experimental behavior could reveal. These new factors were brought forth mainly by the study of comparative anthropology, which at the time of the birth of behaviorism was little known and was greatly encumbered by moral and ethical values which the investigator invariably had to bring with him in the same way as he brought his table manners and his clothes. It is difficult to think of table manners and clothes as relative and arbitrary acquisitions, and it is still more difficult to think of your morals and ethical values as arbitrary acquisitions. Consequently, the real light that this science had to shed on the biology of man could not be sufficiently well appreciated at the time when behaviorism was climbing to its peak. Not that behaviorism, like any other scientific movement, did not make its contribution, especially by way of revealing new problems and of combating old misconceptions. But as a saving hope, I think that it had more or less the same record as any other final hope of mankind has had in the past and our present hopes will be found to have had by succeeding generations.

On the basis of this optimistic view of human behavior as merely physiology and chemical and physical reactions, it has been customary for many biologists to talk of man as a biological phenomenon in terms of biology, in terms of general physiology, heredity, conditioned reflexes and similar biological experiences. Now, while these sciences are of course of value and directly relevant to the study of human behavior, they are usually limited, for the good reason that whatever you can say about the biology of man is also true of the biology of mammals, and particularly true of the biology of primates. Whether you discuss human behavior in terms of hormones, in terms of heredity and genes or in terms of environmental factors, you can do the same with the primates. The primate has the same hormones, for that matter, even the same form of courtship and kissing, the same adrenalin, the same stimuli to send it out into the blood stream, the same autonomic system, the same general nervous phenomena. All the laws of muscle and nerve are the same as for man. Consequently, when talking about the



biological aspects of man you are really considering the biological aspects of the group as a whole, chiefly mammals or more specifically primates.

However, man does have certain unique characteristics, unique features, which are, as a matter of fact, built upon a biological basis. But this biological basis is apparently greatly modified, or to say the least, plays a far different role in human behavior than it does in the behavior of other primates. The uniqueness of man as an animal, as a phenomenon in the biological world, lies in the fact that he is a culture-making animal. No other animal has that peculiarity. Being a culture-making animal does not imply that he becomes cultured but that he lives in a way which we say involves a culture.

By culture we mean a set of habits, practices, tools, institutions and beliefs maintained by a given group. The characteristic of man is that he is a social animal, and lives in groups. That incidentally is of course true of apes as well. They also live in groups of a certain type, not quite the same as ours, but deserving the term groups. At least some apes, those that have been studied. We will talk of that later in connection with the family. But the peculiarity of man is that he always lives in a fairly large social group and that all the habits acquired by that group are shared by every member of the group, generally speaking. There always are individuals who are peculiar, exceptional, but on the whole even they show the stamp of their group.

Let us examine how this operates. For instance, take our clothes. We wear clothes. Of course women don't like to be told that they wear exactly the same kind of clothes as anybody else. Women like the idea of being unique and individual in their dress, at least modern women do, but the truth has to be faced occasionally, and the fact is that women as well as men wear stereotyped clothes. Consider the Arabs, Australian natives, African Negroes or American Indians of North and South America. They dress differently and even though they too like to give individual patterns to their own dress, they dress in a way that we consider typical of the specific group. Our clothing too forms a type. The same applies to food. Consider bread. We eat bread. The majority of the human species does not eat bread. The Hindus or Chinese or Japanese don't eat bread at all. They eat rice, which is their staple. We use tools for handling food, knives, forks and so on. Other groups don't. We speak a certain language, others speak a different language. We have certain notions about religion, politics, the possibility of a future life, ethics, morals, family relations toward relatives, and so forth. Other groups have different notions. Moreover, the groups that exist in our national community, as mixed and polyglot as it is, are nevertheless more or less uniform. These habits, these beliefs, practices, institutions, foods, clothing, etc., constitute the culture of a group. Man is a culture-making animal by creating different social groups, each possessing its unique culture.

There is a biological basis for culture-formation in the sense that we imitate; that is, a given member of a group introduces an invention and the others copy it. Before you know it, it has spread throughout the group and become the accepted way of doing things. Apparently there is something in man that tends toward standardization



of practices, a desire for uniformity, a desire for social approval, for social harmony on the part of every individual. Very few people want to be entirely different. They want to be different within the framework of social acceptance but not too different. Being too different brings ostracism, excommunication or at best distrust and suspicion. There is a significant psychological consequence of this behavior in that we invariably call natural that to which we are accustomed. As a matter of fact, that is the definition of natural. A tree is natural when it grows with its roots in the soil and its branches in the air, because we have never seen trees grow any other way. Should we see trees grow the other way in a fantastic world we would call the phenomenon unnatural. Similarly with behavior. We behave in a certain way. Behavior which is different is called unnatural. In fact, man always called his own behavior natural until he began to see different forms of behavior and began to hear members of other groups call his behavior unnatural. We always consider those beliefs or events to which we are accustomed as natural and the things which seem strange or novel as bizarre and unnatural.

Then there is also the sense of group feeling, the identification of one's self with the group, that helps in the formation of common cultural patterns. I mention these points only as possible biological or psychological factors in culture formation.

These properties of the human being are, in a way, inherent in every man. I say inherent because there is really no better word for it. In fact, when you come to consider the essential biological nature of man, you are confronted with the infinite diversity of the expressions of his behavior, and realize what a difficult task it is to ascertain what is inherent and what isn't. But it is possible to solve the problem in a statistical way, which makes it a bit arbitrary and does not express it in terms of a law, but gives you sufficient justification for stating the case as best you can, since you don't claim it to be irrevocably so. You merely state that on the basis of statistical evidence such would seem to be the case.

Now, let us apply this to human behavior. How could we possibly decide which is biological and which aspects of human behavior are not biological? Let's consider the formation of specific culture elements. The best way of determining whether they are biological or not is to make a list of institutions which are common to all human groups. In other words, we shall make a table of all the information we possess concerning the life and culture of every group of Homo sapiens, say, for the last 30,000 years, or as long as the records extend, but limiting ourselves to Homo sapiens, since that is the species we are dealing with. We will then find such institutions as belief in magic, some definite forms of religion, forms of government or group regulations on certain occasions, some notion of the family, control of sex, control or regulation of individual or group property rights, music, songs, stories, dances, group feeling and group loyalty, resistance to novelty, the desire for social prestige and for social approval; the use of tools and weapons, the use of jewelry and decorations; play and war. This will on the whole, I would think, exhaust more or less the list of institutions that have been found to exist in every human group.

Now, it is very difficult to say whether these institutions are natural, that is, whether they are immutable and inevitable. But inevitability and naturalness in the absolute sense in which people usually think are not desirable scientific terms, because everything that exists is a resultant of antecedent events. It stands to reason that if you change those events, modify their nature or sequence you will modify the consequences. The same holds true for genetics. We can state definitely that specific characteristics of animals, say the skin color, eye color, height, structure of hair, susceptibility to disease, as a matter of fact every feature of human beings that we can think of, undoubtedly have a genetic basis. Often we can predict the consequences in the offspring even in man, provided the parents decide to be sufficiently prolific. A good guess can then be ventured on the percentage of offspring that for example will be blue-eyed or brown-eyed, that will have curly or straight hair. But with small families close approximations are difficult. Yet, even at best that gene which we know to exist in the chromosomes of the egg and sperm, and which we know to produce certain end results, under given circumstances, say blue eyes, is not an irrevocable force, because under changed conditions that same gene may produce a different end product. This is only to be expected since the result depends on interactions of developmental processes in cells functioning in a given environment. What I mean to imply is that there is no event in nature which could not possibly be changed by a change in the determining or environmental forces. However, we always speak in terms of things as they are. In other words, given man as he is, a union of certain genes will produce a given end result. That we know more or less to be correct. The same type of reasoning should be applied to the enumerated cultural institutions. The fact is that we have these results of man's social evolution and these cultural institutions. They are common to all, or to practically all human groups that have been studied. Consequently, having no evidence to the contrary, and expressing the results faithfully by saying that all human groups have shown these institutions to be part of their culture, we are justified in concluding that there is something in the psychological or biological make-up of every man which necessitates the birth of these institutions. We are then in a way justified in speaking of these institutions as having a biological basis, or of being biologically determined.

Whether the existence of, let us say, magic, is due to an instinct is very difficult to say. I think on the whole it is preferable to eliminate the word instinct from human behavior for the very simple reason that it has a different and a specific meaning when applied to other animals, like insects. In insects an instinct is a definite chain of reactions in which each link is evoked by the antecedent event. It is forced behavior, independent of reason, experience or learning. In other words, the behavior of the insect is completely independent of thoughtful coordination and when it is dependent upon brain centers it can often be very confusing. For instance, the male wasp, like most insects, has its sex behavior controlled by the brain; that is, by the nerve ganglia situated in the head. The male behaves characteristically, courts females and feeds on sugar. The female behaves like a female. She has a sting at the tip of her abdomen, stings larvae, deposits her eggs in them, and does not use sugar as food. Now, it so happens that for no biological reason, we very often get a gynandromorph, or hermaphrodite, that is, a male-female combination. The dividing line may be in the center of the body, so that the



anterior part will be male and the posterior female or vice versa. Thus, we may encounter an animal possessing a male head, a male thorax, and a female abdomen having an ovary, eggs, and sting. An animal of this kind, possessing all the female paraphernalia for sex behavior invariably will act like a male, because it has the male head. It will mount females, refuse to use the sting or lay eggs, and will live on sugar. Now the opposite combination of gynandromorph wasp, that is, an animal with female head and thorax and a male abdomen, small and round and having no sting, will try to sting larvae and lay eggs and behave in courtship like a female. In this case the behavior comes from the head, but is confused in expression. The significant point is that the instinctive behavior of these animals is determined by a chain of events. The receptors in the head are different in the male and female, hence their sensitivity to different events. Consequently, the stimuli sent out by the head ganglia are different in the male and female, and the fact that the animal behaves "unnaturally" is no fault of the nerve path because the nerve functions the right way. The original reception, the dispatched executive order are normal but lead to behavior responses that are different from the ones which we consider normal and which are biologically adapted for life and survival. Yet we see here a typical instance of instinctive behavior in animals. Most instincts are of this kind. There is stimulating force, a receptor and then the executive organs which obey the orders they receive. In man we have little such behavior, because there is always an intervening force between every stimulus and every response, and that is the malleable brain, especially the cerebrum. When there is no such intervening force we may still have a reflex, as when we withdraw the hand after burning it. But the term instinct is not very useful or helpful in either case.

So far as the cultural institutions that I enumerated are concerned, we may consider magic as an illustration. The facts are that man in the past and even today on a lesser scale has attributed all kinds of wishes, desires, and anthropomorphic feelings to natural objects such as rocks, oceans, stars, days, or numbers; that he believed in the existence of sympathetic attitudes on the part of certain natural forces and hostile attitudes on the part of other forces, in the evil eye, the evil effects of Friday the 13th, or the number 7. The fact that man has always shown such an attitude to nature leads us to believe that there is something in the nature of man which impells such behavior. Otherwise it would be very difficult to explain the independent development of these cultural elements in so many human groups that were never in contact with each other and therefore could not borrow from each other. The same is true with regard to the institution of the family, control of property and what we may call government. Every human group invariably possesses some kind of regulation with respect to sex and family. Of course, the family is also known among monkeys and apes. It is a family that is much different from our own and I don't know that it would be legitimate to call it a family, but the fact is that they live in groups held together mainly by biological ties. A controlled experiment was conducted, if I recall correctly, with 42 baboons, 8 males and 34 females. Invariably there were some males that appropriated a number of females while a few males were left without any. These are called bachelors. Groups were formed consisting of from 6 to 9 females dominated by a single male. You have

then a number of males left without females and they attach themselves to one group or another. You find families or groups of these apes living together and having a group feeling, and in migrating to another place they retain their identity. A group consists of an overlord who is the real boss, a number of females, and one or two so-called bachelors. These never mate. They just hang on to the group. When food is given to a group no one will touch it until the overlord has had his fill. The favorite female then goes over and helps herself, next the other females, and finally the disreputable bachelor, who is generally speaking a pathetic character. He very often makes an attempt to approach a female or mount her, but it doesn't materialize and the overlord does his job and starts fighting and screaming and more often than not somebody gets killed. But the fact is that this group maintains a definite routine of behavior and maintains itself as a group having an identity and retains that identity in spite of migration. The same thing is true with regard to all other institutions I have mentioned - art, decoration, play, or war, incipient forms of which may be noted in other animals but never to any degree approaching their expression in man.

A common feature of most human cultures is general resistance to novelty. Given a certain set of practices and beliefs, man invariably believes that these habits and institutions are natural. That is a characteristic of the way we think. We consider natural that to which we are accustomed and defend it because it looks reasonable to us. This mode of thinking we call rationalization, or reasoning, since it is very often difficult to separate the two. But given a series of habits and practices, we will adhere to them precisely because of their appearing to us so natural. As a result, every new event is resisted by the group and by the individual.

We may put it on a practical, everyday basis, not by way of a scientific explanation of the phenomenon but by way of a homely illustration. You try to feel kind towards a friend who writes, or plays tennis, or does something in a way you think could be improved upon. Out of the kindness of your heart and the security of your superior knowledge you delicately attempt to tell him to modify his practices and adopt the way in which you do it or think should be done because it is the better way. You know of course the thanks you get for it. The person is irritated by the advice and certainly doesn't like to change his old habits. In fact, it wouldn't be too flighty to imagine an Old Stone Age individual who is propagandized by somebody on the subject of the superiority of a bow and arrow over the harpoon. You know what his answer would be. "The harpoon was good enough for my father and grandfather and is good enough for me." It may have been good enough, because with many clumsy tools and weapons man managed to survive amazingly well, in view of the difficulties we have today with so many improvements. But there is one thing about a human being which distinguishes him from other animals, and that is that he can take the severest beating and survive. There isn't an organ in the body that hasn't been mutilated, because man believed it was good for him. The head has been bound and forced out of shape because it was thought good to do so, the lips and neck stretched, the nose pierced and cut, the teeth filed to a point or filed off. Fingers have been cut off with an axe for love, that is, because you were married, or just so because it was the right kind of thing to do under certain circumstances. Feet have been bound in large sections of the Orient. Circumcision of



men and women, tattooing, flagellation and other mutilations have been practiced for thousands of years. There are very few organs of the body that haven't been mutilated for long periods, much to the disadvantage of the individuals who practiced it. But these institutions manage to maintain themselves and disappeared because of incidental rather than rational reasons.

Clearly, the amazing thing is not that changes do take place in beliefs and institutions but that they are so stubbornly resisted. The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that resistance to novelty is a result of man's culture formation and habit, causing his mind to regard as natural that to which he is accustomed. Resistance to novelty is a mighty factor. In the social sciences people talk of the cultural lag. They think of science as making progress easily because scientists are presumably willing to adopt new ideas, but that in social, cultural, moral and ethical movements, we usually show bitter resistance. Actually, while this may be particularly conspicuous at certain periods, it is not true in the long run. There are very few discoveries in science, obvious and simple though they may seem to us now, which have not been resisted by scientists for a long time. In fact, the more they were related to immediate human benefit, the stronger was the resistance. For instance, only 100 years ago, there were riots in Baltimore and New York because of rumors that human dissection was being performed in hospitals. Dissection was opposed on a large scale for hundreds of years. Why? For the reason that people had the idea their bodies should be left alone. The same stubborn opposition was displayed against anesthesia, and what should we desire more to eliminate than pain? What is disliked more than pain and yet man clung to it more than to dear life. He was more willing to fight, suffer and die than to protect himself and avoid pain when it readily could be avoided, merely by not seeking it. Ether, chloroform, every form of anesthesia, was opposed. What is more, scientists opposed it just as much as churchmen or the average citizen, and it is precisely because it had a connection with society that the opposition was stronger. The circulation of the blood, discovered by Harvey was opposed. Vaccination and many aspects of hygiene are still being opposed. Lister's reform by way of antisepsis was opposed. Lister fought hard for the new ideas but he himself opposed the theory of asepsis, that is, performing operations in such a way as to permit no possible contamination and therefore obviate the use of antiseptic methods. Lister himself opposed it for twenty years, until a short time before his death he said, "There is probably something to it." The fact is that the opposition to novelty goes on and probably will go on in the future. Try it on yourself, on your habits, pet beliefs, hidden assumptions and unquestioned preferences and opinions. Yet in spite of this resistance to novelty, we do know that change does happen. There are few things that don't change. Even ritual, which is, in a manner of speaking the citadel of conservatism in tradition and religion - even ritual undergoes changes. The question therefore arises, how does that interaction take place between novelty and the resistance to it so as to give rise to change? That is of course a difficult problem, but biology can give us some clue to a solution of it.

In a way, the analogy between social evolution and biological evolution is a very helpful one. Let's consider first the path of social evolution. The path of social progress, or better stated the

mechanism of social change, depends on discovery and invention as the feeders of novelty. Consider a given practice which becomes established, such as a particular way of making stone axes or a way of making leather moccasins, or swords, or a bow and arrow. Specific modes of production are accepted and practiced by the workers in the given field. I mean there is established by the members of a given group a particular way of doing it, and that is done by every practitioner in the respective trade. Sooner or later somebody appears who does it differently. Sometimes that modification is rejected, forgotten or overlooked. Occasionally, however, a few people start to copy it. The advantage of the innovation is often a real one and this advantage is often a factor in its rate of diffusion, in its rate of spread to other groups, but is never the sole determinant. There are new ideas or new modifications that are economically most advantageous, but are completely overlooked and wait a thousand years or so until they are reintroduced under different circumstances. But the fact is that the only forces for, or rather feeders of novelty in social evolution are discovery or observation of new events or phenomena in nature. This process requires a uniquely gifted individual, since we may all see a given object but may have to wait for the right person to make the proper combination and thus contribute something new. The second force for novelty is invention which is a new combination of old principles, ideas or concepts in a way that something entirely new is produced.

Given these phenomena, we are next confronted with the problem of social acceptance and diffusion of the new to the entire group. When that occurs the new element becomes embedded in the pattern of the group as a whole. It then becomes the necessary and natural thing to do. This mechanism of acceptance of new things is a difficult link in this chain, little known and hard to study.

\* In biological evolution we have similar processes. Like produces like is a common observation. In other words, you can breed white mice for hundreds of years and you will obtain nothing but white mice, if your original breeders were of a pure strain. But we do know that evolution takes place, that new types do make their appearance. The feeder for this type of biological change is mutation, the capacity or property of genetic elements, called the genes, to undergo some unknown and inexplicable change which produces a new gene and hence a new or modified trait. In other words, you can breed those white mice for hundreds of generations and they will reproduce their kind, until suddenly for no reason or fault of your own or of the environment so far as you know, a new type appears, say with a black spot or a black body, or a brown body, or some other change in color. The changes need not be limited to color. The new type may be tailless or blind, or have curly, or kinky hair. With time this new type may become established and before you know it, speaking in terms of geological time, there is a group of that new characteristic which becomes fixated and then tends to maintain itself on the above principle of like producing like. However, thousands of mutations appear which vanish without a trace, and other thousands which have their genes scattered in the population without any visible effects.

We thus meet again the same principle. We have a resistance to the new, but at the same time there is some force which supplies novelty and which permits this novelty to become established. The new element once established, maintains itself in the same way as the elements which



it had to displace maintained themselves in the past.

We may consider at this point the biologic basis of social progress or social change, because essentially the biologic aspects I'm going to discuss will be seen to constitute the link between social and biologic evolution. I mentioned previously that social change is maintained by the occurrence of discovery and invention. These phenomena are expressions of biologic forces in that their occurrence seems to have a genetic basis.

We are all familiar with the distribution curve. Let us consider height in man. If you take a group of men and classify them according to height you will find that few will be extremely short, few extremely tall, while the great majority will cluster about a mean of five feet seven inches, with intermediate size groups for the values between the mean and the extremes. The same applies for such a capacity as singing, the possession of exceptional memory, chess playing, etc. A few individuals will be a total loss, a few will be exceptionally good and the majority will be average.

Even after prolonged and expert training the distribution curve still persists. Plainly put, college graduates will still show this peculiar form of variation within a group.

Now creativeness and originality in one field or another, or what we refer to as genius or talent, are merely names we give to a few individuals grouped at the high quality end of the distribution curve. Both biology and history tell us that such individuals appear in all human groups, always existed and no doubt will exist. It is this creative group that supplies novelty in tools, practices and ideas. These products are then acquired by the group, but the path of progress is paved with the efforts of these exceptionable people. Everything we use or know, every object you see here is somebody's invention. Since these few creative minds will continue to appear, novelty will never cease and the Cassandra visions of some biologists need not disturb us.

Now there are two points I would like to consider. We said that upon a fundamentally similar biologic groundwork man has evolved a completely different form of behavior from the primates which are so closely related to him. It is the culture-making habit that is really at the bottom of this difference. The name Homo sapiens is a misnomer, because it should really be, not the man of wisdom but the man of culture, on account of the culture-making habit which is responsible for the uniqueness of man.

There are two philosophical implications involved in the relation between the culture-making habit and the biological basis of man's behavior. One is the problem of reason, which is usually considered a significant characteristic of man and which Linnaeus thought was unique and significant enough to classify man by the description sapiens. Reason, so far as we see it in the primitive man, consists of rationalization involving defending things as natural because they are customary, and subsequently viewing the world and man with one's limited habits and rationalizations as the basic alphabet. For instance, when Lowie, the anthropologist, talked to a Crow Indian disapprovingly of the prevailing custom of wife stealing in his tribe, the Indian replied

that it was difficult for him to understand how the white man dared preach to him on morals and yet talk to or even touch his own sister. The idea of incest is pushed so far among some American Indians as well as many other primitive tribes as not to permit men to talk to, look at, or be near their sisters. It is natural and reasonable for an Indian to accept that as absolute, as it is just for us to accept our own notion of incest. Each will present numerous reasons for the correctness of his custom. Hence the relativity of reason.

Now, the biological basis of our knowledge of reality is rooted in our sense organs. They constitute the only mechanism we have for the detection of events in nature. Our sense organs are limited in number and therefore our perception of events in nature is limited. A sense organ may be compared to a combination lock that intervenes between a specific sensory nerve and the external world. The eye shields the optic nerve. That optic nerve cannot be stimulated by light in a direct way. Light has to enter the eye, come into contact with the retina and decompose a substance in it which is sensitive to light. That decomposition brings about a stimulation of the nerve. Were it not for the retina, anything could stimulate the optic nerve. Any force such as heat, or wind would produce vision then, because the basis of sensation lies in the fact that a sensory nerve sends a stimulus to the brain and at the locus where the nerve terminates some event takes place which we call sensation. When the optic nerve even of some blind men or animals, is stimulated the subjects will experience the sensation of vision. Since our sense organs are few in number we are able to intercept only relatively few events in nature. Those we call facts. They involve forces in nature which have the combination to our sense organs and manage to penetrate our brain and our sensory perception. Sensory stimulation is thus the direct vehicle for knowledge of reality. Conclusions, theories, generalizations, causal connections, explanations, etc., are rational fictions created by our mental, imaginative or rational powers. Our sense organs have not undergone any change to speak of within the last few thousand years. Yet our reasoning changes from year to year in one sphere or another.

It is a fact that our sense organs are quite uniform and the number of people having uncommon, or as we say abnormal, sensory perception is small. This biological event proclaims that the groundwork exists for mutual understanding among human beings. By reducing complex phenomena to a common elementary and factual denominator, the possibility of mutual understanding is biologically not excluded, but on the contrary brought within the realm of probability. This is the first point of the two I mentioned.

The second point I want to call attention to is the realization that such an objective encounters severe difficulties because all our reasoning engages a large number of hidden assumptions or values which we never think of even stipulating let alone of questioning. There is no special organ for thought possessed by the brain of Homo sapiens and not by other primates. The "laws" of formal logic are more in the nature of arbitrary rules of a game than experimental deductions concerning the way we think. The opposite of what formal logic presupposes is probably correct, namely that reason is the most elusive of relativities and no amount of questioning can sift out or even reveal the values, beliefs, and explanations which seem sound at a given historic period



and which time ultimately exposes to ridicule. These two points, the theoretical possibility of a common language and second the difficulties created by the diversity of culture patterns and their consequences, rationalization, occupy a pivotal point in the biology of man. The different culture patterns of different human groups create different social worlds, different values, standards and assumptions, hence different reasoning and logic. How these obstacles are to be overcome is the real problem in the study of man.

## BACKGROUND S

### CAN HUMAN NATURE BE CHANGED?

Robert B. Vance

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: When I realize that the wheels of the great Bureau of Agricultural Economics have temporarily stopped running and that the cogs are here assembled to hear me talk about human nature, I must confess that I am overwhelmed.

Can human nature be changed? What is human nature? Not so long ago, somebody asked as a rhetorical question, "What is horse sense?" and received the answer, "It is the kind a mule hasn't got." Shall we say that human nature is the kind a mule hasn't got? A mule has stubbornness, and we have seen that characteristic in human nature. I suppose we really must begin by saying that human nature differentiates us from animal nature; that as organisms, all are animals; but as civilized beings we achieve what is called human value. "Man", says Robert E. Park, "is not born human."

Human nature as the eternal scapegoat of all our ills, has staggered under the weight of many accusations. The clerics, the conservatives, the cynics, the evangelists, the tired reformers and the tired radicals - all have decided to lay the blame on human nature. On the other hand the Utopian, the social perfectionist, who sees something around the corner, whether it is prosperity or a new social order, and wants to realize it, bases his hopes on human nature. To him it is infinitely perfectable. I doubt that anybody has ever felt that human nature was infinitely good but many have felt that it is infinitely capable of being made better.

This discussion of human nature began so long ago in history that I doubt we can take time to go back and catch up with it. Aristotle, in criticising his great teacher, blamed human nature. "Politics," said Aristotle reproving the idealism of Plato's Republic, "Politics does not make men; it must take them as they come from the hands of nature." And then he proceeded to tell what kind of creatures men came from the hands of nature. Aristotle said one good thing of human nature though we may not take it as a compliment today. He said man is by nature a political animal, but I doubt that he used the term politics in the way we do today. He must have meant that man is by nature a social animal and capable of social and political development.

#### I.

What is human nature? Unless we can arrive at some agreement on that point we might as well stop discussing the question of changing human values. This question, of course, is always revolving around a second question: are our present social, economic, and political institutions necessary products of human nature? Two great questions that we ask most often are: (1) Is war a necessary consequence of human nature? (2) Is the profit system as we have it, an inevitable corollary of our human nature? These two examples are simply two ways of asking whether human nature is subject to modification.



The first thing we ought to try to clear up is this: suppose we do say that the term human nature should be limited to differences that are exhibited between the characteristics of human beings and the highest development permitted to the anthropoid apes of whom my colleague, Dr. Gabbard, spoke.

Until men come to agree on the nature of human nature they can have no common basis for the discussion of its modifiability. John Dewey has pointed out that four principal meanings have been read into the term human nature. First it is obvious that the term has been used to designate our original and native constitutions; that is, the instinctive and inborn equipment of man - original nature rather than acquired nature. An ambiguity is found here unless it is made clear whether the native constitution is common to all normal human beings, or whether it can vary from individual to individual, as in individual differences, or whether it varies from race to race. There are some who believe in racial differences which have to do with emotionality or temperament, and some extreme racialists would claim, with intelligence, whatever that is. Are these differences to be admitted into a general theory of human nature?

Human nature has also been defined in terms of alleged psychological powers or faculties. The psychological is then placed in antithesis to the physical or biological, and these faculties have been given names like perception, judgment, memory, and desire. Regarded as formal faculties, they are distinguished from what is perceived, or remembered and what is thought about and what is wished. This gives us a dualism which has made the whole concept of human nature extremely difficult to handle. This assumed dualism between human nature and other nature has such a respectable history in our philosophy and psychology until recently that it enters into practically all our common sense views and into practically all discussion without ever being avowed. This of course is one of the most dangerous things about it.

There is a third point of view. Human nature in itself has been said by some thinkers to be empty, formless and without particular structure. According to this view human nature reflects simply the environment. This is the tabula rasa of Locke, a blank wax tablet on which experience writes. Such a view would have men born without motivation, without impulse, but we could not carry it so far as to say that men are born without hunger and without thirst. Such impulses, however, are supposed to be cut off before they affect the mental life. Accordingly, if men are corrupt or prejudiced, it is simply because our institutions have formed men in their own image. This is a view dear to all reformers and idealists, and to all who hope to change this sorry scheme of things before tomorrow morning.

Now, there is a fourth view which holds that human nature cannot be properly defined in terms of the constitution of individuals as native or acquired. It can be known only through its great institutional products, through language, through religion, through economic systems, through laws, through the state and the state's practices, through the arts. As displayed in the individual it is merely potential. The potentialities of human nature are found in a plastic nervous system, many of whose connections are socially conditioned. Thus man may have what Allport calls "prepotent reflexes" but not instincts as

found among insects and lower animals. We still have to consider the question of motivation, of inborn appetites or impulses as we see them in a new-born infant. Here, of course, we haven't been able to decide in a new-born infant whether we see rage or fear in some of his behavior.

While none of these views seem adequate we must realize that the study of human nature is now subject to more objective considerations. This, as the previous speaker has pointed out, is due largely to the rise of a biology and a psychology based on an objective foundation, behaviorism. Such an approach discloses some of the questions which were hidden or implied in the old philosophy and centers psychology on new problems. Our knowledge about nature has also profited from the rise of a comparative science of culture. Anthropology and comparative sociology have been able to show that tremendous variations in culture systems can exist on the basis of, as far as we can tell, the same physical and biological structure. These cultural variations are seen not as having their origin in inborn biological differences, but in habits and attitudes formed in social interaction and handed down in the group tradition.

The relation between group culture and individual psychology can be made clearer by an example. It is the custom of the country and the rule of the road for us to drive to the right. If you went to England you would find the custom of the country and the law of the road is to drive to the left. It may very well be true that driving to the left is more efficient. Let us then suppose that our legislators talk it over and tomorrow pass a law saying that beginning day after tomorrow everybody now drives to the left. That would change the law. Theoretically, I suppose that action should change the custom of the country, but actually you and I know that ingrained in our nervous system is this tendency to drive to the right and we can predict that automobile accidents will mount to new high levels. What is custom in the group becomes habit in the individual, and habit is oftentimes what we really mean when we are talking about human nature. But habit is not built on sand, it is built on the core of a very plastic nervous system that integrates and holds these connections long after our reason tells us that we ought to drop these habits now and learn new ones. Moreover we have emotional habits, attitudes, complexes, and sentiments that are just as persistent as any manual habit. The customs of each generation are handed down as the habits and attitudes of the next generation.

As you see I started out very optimistically. Certainly we should be able to change human nature for human nature is not a fixed biological quality. It is the habits of individuals acquired in the group and engrossed on a fine highly plastic nervous system that go to make up our folk-ways, mores and beliefs. All you have to do accordingly is change the customs of the country, change folk-ways, mores and institutions and you will change human nature.

We are now back where we started. If I ask you where the customs of the country are situated, you would have to point to your spinal cord and upper brain. We have sentiments and emotions about these habits and thus they are tied up not only with the nervous system but with the glands. If some of the customs of your country are outraged in your presence, the stimulus will turn loose adrenalin in your blood stream, and you will get very emotional because somebody stepped on the flag.



That may be biological behavior but it is culturally conditioned. It serves to illustrate what we mean when we say that habit is second nature.

Such a view, it seems to me, does not make the task of modifying of human nature any easier. The determinism of biology is replaced by that of culture. Who is so strong that he can take a lever and lift the yoke of culture? Like Archimedes, where will he find the fulcrum by means of which he can get a purchase on our cultural complex? We have been so brought up inside the whole thing that we accept the most of it. We have argued that we can certainly change human nature, if we can change our institutions. But then we started out by asking the question: isn't it true that human nature isn't responsible for such institutions as war? And now we have the answer: if we can change the war system we can so change human nature that we won't have war. I am told that philosophers chase themselves around in circles. I don't claim to be a philosopher but the result in this case has been the same.

## II.

This brings us to a theory of social change, and we know of course what we rely upon to bring about social change. Once it was education, enlightenment and the power of human reason. Now we talk about cultural lag, about invention and discovery. We rely on invention and mechanics to change our social organization. We invent a steam engine and we have social change. This is felt in our institutions and in human nature. We invent an automobile and that changes our horse and buggy morals. In order to change human values we must, it seems, sit back and wait for mechanical inventions to happen. Of course they don't just happen because chemists, physicists, inventors and factory owners make them happen. The basic motivation of social change is thus largely economic. Most of us who have read Marx, Keller and Ogburn have felt that if invention pays on the balance sheet industry will put it in. It may do this or that to the community but that doesn't get on the balance sheet. The principle of social change accordingly is increasing mechanization; and it has led us to a strange situation in which we accept all the bounties of the machine, and then as philosophers sit down and abuse the machine because it is always making for social changes that thwart our human nature, when most of all we would like to get a little rest from social change.

This is one theory of social change and I submit it is about the most respectable theory we have. The theory in short is get out of the way of invention or adjust to it if you can. What adaptation to our artificial culture is to be expected from human nature? Some have discussed what they dramatically call the problem of the caveman in the modern city. Man has all these biological impulses, he has the adrenal glands emptying into his blood stream, all these conditional emotional reflexes, and is continually listening to the honk of automobile horns and jumping out of the way. Thus I might call your attention to a cotton speculator who has a fine emotional setup that would have served him well as a caveman. When he got scared as a caveman he could have run away and he would have felt fine at the end of the run, provided that he escaped the prehistoric animal. And when he got mad, he would have fought. If he had won the fight he would have felt fine, and

if he lost at least the emotional energy would have been drained off; and all in all he would have been a pretty healthy specimen. I doubt if he would have had what we call nervous indigestion. He might have gotten his head caved in, but he would not have been troubled by nervous indigestion.

Now, let's take our cotton speculator. He gets afraid of the market and he can't run. There is nowhere to run, nothing to run from. So he just gets so he can't sleep at night and can't digest his meals, and his wife finally says, "You may be making a lot of money but I can't live with such a creature." He gets mad with his competitors and cannot give them a poke in the jaw for he has to be polite and get along with them according to the code of the Better Business Bureau. Moreover cotton brokers like doctors and lawyers have developed a system of professional ethics whereby potential enemies can always remain friends on the surface.

A more tragic question has to do with the effect of war on human nature. Has war ever been a release for human nature? Modern warfare is a torment to human nature. It may be a release to the doughboy to get away from an ill-natured wife and to be relieved of economic drudgery. Some psychologists have made a good deal of that, but more have pointed out that the shellfire at the front is no release to the human nature as we know it. Certainly the development of new psychoses and neuroses like shellshock shows what modern warfare does to human nature.

### III.

Thus we return to our dilemma. We can change human nature, if we can change the system of institutions and culture under which human nature is developed.

Let us accordingly examine our culture for the sources of social change. There are, we all realize, divisions in every culture. In our civilization are found clashes of interests, clashes of groups, clashes of classes. Social conflict offers a source of social change as important as mechanical invention and discoveries. We don't believe the same thing about everything. There are groups down on the bottom that other groups may be sitting on, and they get a different view of the upper classes than the upper classes have of themselves. Anybody who has a shoe to pinch his foot has certain views about shoes, and social movements often start where the shoe pinches. Here we must have a leader, a man who is vociferous about shoe pinching.

There are other sources of change, then in our society besides mechanism, invention, and discovery. There are social movements, reform, and let me speak the dreaded word, there is revolution. Conflicting cultural interests and economic interests in any society are perfectly capable in the long run of slowly changing institutional systems and economic systems and in that way changing human nature itself. What the reactionary often comes to in his proposal to stop social change is to set up some arbitrary view of human nature. He says human nature is thus and so, you can't change human nature and thus you can't change the institutional system. To me this amounts to simply saying we can't change the system because we can't change the system.



The history of the concept of human nature down through the ages is practically the history of what people believed about their social systems. If they felt it was inadequate, they laid the blame on that scapegoat, human nature. Any economic institution or political system no matter how bad can be defended, if we are allowed to establish as a first premise our special view of human nature. That is the cat in the bag of every social theory. Who ever puts the cat in the bag to him belongs the trick. Accordingly we ought to examine carefully all assumptions about human nature. We ought to press more and more on the biologist, the anthropologist, and the psychologist to give us sound objective views of human nature, its basis, its capacities, its potentialities, what it can stand and what it cannot stand. The field of child psychology, the early learning of children, their conditioning to the social amenities is a most fruitful field for showing what human nature is and what human nature can do.

If human nature has a bad name, it at least has the name that people wanted to give it. If the perfectionists have been too fond of it, others have found it too easily used as a scapegoat. Human nature will have to be rescued from those who think too ill of it, as well from those who think too well of it. We now realize what human nature is developed in an institutional system; that cultural complexes change but slowly; that the only rapid methods of change are found where starters can be introduced in the cultural system; that these starters are often introduced by innovations, mechanical and otherwise; and that people are motivated to introduce such starters by the search for economic profit. But that is not the only, possibly not the best, source of social change. That this is not the best source is indicated when things work so badly for certain groups that they are hardly able to stand it. Under our democratic procedure this set up agitation because the agitators - and that is a good old phrase - do set up a howl when the shoe pinches. "This" they say, "has got to be changed so far as we are concerned because we can't endure it." The farmers have done this in the past as have many other groups. Other groups are going to continue to follow this pattern, and the only way we can stop it is to shut them up by force. We are committed in a democracy against that kind of procedure.

Human nature as exhibited in Germany and Russia indicates what happens under power by force. But there we have the feeling that certain groups must have been subjected at some time or other to such repression, such exploitation, that they lost certain characteristics that seem to us to be part of human nature; tolerance, ability to work with other groups. Thus has developed totalitarianism, which is an all or none philosophy. The leaders say, "Let us get in and make our change and there will be no more changes." Under the Nazi and the Communistic system, you don't have to win but one election - the election that puts you in. After that there are no more elections. Observe the way about which they set about to change human nature. The Hitler Youth movement, the Communistic Sunday-school, shall I call it, are doing tremendous things to the human nature of people coming on, things that possibly cannot be undone for generations. Yet biologically they are the same folks they always were. So the biological differences are not the great differences. Nobody really wants to make any changes that go against biology. No one wants to change the race so they can live without hunger or thirst or the social amenities.

"Can human nature be changed?" The answer it seems to me is: "Yes, if". In this answer the "if" looms as large as the affirmative. Human nature can be changed, if we can change the civilization and the system of social value in which all live. That is a difficult thing to do, but it has often been done. In some particulars, it may well be worth doing again.



## B A C K G R O U N D S

### THERE OUGHT TO BE A LAW ABOUT IT

E. G. Nourse

I have been interested this morning in seeing the way in which a biologist brought the learning of his particular field to the support of the view expressed many years ago, as Professor Vance mentioned, by a great philosopher to the effect that man is by nature a political animal or, as Professor Vance wanted to revise it, a social animal. I like particularly Professor Graubard's phrase that man is by nature a culture-making animal. There is to me nothing more intriguing in the whole field of the social sciences, buttressed wherever they can be by the natural sciences, nothing more intriguing than to see how this culture-making animal is working out his problems according to the pattern of the primates that Professor Graubard referred to. We keep monkeying around until the leaders hit on something, and then the rank and file ape the leaders until we get somewhere. But for those of us who think of ourselves as a little more self-conscious, a little more trained, a little more sophisticated in this field it is highly desirable to give consideration to the ways of thinking, the ways of acting, the techniques of the culture-making animal in trying first to discern certain worth while objectives for this social life into which we find ourselves catapulted without our own volition, and then working out devices by which we can develop and improve our culture, moving it toward those goals. That seems to me the keynote of human nature, man as a culture-making animal or, if we go back to the story of creation, man created in the image of God, God the creator, and man constantly attempting to create good things in this world.

With that as our keynote, I should like to pick up what Mr. Vance said as to whether we want to or can change human nature. That creative urge certainly is one basic element in human nature that we don't want to change. That is one thing we can bank on, this tremendous concern to find out what makes the world tick, to get some control based on knowledge. And that human quality, as shown in the first talk this morning, does run back very deep. I shan't go back as far as the biological explanation, but the fact that over the period of recorded history men have gone on studying and puzzling and experimenting and trying to make better institutions through which this human nature may function toward the best goals that we can discern, that seems to me the thing which is basic, and the thing which gives me a measure of hopefulness and optimism rather than a despairing outlook for our future.

In our program this morning, the first speaker sketched the biological background of human nature and of cultures. The second speaker discussed the question of human nature and the possibility of changing it. I want to begin the discussion which will be carried on tomorrow on the institutional aspects, the framework, the implementation which we are setting up through which, with such human nature as we have inherited from a long biological evolution, we may achieve something constructive, something creative.

I am not sure but that the form, the original rather than the amended form of the phrase that Dr. Vance used, may be quite satisfactory; man is by nature a political animal. Because the state is the

great basic institution conditioning practically all our other institutions, we very properly look to the state as an agency through which we create and improve culture. The wording of my topic suggests how we of human nature look to government to solve all the human problems in which we find ourselves immersed. There is a tendency which we often deprecate among Americans, when the shoe pinches to say, "Well, there ought to be a law about it." When the shoe pinches, we very definitely ought to reconsider the institutional framework that we have set up to see whether it does adequately implement our human activities, whether revision is indicated, not, as the phrase is very often used, make the appeal to regulatory law a means of transferring our difficulty or finding a scapegoat.

I wonder what the content of the phrase, "there ought to be a law" is in the mind of the average person who uses it. I suspect (and this is the more dangerous phase of that reaction of our current human nature) that there is quite a tendency, when confronted with difficulty, of saying government, the state, something outside ourselves, ought to do something. And there is a second implication, namely, that the law passed by the state should make other people behave. Then the third part of the idea, make them behave in a way that would be more comfortable to me. There I think is the spontaneous and superficial way that human nature expresses itself time and time again in that phrase, "there ought to be a law." An authority outside ourselves ought to do something to smooth our path or take the pinch out of our shoe (whichever way you want to put it) by making other people act in ways which will make a world which pleases me better, which is more comfortable to me as I am. That is what you might call the vulgar reaction of the individual in society, whose social institutions have government as rather a cap sheaf.

I am optimistic, however, because I believe I see signs that in these United States--thanks to broad popular education since the founding of the country--human nature, without being basically changed, is being guided by education. The masses of the people are being educated up to the point where they approach the problem of the creation of cultures, of the perfecting of their social institutions, with a much broader and much more constructive and much more helpful and permanent attitude. That is what I want to talk about this morning; the broad attitude by which men as a culture-creating, as an institution-improving, animal can go about his job, can develop the technique which will make the social process work out most desirably.

Now, when the shoe pinches and when he says there ought to be a law about it, a law which would take the pinch out of his shoe, or take the pebble out of his path, he is acting true to naive, naturalistic human nature, basic and unchanged human nature, his spontaneous demand of self-interest. Though I am optimistic as to human progress, I am not optimistic about our ever getting self-interest out of the behavior pattern or out of human nature. But there is self-interest and self-interest. The self-interest of the ruthless savage, we have passed in the main. Even biologically we start ahead of the position of complete self-interest, in which the normal individual sets himself and his comfort and his well-being above all others. We normally have a desire to protect and to benefit our own progeny, which is certainly biologically grounded, and even among primitive peoples we see a concern of self-interest which is not absolutely egocentric self-interest, which is just



me, myself alone, and to hell with the world, but of me myself within a culture pattern of taboos, sanctions, rewards, and all the rest.

Now the thing in which we are progressing, it seems to me, is in getting a picture of self-interest which goes not merely beyond the individual to those who are biologically so close to him as to make a family connection (however narrowly or widely it is defined or differently interpreted) to a larger emphasis on one's self-interest as getting the best life by living in the best possible society and by contributing himself to the making of that better society. A man functioning not alone, nor even in a small family group, but a man functioning as a truly social individual.

Here we come back to the questions that Mr. Vance touched on in the latter part of his talk with reference to forms of government, autocratic forms of government, aristocratic forms of government, democratic forms of government, communistic forms of government. In a sense the latter would seem to be the broadest concept of government, but when it becomes the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and you have repeated purges which narrow the basis of participation, it seems as though it belongs at the opposite end of the scale from the broad idealistic concept of common well-being. At all events, the way in which cultures are shaped, the way in which laws are based or decrees are made or controls are set up, which condition human conduct and determine how good a life we shall lead, they come out in different ways under these different patterns of government. The one that we want to consider is what we are pleased to call the democratic system.

Two questions are to be asked if we are talking about rule-making or law-passing or culture creation or the erection of institutions under a democratic way of life. The first one touches the general objectives, the second touches the techniques. If you are going to get a law, not a decree such as you might get under a benevolent despot, but a law under the democratic system, we say not merely, "they ought to pass a law about it," but rather "we should consider whether, through our government, we can make an approach to some better way of living together." What is the objective there? Ideally--and I talk primarily in terms of economic techniques and economic problems--ideally the objective to be approached runs in terms of such a definition as Adam Smith gave us, economics as concerned to achieve the wealth of the nation. I am going to hold in abeyance the question of internationalism, but he took a large unit as far as legislation is concerned. In spite of your awareness of repercussions on outside relations, you do think inevitably in national terms. Your nation is your society. And there your concern as a culture-making animal, with these pinching shoes, is to create a national economic system, national economic institutions, which will promote the wealth of the nation by enabling the whole population with its total resources to apply its labor to the maximum satisfaction of its wants, and using such techniques as we now have but promoting techniques for greater efficiency in the future. That is your broad ideal. Walton Hamilton used to talk about "the pure ideal and the spotted actuality." All right, let's come down from the pure ideal. The citizens of a democracy cannot be broadly informed as to what that national interest is. They cannot be economists, who would be able to give formal answers as to how that national welfare would be most fully promoted.

And so we must approach our larger ideal by a series of approximations. Above the individual, but short of the nation or the society, we have intermediate groups, solidarities, interest groups, industrial groups, and local groups. As a practical matter, it is through those smaller groupings that we have to put the individual in some kind of a working social harness so that he can function through his society, as expressed in government, toward improving his culture, toward expressing his wants, toward telling how and where and when the shoe pinches. We hear a great deal today about the shortcomings of government by groups and blocs, about the fact that this is something new in these United States. In fact, one of our own staff in an address over at Brookings in the spring made a remark about the New Deal in which he said, "Thus, for the first time, the government became the spokesman for interest groups rather than for the total welfare." Henry Wallace sat just behind me and he leaned over and said, "That is news to me. I thought that in the last few years we had been trying to get away from the point of view of government through special interest to a consideration of national welfare and comprehensive plans and programs for the advancement of national welfare, not for the first time, but at least much more broadly and much more adequately than ever before." I think anyone who knows Henry Wallace and M. L. Wilson and the outlook of the Department of Agriculture will sympathize with their rather irritated reaction to such a remark as had been made. Mr. Wallace has frequently put in the record clear statements as to the breadth of the national concern which he does have.

The thing which is bothering people, very likely, is the fact that some new techniques have been built up which make more obvious the machinery of group interest and group action. However, these changes broaden rather than narrow the size of the interest group which is coming to effective expression in the process of legislation. The "style of play" is frankly more open. It comes out where it can be seen and counted, and some people deprecate this sort of group or bloc or interest government. I am not a political scientist and yet as I observe the ways of working necessary to a democracy, it seems to me that you have to crystallize, you have to formalize, you have to organize numbers as large as 130 million people if you are going to get effective expression of opinion, effective participation, effective action. If that becomes a battle of tooth and claw, of blind unreason, pressure for self-interest regardless, then obviously you do have an unsatisfactory situation. But, on the other hand, you may have such interest or bloc or (if you want to call it that) class government, develop simply as the necessary basis of organizing the culture-making activities of enormous groups of people. Their thought and action may be infused by a broad and adequate view of objectives, a tolerant attitude, an expression of self-interest, not in terms of me and my group but the social whole.

My father used to tell me about a man who prayed, "God bless me and my wife, my son John and his wife, us four and no more, Amen." Now if you get beyond that attitude and say, "Let us try to bless ourselves as part of a progressive society, by bringing the legitimate claims of our interest groups, the problems of our interest group, into a conference, into an orderly governmental process in which every other interest group is represented and has a chance to be heard as to what its hopes and fears and aspirations are," then I think you have a scheme of democratic government which is effective. It at least has potential effectiveness. A societary organization is sound which seeks to make my life,



the life of my family, the life of my community good because each individual and group is participating in and finding its niche in a great social system whose welfare must be promoted en masse, that must have a balanced and orderly scheme of economic life to effect economic progress and economic welfare. In other words, I have the most prosperous life in an economic sense, the richest life, as part of the best United States that can be built; and to that building I, my group, my community, my industry, must make the largest participation. But they must "come clean," they must approach the problem of prosperity from this social point of view.

Now that is simply another way of saying some things that Mr. Wallace has said in various addresses and in various annual reports. It is the philosophy which he and the high command of the Department in general have often enunciated. There are those who say deeds speak louder than words, and after all, what you have really had is an awful mess, that there had been only lip service to a fine ideal. Obviously, there have been difficulties, but I don't believe that anyone who really knows that particular group could be so cynical as to say that theirs are mere words. They are gropings and aspirations toward an ideal which confessedly is imperfectly worked out as yet. But you must see the ideal, you must formulate it in words which can be transmitted to others if you are going to get your society marching along on the desired lines of societary development. That is the first great achievement.

I have been critical, my former colleague Joe Davis has been critical, of particular devices, particular experiments, particular methods, particular administration in the carrying out of the agricultural and general economic philosophy which has been enunciated. But I do believe that the general objective which has been stated is a sound objective. It is an objective which could and should be copied by other interests in the community. I wish industry would take advantage of the invitation for collaboration which is extended them--industry in the broad sense of both labor and management, the two parts of industry which haven't got together as yet to find out what their own solidarity of interest is. A great deal remains to be accomplished but it lies within the realm of possible accomplishment.

If all branches of economic life accept the ideal which has been enunciated with reference to our agricultural industry, they would have to explore different methods suited to the situations of those industries but looking toward a similar organization of these groups for the expression, through channels of government, of what they conceive to be their legitimate interests. Then all these groups should be brought around the council table for negotiation, because the way in which we work out a subject is not by formulating the program by one particular party and impressing that on the others. If I know anything about the process of social life, a group which starts with such a general interpretation of its program is almost certain to want to modify it when it has had an opportunity for honest-to-goodness discussion with other groups, when it has seen the results which would flow if they took the precise steps which at first they wanted to take, they thought they needed to take. In other words, we have gone so far beyond primitive life, we are living in so complex a society, that no individual and no group can really have in advance an adequate grasp of the new problems into which the new positive force injected by any new law or by any new

administrative ruling under a law will thrust them. Hence the way of maximum progress in a democracy is by giving opportunity for the best organization we can work out within interest groups of sufficient size so that they bring this enormous complexity of individual interests down to a certain limited number of strategically representative points, at which matters of policy can really be thrashed out on their merits in the light of integrated needs.

This brings us to the second phase of our subject--after the law is passed. The more that law is thought of as designed to promote the welfare of the whole people, the less can we feel that the passing of a law settles anything. Let us consider briefly this second shortcoming of the philosophy involved in the slogan, "There ought to be a law about it." When after great struggle we secure the passage of a law that embodies the best thought we have been able to give to a problem, we naturally feel that it is a pretty swell law. But how soon we begin to find "bugs" in it! John Gaus has shown the nature of this difficulty in his forthcoming study of public administration as exemplified in the Department of Agriculture. I take the liberty of quoting one paragraph from his manuscript.

"The extent of the government's activities in problems of land utilization reflect considerable activity by the Congress. Its authorizations for the different activities are to be found in a number of legislative enactments resulting from the extensive efforts of congressmen and interest groups. But nowhere, during the time most of this legislation was formulated, was there a comprehensive legislative plan to guide the lawmakers in fitting each special activity into a single whole. While there were not necessarily any serious inconsistencies in the laws, it is not surprising that as several of them converged at the farm serious inconsistencies developed. While one agency worked to improve the habitat of wildlife, another seeking to reduce fire hazards would remove the hollow logs in which local bear made their winter homes. One agency would develop a water project for wildfowl, while another drained a nearby lake in a campaign to control mosquitoes; and while one agency sought crop reduction, another reclaimed arid lands. Frequently, of course, these inconsistencies developed between projects of two different departments; but they also appeared far too frequently between projects of different agencies of one department, particularly the Department of Agriculture."

This passage serves to illustrate a phase of a difficulty which comes in any complex social situation such as we have to deal with. It is utterly impossible for the Department of Agriculture, for the Secretary, any official, any specialist, to see even agriculture, much less the interlockings of agriculture with all the rest of our economy, as a going whole. There results a vertical division of lines of effort which converge in the way Gaus has indicated here, which need reconciling, but which cannot be reconciled by the passing of a law, because the human mind simply cannot comprehend the total situation.

There is just one place where economic and social situations are seen as a whole and that is on the individual farm. The farmer sees the production and the marketing problems, pest control, household equipment, farm financing all together. He has his balance of values between wild fowl and mosquitoes, and all the parts of the total situation which is



centered on his business as a going concern, on his house and family as the domestic or human unit. And that is why I think it is absolutely indispensable that we develop techniques--as the Department has been doing for many years--by which that individual point of view shall be made one of the great poles of this effort toward perfecting our social institutions. You have your common denominator in the family group, in the individual farm business. The local farm proprietor goes on seeing his situation as a whole. He meets with his local group, who have a degree of solidarity there in the local community, and he begins to adjust the management of his farm to the community unit. The county unit widens its horizon of thought to include the state or region. And so on through to the other pole of democratic organization in Washington.

There is no point, I think, at which you can stop that process of synthesizing your culture-making or institution-modifying activities of the human family until you come to the very top. While this individual approach in terms of the going concern, in terms of the family living, its family life, has the advantage of unity, it gets only a cross-section, it still is hopelessly inadequate in its provincial viewpoint. That would work out as the best compromise, the best adjustment for the individual farmer, is not the answer that the community will work out once it gets together, and to which that individual will adopt and adjust his own pattern of life from then on if he accepts it, if he participates and accepts.

Starting with the individual unit, which has a real inherent unity, you must plan a scheme of organization which goes through successive levels until it comes to comprehend the wide horizon of the nation's agriculture. Beyond that, if we are to have, as I think we must have in democratic government, a system of adjustment among interest groups, then such unity as agriculture has, such unified policy expressions of interest as it provisionally adopts, looking at its own problem from the grass roots up, must be developed, must be adjusted to those of other interests through the interchange between interest groups, between Departments, between industries, whoever may be concerned.

One other point, and my last. If we are going to give Mr. Hitler the lie, if we are going to show not only that we believe in democracy but that we can make it work, the people who participate actively in the framing of policies and the shaping of institutions must, so far as possible, bridge the gap between large objective and personal desire by a basically sound understanding of the nature of the social process-- a few fundamentals of economics, since I am talking primarily of the economic side of life. Their thinking and planning and democratic organization of activity must be infused with a sense of the meaning of science, natural and social.

Now how are you going to get it? That is one of the most challenging questions which is put up to us in working out these techniques. One thing: you can't get it from the savants, from the laboratories, from the research institutions, from your centralized staff in Washington. You can get part of it there, you can get leadership, you can get one approach which is absolutely indispensable. But if you believe as I do in the necessity of following empirical methods in the development of the social sciences, then you must agree that the savant, the top-flight

researcher, can't do his generalizing soundly unless he fits the largest possible amount of this comprehensive sort of material, of going institutions over the country, into the formulation of his principles or hypotheses. The Department has recently undertaken a very interesting development in trying to follow through to see why the words of the scientist are adopted by some farmers in some situations and why in others they are not. One answer they will probably discover is that some of those generalizations have been made without sufficient knowledge of the situations into which they were supposed to fit. I suspect that we shall have better science as we get more of this sort of approach from the individual enterprise in its operating reality, as we get more of these data and our analyses include the facts of rejection and the claims of inapplicability--as we get these materials back to the scientist. The scientific process is a two-way street.

Now you can't expect that your man on the farm is going to be an economist or a scientist in any field. You cannot expect that he will do the generalizing. But it is he who attempts to apply the generalization, and he has his own explanation as to whether it fits, whether it works. Probably he can't give the explanation of why it doesn't work--though sometimes he can. Often he will give the clue as to why it doesn't work, why it needs to be put through a different method of application, or why the general method perhaps needs to be re-formulated.

We need to emphasize the fact that there are here many successive planes of performance; the contribution of raw data at the very bottom, the suggestion of tentative and perhaps very naive and crude generalizations in your local group, the passing on and on and on until you get to the top level of the scheme of research, of science building, where you do the broadest generalization that is possible.

And so it seems to me that in the sort of culture which we are evolving in agriculture, we must be mindful of the needs and the realities of the scientific process as applied in the social sciences--I am talking from that side primarily--but in the natural as well. We have here an educational system which meets the basic needs, which provides the elements of a sound technique for developing the kind of culture which can visualize for all parts of the system the wider horizons and can put them to work on their different levels in developing real knowledge, real understanding. Now because I am talking of the constructive element, you may think I paint the lily. I see plenty of shortcomings, but I venture to say that the system as already worked out in agriculture holds in it the possibilities of answering in its broadest meaning this demand, there ought to be a law. Government should be so organized as to serve its citizens better and so implemented that our total resources are fitted together toward a goal of common well-being, or at least get the closest approximation of a fit that is possible.

We have made more progress toward developing such institutions in agriculture than in any other division of our society. But is there not an equal demand in the field of industrial labor that the man at the bench have an opportunity to express his outlook, to tell where the shoe pinches him, to express as never before his hopes and fears and aspirations? And then there should be that other stream coming back, which would afford discussion of the workability of the ideas he would like to carry out. It would discuss what a rate which "prices you out of the

market" means to the man at the bench. In such an educational process economists in the labor field, executives in the labor field, trade organizations in that field, would really thrash out their common problem and approach tenable answers as they are being approached by groups like this in Washington or in the wide-flung group meetings of agriculture over the country, starting with the rank and file, converging at strategic points on all levels up to the one in which the wisdom of a group can be brought to bear on the solving of the total national problem.



# THE PLACE OF GOVERNMENT IN MODERN SOCIETY

## INDIVIDUALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CONTROL Rupert E. Vance

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: There is no denying that we are the unhappy children of unhappy times. Our generation is caught between two World Wars, in a period punctuated by a world-wide depression which has not yet lifted. We have paid for neither the war nor the depression nor have we saved up any reserve to see us through the next depression. We live in a period between a war to make the world safe for democracy and another war in which we are trying to make democracy safe from the rest of the world. This represents a retreat. It represents not only a retreat, in the minds of some people, it represents contradiction, possibly an impossibility. The problem is internal and external. Here are the people outside our system who are to watch us succeed and are to admire our prosperity. Suppose we do go forward while they fail. They will envy us, they will hate us, they may take what they can, if they can. America's success in a despairing world may not be the pleasant prospect that some isolationists picture. The problem is also internal. Can we make democracy work inside our country if we didn't have these external intrusive factors of a world gone mad? Now we have no right to be too sure about that.

Any discussion of individualism, democracy and social control in America may well begin with those basic guarantees found in our historic documents - the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. In the Declaration of Independence are found the basic guarantees of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Of these three I must admit that the pursuit of happiness intrigues me most. It is that phrase I want to consider in relation to our topics, individualism, democracy and social control.

Happiness, of course, is found in the satisfaction of normal and natural desires, and in the fearful and chaotic world of today, happiness to men who are unemployed, to men who are fighting, to men who fear war, must seem far, too far away. What has happened to the pursuit of happiness? Somewhere, somehow we have failed to organize the pursuit of happiness. And if we ever do organize it we must take into consideration two sets of facts, the basic forces in human nature and their counterparts, the basic values in human institutions. We must get those two interrelated so that they function together. In a harmonious world we would recognize them for what they are, the reverse sides of the same thing.

One cannot talk along this line very long without developing a psychological point of view. Lester F. Ward in considering this problem saw the forces that make society move resting in the nature of man, and held that we might as well call such forces desires, wishes, or wants. Nowadays we also call them interests. The forces that move society then are the desires of men. Here are the dynamics, I suppose, that make the wheels go around: and if we could remove those desires we would put out the fires in the furnace, and thus could all sit perfectly content. There is a philosophy of that type whose goal is to reach Nirvana. Desire then is dynamic and maybe here is an analysis of self-interest that

does not get in the economics texts. Maybe we can broaden the term self-interest by taking in all these natural normal desires. In discussing the pursuit of happiness, let us not be hedonistic, but pragmatic enough to define happiness as the satisfaction of normal, natural desires in organized social life. Also we must allow variations unless we are going to force the artist to enjoy being a businessman.

But if man is a creature of desire, he also has in his nature intellect or reason. And suppose we say that intellect is telic--that is, intellect guides. Then he pointed out in the course of evolution desire tends to be blind. We know what we want but we don't see where we are going, and that explains the tooth and claw theory of evolution. Desire is the propeller that moves men in social activity while intellect is the rudder.

Now one reason why the search for happiness must be organized is that desires themselves are not furnished fully perfected and finished from the hands of nature. Human desires are nurtured and cherished, guided, directed, and redirected by societies, institutions, and organizations. They can be perverted and misdirected by a bad society. Curiosity may be an ignoble urge. We think it is in the village gossip, but it can be developed by our human nature and by our social institutions into the scientist's gleaming passion for truth, a thing that drives him even beyond hunger and material reward. Men in the natural search for food, for clothing, for shelter, for love, may be driven by bad social condition to unnatural adjustments. Freud has lifted the lid on that. I have often thought if we could get inside Nazi Germany and see men who have to pay lip service to things in which they do not believe, what neuroses and psychoses we might find. Men thwarted in their natural desires are driven to abnormal adjustments and to crime. When we think of our youth, we know that if their adjustments to family life, to jobs, to community relations are long delayed, that human resources are bound to deteriorate. We could have on our hands if we didn't take care--and I hope we are taking care--another lost generation.

If feelings, if desires fundamentally dictated all our activity, society would be involved in a constant struggle of conflicting human wishes and interest without any prospect of arriving at a harmony except through force. Ultimately self-destruction would ensue through the emphasis on pleasure to the neglect of order and safety. Hence comes the function of human intelligence in perceiving ways and means of attaining social goals. It shows the advantage of individual self-restraint, which is often a painful thing and the advantage of social cooperation, which has its joys once it is learned. Social cooperation under the interplay of reason works out restraints, regulations, folkways, mores, customs, law, even ideals, principles that guide the energy of our feelings and desires into higher emotions and ambitions. They help us to transform individual desires into desires for the common welfare of a common society in which there should be no negation of normal individual desires. Hence the individuals in society come to seek satisfaction for more desires than just the physical desires for food, shelter and a mate. They come to seek satisfactions for desires for moral standards, esthetic ideals, intellectual truths, religious aspirations. In so doing, men have passed from a mere physical level to a cultural and social level without denying any of the realities of physical existence. I think we must come to feel with the most sane and clear-headed of our

philosophers that everything natural has its ideal extension and everything ideal has its basis in nature.

As intellect and reason then come to gain a larger place, it becomes able to formulate ideals, values, which men desire not only for their individual guidance and self-development but for the guidance of all society. Could we hope then that society might finally pass out of the stage of conflict into a stage of collective planning, where it deliberately plans out a future in terms of certain values which men accept as basic to individuals and basic to groups in which individuals will have to continue to live. This it does, by formulating for itself a goal for the social energy that is found in feelings and desires. It then should ascertain the best method of attaining this goal and guide the activity of those social forces, human wishes and human desires, in that direction. Now such a theory allows for the individual and allows for social control. It will continue to say, it seems to me, that that social control is best which is felt the least, and it is felt the least when men are satisfying their normal natural desires in the normal interplay of social cooperation, competition and adjustment. It will allow for the fact that there are going to be divergences and thwarted, ruined souls that we will have to repress by force and put in the madhouses and in the penitentiaries. I think it would say that with the gradually evolving society those poor victims will become less and less.

Now then, this demands a great deal of any society. It demands talent, it demands genius, it demands leadership, it demands that some men will best satisfy their desires by working for common goals. There is not only the question of training of intellect but of training the feelings. We must believe then, if we believe in anything, in the talent-releasing power of good institutions, of good society, and good environment. Undoubtedly, the capacities of the human spirit are great. Society can awaken in most of its members desires for the good, the true, and the beautiful that are not necessarily inherent in just plain biological structure and original nature.

If the problem of our day is organizing the pursuit of happiness, it is basically one of developing and satisfying human desires by the use of collective intelligence in planning and guiding the development of our integrated society. Ward was fond of pointing out in answering Herbert Spencer that intellectual achievement is so much more rapid than biological change found in nature. It must require millions of years of evolution to produce fundamental changes in organic structure, morphology of organisms by natural selection. The geologists are always asking us for more time. They just keep pushing it back and we give it to them because they take it off the other end where it doesn't mean much to us. But social inventions, intellectual structure, new organizations, innovations, and plans are of comparatively mushroom growth. Every new invention, as it is so often pointed out, breeds a host of younger and new ones.

I am not going to plead for a moratorium on mechanical invention, but I would be willing to say that it is time for social invention to catch up with mechanical invention. If mechanical inventions continue and social invention doesn't increase its speed, we will never close the gaps. I am perfectly willing to sit down with anybody who has the time and reexamine some of our theories of efficiency, if we have to do it.



I know that efficiency is a method for satisfying human desires, of providing more goods and service. We must learn to plan and invent for social guidance as we have learned in the field of mechanics and applied science. And our planning is going to have to be social, economic as well as technical.

One can't talk long in this strain until he comes to the problem of education. Everywhere, in all classes of society, exists latent genius, genius that can do more than serve itself, genius that can serve humanity, that can serve in this organized search for human happiness. It is the business of the state, of the collectivity of democracy, plagued or challenged with the problem of individualism, individual interests and wishes and desires, to reach out and release and develop these capacities in all its members.

The aristocracy of the future in our democracy will be, let us hope, an aristocracy of talent, an aristocracy of intelligence, a true sociocracy Ward called it, devoted to increasing the well-being of the human race. Ward worked out some theories of how education was going to help this to come about. Social progress, he contended is the direct route to human happiness. Dynamic action is the direct means to social progress. The direct means to dynamic action is dynamic opinion. The direct means, to dynamic opinion is knowledge, actual knowledge, not stereotypes and hearsay. The spread then of valid and useful knowledge to all men in proportion to their capacities, Ward held, is the direct means of creating dynamic opinion and thus of leading on to progress. We will have to agree that the family, our educational institutions, the points at which community impinges on the individual must not only train men's intellect, they must guide their wishes and desires. Nobody knows the amount of latent talent and genius hidden in any society. No society has ever made a concerted effort to find it and develop it. No country has ever developed an adequate system of education. Most of us possibly would not even know how to lay down the guiding principle for such a system. I for one should hate to have to try it, but all must feel that the goal of our educational and social process, should be the creation of men of good will and the development of intelligence in men. In the first we would seek to train and retrain individual desires until they become also wishes for the common good. In the second, we would seek to train the natural intelligence of men until it becomes capable of planning for the on-going of society.

The pursuit of happiness must be organized or we will never find it. We have the intellect, actual and potential. We have desires and wishes that trouble us as individuals, that lead to conflicts of interest groups and of national groups. Somewhere we are going to have to learn how to structure, organize, and functionally interrelate interest groups and national groups. Their clashes thwart our poor human nature and place on our institutions an intolerable burden. Unless we can apply our collective intelligence to the guidance of society, all our boasted achievements in the purely mechanical and physical fields will be like the paths of glory that lead but to the grave.

The pursuit of happiness must be so organized that society can bring its achievement within the range of every capable individual. When our desires are finally disciplined, humanized and socialized so that together we desire the common goals of our general welfare, when we

can call in the collective intelligence of our society, pool it in social guidance, then society will be organized for the pursuit of that elusive thing we call happiness and then perhaps it may not matter so much whether we catch the bluebird or not, for with desires so socialized to the common good, with intelligence so keen, we then can endure some disappointments and some failures.

THE PLACE OF GOVERNMENT IN  
MODERN SOCIETY

ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY  
Lloyd M. Short

Dr. Gray, ladies and gentlemen: I presume that it is the function of the second in a series of three lectures to furnish a quiet, soothing interlude between a stimulating introduction and a challenging conclusion. In trying to carry out that function, I hope that this does not prove too dull. In keeping, at any rate, with that function, I choose a very simple and obviously not original thesis. My thesis is that administrative officials and agencies in a democracy must be made accountable either to the people directly or through their elected representatives, both legislative and executive, for the efficient and faithful performance of the tasks assigned to them and for the lawful exercise of the powers that are given them to implement the performance of these tasks. I say that is a simple thesis and one with which I feel confident we are all agreed. The question is then legitimately raised, why discuss the obvious? The answer I would give to such a question is this: because, in the first place, in our modern democratic state, administration has become vitally important for the human welfare, and secondly, because it has become increasingly difficult to achieve the tasks assigned to public administration and at the same time preserve this accountability. As an addition to that second point we may note that those methods by which our democracy has in the past sought to make administration accountable have become increasingly ineffective. Together I think these reasons are adequate, at least they seem so to me, to justify us in devoting this period to the discussion of the thesis previously enumerated.

You will observe of course that I am making one assumption, namely, that we here are interested, vitally interested, in carrying on administration in a democratic fashion. We are in that respect like Pat with his proverbial political interest, who, when taken to the hospital after suffering an accident and being asked by the interne whether he wanted to be placed in a three-bed ward or an eight-bed ward, replied, "Any of them, doc, just so it is safely Democratic." We, I think, start out with the assumption that must be administration "in a democracy." Well, let us pursue these two reasons which I have offered to justify this discussion. First, as to the vital importance of administration in a democracy. One writer has put it this way: the competence of administration sets the limits of popular rule and democratic effectiveness. Put a little differently, as I would understand it, this means that in our present society, men and women find the pursuit of happiness, this search for the common welfare, increasingly through their collective rather than through their individual activities. Oftentimes that is true whether we will or no. We have to an increasing extent lost the opportunity to achieve happiness by virtue of our own individual efforts. I need not labor that point, it is so obvious. But that means that if we turn increasingly to collective action to satisfy our needs, our wants, our desires, we have to have an instrument, we require an organization, and that means clothing that instrument, that organization, with authority, with power, and the assignment to it of tasks which we have, willy-nilly, given up from the realm of individual performance. When we have done that we then deposit our welfare in the



hands of others, and one of the goals of course of a democratic society properly is that, granted the necessity of such delegation, we have ways and means by which we can hold those to whom we have delegated power responsible, we can keep them under control, always insisting that the organization, the machinery, is not an end but merely a means and that that end must be kept subject to those whom it is designed to serve.

The second reason which I offer for discussion of this topic is that the achievement of this accountability has become increasingly difficult as we have constantly enlarged the scope of administrative action and administrative power. It seems almost paradoxical and yet the truth of it confronts us unmistakably. Why increasingly difficult? May I point out a few answers to that question? First, there is the mere fact of size of our public administrative organization these days.

To one who casually visits this capital city from the wide open spaces of Minnesota, this fact is impressed upon him just by virtue of constant accretions of the housing facilities of administration here, and as a student of government I have constantly to remind myself that with all this panoply of physical property, that Washington here is after all only a small part of the total national administrative system, and that the national administration is after all only a part of the total governmental organization in the United States, which we have developed and which we are constantly enlarging in order to satisfy our wants through collective action. And that size, I said, in itself means that keeping it accountable becomes increasingly difficult.

We have virtually given up in most of the governmental units of the United States direct popular control because we have found it impossible, and when we turn to our elected legislative and executive representatives, we find them bewildered, often impotent to exercise the controls which they have the power to exercise and which it is their responsibility to exercise.

In occasional visits to this city and in informal personal conferences with men and women like yourselves, I have become increasingly aware of the fact that you understand the limits of congressional and executive control. You sense that very frequently it is blundering, it is opportunistic, it is political in the narrower sense of that term. That it is not, on the contrary, steady, continuing, thoroughgoing, and if for the moment you forget your official capacity and think of yourself as a citizen of this democracy, it must concern you that such is the case. Again, there is the obvious fact that the tasks of administration have in so many instances grown beyond the comprehension and the knowledge of the layman, and our elected representatives, as well as our people, are, by and large laymen, and many and many a citizen of my acquaintance and yours approaches his government, looks at his government with increasing bewilderment, because he realizes that the tasks which his government is performing are beyond his ken, not in their end objectives but in the methods by which those objectives are to be achieved. And he says, "How am I to raise the question as to whether this administrative procedure is calculated to serve the public interest? If I challenge it I am immediately swamped by the arguments of the technician, of the expert." Again, and many times against our best judgment, at least against our wish, we have been forced by the necessities of the tasks which we have charged to our administration, to enlarge the discretion of the administrative offices and agencies charged with their

performance. We have done that oftentimes feeling that there was real peril in doing so, and yet this impelling motive to get things done, to see things performed and achieved, has led us to enlarge that area of discretion.

It is still of course quite possible for a political speechmaker to arouse the feelings of his audience when he lets loose a tirade against the increasing influence of the bureaucracy in the formulation, in the making of governmental policies, and yet while that is true, at the very time that he is making the statement the elected representatives of the people in some legislative body assembled are delegating such powers to an administrative agency. Another writer has put it that the paradox of our present day is that the democracy we have thought of as involving a maximum of popular participation and certainly effective control of policy-making in government, nevertheless is relying increasingly upon a huge bureaucracy. How else can we develop the plans and policies which, to the thinking person, obviously are necessary in order to achieve the major objectives which we set before our government? Governmental planning these days can't be done by the amateur, it can't be done by the layman. He can contribute something to it, but he needs the assistance of those who are devoting their entire time and thought and training and experience to the task. But Mr. Average Citizen, if you please, is worried. He sees a more or less distant administrator determining matters which he considers vital to his welfare, and he feels impotent to guide or mold them in any effective way.

Finally, we may note that on the executive side to which branch of our government obviously we have been turning for aid in this direction, our elected executive officers oftentimes do not bring special administrative competence or knowledge, and when they do have it and do take an interest in administration rather than merely in the tasks of a political leader, they find themselves lacking the tools, the aids, which are required. Let's be frank here, and admit that oftentimes the administrative agencies certainly do not aid and frequently hinder the achievement of effective aids to executive control. I am not questioning motives, I am merely stating what are to you obvious facts. Well, those are to me reasons why keeping administration accountable in a democracy, making it accountable, is an increasingly difficult task. We might proceed from here to note the *offenda* which I mentioned, namely, that older accepted methods of control are losing their effectiveness. I have touched upon that as we have proceeded, but may I pay especial attention now to control through the courts, by which we have placed special store in our American democracy? What observations do we make there?

First, we see individual members of the bar, and collectively the American Bar Association and other law groups, expressing concern that the courts by virtue of the caliber of our legislation and by virtue of the character of the administrative tasks that such legislation imposes and the powers given to administration agencies, are losing much of their control. But there is another factor which I think is even more important and which is increasingly recognized I believe by members of the judiciary, namely, that the older conception of judicial control as designed to keep administrative action within rather definitely prescribed limits is at variance with the modern democratic desire for action, for getting things done. It is again the paradox of concern about



the exercise of power yet impatience until things are achieved. And the courts can come in only so often to say, "No, you can't do this, or you can't do it in this way." That is negative, although important. And may I throw in here the statement that in this discussion I am not for one moment proposing that democracy give over these older traditional forms of control over its administration. They must be preserved, they must be strengthened, but what I am saying or trying to say is that they are not enough.

Well, getting on toward our conclusion, what can we do about it? Is there any additional--notice I am putting it that way rather than as a substitute--is there any additional control which we can develop which will keep pace with a growing administrative area of operation in our democracy? My answer and again certainly not an original one, is that the additional control we must look for within the administration itself. As uncertain as many people feel that to be, as lacking that legal definiteness with which we have always been accustomed to want in a democracy where we have put store upon government by law and not government by men, though obviously we have never followed that principle completely, we must increasingly look to folks like you who are the possessors of this administrative power and responsibility to develop within your own organization and within your own selves that devotion to democracy which will not let you exercise power or perform tasks without ever asking the question how can I to an increasing extent keep these within the public interest as nearly as I can discover that interest? If it was once the primary task of the legislative body to find out what the people want, it is now your task as much if not more than theirs. You must, it seems to me, be jealous of the privilege of functioning as a bureaucrat in the best sense of that term, as a bureaucrat in a democracy. You know better than I the ways by which this may be done. In your own department I am vaguely aware, at any rate, of the extent to which you have tried to bring in your constituency for purposes of conference and consultation and to challenge your purposes and objectives and procedures. May I remark that, what again perhaps is obvious, there is a danger always, that such democratic consent will be engineered, will be controlled by the administration rather than the administration will be controlled by the conferees, by the advisers, by the members of the councils and committees, and so on. We don't want packed houses here, ladies and gentlemen, we want open, frank discussion of all sides of the question of administrative policy and procedure. I have great hopes that that is not too much to expect from our administration at all levels, national, state, and local.

The development of such a sense of professional obligation is obviously implemented as we as a people have come to recognize government service as an estimable occupation and one that calls for the best of talent that our nation affords. And let's make no mistake, if our people come to feel that permanency of tenure, a relatively slow movement among government personnel, is making a smug, self-satisfied, arrogant bureaucracy, if they don't come to that realization too late, they will throw it overboard and with a vengeance. But I don't feel that that will be necessary. I think we have the intelligence and we have the devotion to democracy within the ranks of our government personnel so that we can match this ever-growing sphere of power and operation on the part of the administration with devices calculated to keep administration in touch with and responsive to the public will. We are reminded constantly these days, that the turn of events in our world has



placed upon us a special responsibility for the preservation of a great political ideal, the democratic principle, and I leave with you this morning the thought that perhaps far more than you have in your day-to-day tasks realized, the preservation and the perfection of that ideal rests, not on Capitol Hill, not in the White House, but in the rank and file of the great administrative departments and agencies which go to make up this government.

THE PLACE OF GOVERNMENT IN  
MODERN SOCIETY

PROBLEMS IN CONTINUING A PROGRAM OF AGRICULTURAL  
ADJUSTMENT

Joseph S. Davis

Mr. Chairman, other old friends in the Bureau, strangers who I wish were at least acquaintances, and enemies if any of you count yourselves in that category:

I can't approach this challenging task at all lightly. Bringing you greetings all the way from the Pacific coast, it seems that I ought to have an important message, not merely to justify your presence here for an hour or less, but to justify my coming across the continent and taking the time that it involves. Yet I found myself unable to make the usual advance preparation. I haven't been in Washington for nearly two years. I couldn't really get the feel of the situation until I spent yesterday and this morning here. And while I have a great many things that I think might be appropriate to say, I have had great difficulty in selecting which to say and in figuring out how to say them right. The subject brings us down not merely to earth but to the brass tacks that we sometimes talk about, and I am afraid that I shall be landing on them point up instead of pressing them firmly down where they belong.

Dr. Nourse spoke yesterday on objectives vs. techniques. I am inclined at the outset to distinguish rather three levels: broad objectives, intermediate objectives, and techniques or procedures employed. As to the broad objectives and the spirit behind them, I think I agree with Dr. Nourse in taking off my hat to the administration and in endorsing most of these basic objectives. When it comes, however, to both the intermediate objectives and the techniques or procedures, it seems to me that there is great need for discriminating, critical consideration both within the administration and from outsiders like myself. And some of those intermediate objectives and techniques I shall hope to touch upon before the end of the hour.

Perhaps at the outset I should make clear my general attitude in certain respects. I have known the Bureau of Agricultural Economics -- shall I say -- even before it was born. I have taken great pride in its growing achievements, and I have had a high respect for its increasingly competent personnel. I have a deep sympathy with the Bureau in connection with its present problems, as I shall indicate shortly. As to the more questioning, skeptical, or critical phases of what I have to say, I want to assure you that these observations are offered in a most cordial spirit of good will toward men. The pursuit of happiness is a devious road, and I think that even discussions which sometimes become painful are necessary along that road.

The topic originally suggested for me this morning was "The Problem of Continuing a Program of Agricultural Adjustment." In the weeks before the ever-normal granary plan was formally announced as a settled policy, some of the Department's staff members asked for a conference on the advisability of applying it to wheat. The answer came back that if they wanted to confer on how to apply it to wheat, arrangements would be

made, but that there was no occasion for any conference on whether it should be applied to wheat. Your present leaders, I take it, would be equally cold to a discussion of whether a program of agricultural adjustment should be continued, either by you or before you; and I do not propose to discuss that. It was at my suggestion, therefore, that the topic was rephrased as "Problems in Continuing a Program of Agricultural Adjustment."

Perhaps it is not too informal if I suggest that your situation is something like this: We have this huge child -- the adjustment problem, and the complicated administration for dealing with it -- this huge child on our hands. Perhaps he is suffering from gigantism or elephantiasis, or whatever they call it, but we can't kill him or banish him even if we wanted to do so. We have to live with him, even if in many ways life might be simpler without him. He is making all sorts of difficult troubles for us, of course, but on the whole we like him and think he has promise. What can we do to bring him up in the way he should go?

I take it that I am to speak to you in your capacity as an agency for program planning and building. This is now one of the Bureau's functions. As nearly as I can gather, the Bureau has not yet fully digested the reorganization that was declared effective a year ago. Declarations of effectiveness don't necessarily mean all that the term implies. I don't wonder. It will take time. I hope it will not prove that the new function of program planning and building is incompatible with the older function of research, information, and purely technical regulation which the Bureau has been increasingly discharging for 15 to 20 years. On this I am not yet sure.

Of some things I am sure. First, the addition of the planning function renders it even more essential that the earlier type of work of the Bureau continue to be done effectively, honestly, objectively. Its quality must not suffer. Some of it, indeed, must even be improved if it is to serve as a safe basis for planned programs. Because of some remarks I want later to make, I turn aside for an illustration of this point. In The Agricultural Situation for September I noted these paragraphs having to do with the index of prices paid by farmers, which is utilized in arriving at parity prices:

"In 1939", the statement read, "prices for about 330 items are being estimated on a basis of replies received from more than 20,000 independent merchants in all states and more than 75 percent of all counties. Returns also are obtained from chain stores, mail-order houses, and cooperative buying associations where the timing of price changes, and the actual level of prices paid often differ from those in independent stores.

"The series of estimates used in the construction of prices-paid indexes, however, continues to be based on quotations for cash transactions at local independent stores. Until facilities are provided for the computation of comparable averages of prices of articles purchased by farmers from all types of retail outlets back to pre-war years, the index number series cannot be



shifted to an over-all local market price average basis."

I hadn't known that before. I think it is safe to say that in the 25 years since 1914 there has been an important diminution in the proportion of goods that farmers buy from their local independent cash stores, and a considerable increase in the proportion purchased through these other channels; and in considerable measure the prices actually paid to these other agencies I should expect to be rather lower than at the local independent cash stores. Here is an intimation--an intimation that may have been given before but that had not come to my attention--that at this point the index of prices paid is biased for lack of certain additional information, and that if we had adequate data or could make allowance appropriate to the situation, our series of parity prices would be quite different, or more or less different -- how much different I don't know -- from what they are today. I submit that here is an illustration of ways in which the research of the Bureau needs to be perfected if it is to be safely used in connection with planning and action programs.

Another thing I feel sure of. The specific planning that leads to action calls for additional research, to some extent of a different type of level, perhaps to be done by persons specially selected for that type of research, where the interest is not merely in truth for its own sake but for a workable set of facts and figures that can be used in connection with action programs. This type of research also needs to be done objectively and honestly, and not to be warped by the wishful thinking of Congressmen, farm leaders, or even the Secretary or the Chief of the Bureau, and not to be warped by the terms of the current law which is subject to change. Let the warping be done, if it has got to be done, by the publicity men; and may you cultivate the art of tactfully pointing out to them their errors when they make them. You may think it superfluous as well as insulting for me to say this. I think it is not superfluous and I hope it will not be regarded as insulting.

Third, there is great need for intensive study of a very fundamental sort, of the type imperfectly suggested by the previous discussions at this conference, into the assumptions underlying the legislation in force or the programs in progress of execution. Can human nature be changed to the extent implied in the law and its administration? Is the change inherently desirable? What are the prospective costs? Is the end or are the ends worth the cost? More specifically, is there a valid basis for these intermediate objectives of parity prices and income parity for agriculture? These are suggestive questions, but I think that often in the array of administrative research programs too little space is given for study of this fundamental sort; too much it is assumed that one may take either the wording of the law or the fiat of the higher-ups, and merely proceed as technicians on that basis. For many of you that is inevitable. For some of you there ought to be ample opportunity for the more fundamental sort of research, of the type I have just mentioned.

Fourth, I believe there is need for a type of research underlying the planning for future emergencies. Great depressions will come again. We may say that we are not out of the last or present great depression; and yet the contrast between the situation of today and that of six years ago is marked and striking, even by the admissions of our highest

political leaders. We are not, as we were then, in the depths of a great depression. We probably shall be again. What agricultural measures shall we have prepared to cope with those extreme difficulties when they come upon us again? The new great war will end with conditions that we shall have to meet. How shall we prepare to meet those conditions? If the present war is prolonged, problems quite different from those at its outbreak will presumably be at hand to be faced. Can we not make some advance progress in thinking through how to deal with those possibilities? I believe that it can be clearly proved that a part of the staff of this great Bureau should be relatively relieved of pressing current tasks to devote themselves to some of these more distant and yet important objectives.

So much by way of preliminaries.

I want next to inquire what attitude toward the task of adjustment, in its multiple senses, the members of this Bureau may well take. I have been disturbed at times by intimations that the task wasn't taken with sufficient sense of responsibility by some of those concerned with its leadership or with details of its conduct. One of the insidious temptations of those who have acquired power and are engaged in a temporarily successful great development of a government agency is to have a sense of relative irresponsibility, or at least to fail to have their power tempered by an adequate sense of responsibility. Some years ago, one of my friends who had since held important positions in the Administration, talked over with me a scheme that he had been evolving. In conclusion he said, with a twinkle in his eye, "It may not work, but we will have a lot of fun trying." I hope he didn't mean it. Probably he didn't mean it as I took it. But I think there has been more of that spirit in certain quarters than I wish there were. There has been quite a little fun in playing with the public's billions.

When the present triple-A Act was on its way through Congress, I dropped into the office of various friends in the Department after I had given a paper on the subject of one of the matters involved in the bill. One of these friends greeted me, also with a twinkle in his eye, with something like this: "I sometimes wonder if you are looking at things in a realistic way," he said. "You seem to think we ought to be getting somewhere. Maybe we are just keeping things moving." I hope I misunderstood him, or didn't get the true content of what he had to say. In retrospect, I think he was somewhat bewildered by the tremendously composite mixture that was going into the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, was inclined to throw up his hands at what anybody could do in connection with it, and felt somewhat cynically as if the best that one could do was to avoid taking things too seriously and go along as best he could.

This may be an inevitable passing phase of one's mental thought on the subjects, but I think there is no place in this Bureau for much of that sort of cynicism. It is a serious responsibility that rests upon the Bureau, and I am confident that you will take it seriously. I should feel very much more concerned about the eventual outcome if the spirit that I have suggested in these few remarks seemed to be typical of the Bureau's attitude.

I shall not attempt to go into the details of the planning concept. I know too little to discuss them intelligently. Each of them



would concern only a few of you. A great deal of time would be necessary to get down to bed-rock on even one of them. They are doubtless not receiving excessive attention. But I believe that important though they are, they are not so important as some larger problems which seem to me to receive too little attention.

First I want to raise the question, how shall we conceive of the adjustment task in agriculture? Frankly, I am one of those who believe that it is often misconceived in terms unnecessarily over-ambitious. When a child or adult is ill we often call in a doctor. He sometimes prescribes medicine, for a limited time as a rule; occasionally a special diet; once in a while specific treatments or an operation; rarely a trained nurse. Frequently he counsels rest. But he does not pretend to make the patient well. Always he counts on the patient's own bodily forces to work most of the cure. What he tries to do is to provide the conditions under which those forces may have favorable opportunity to achieve their curative results. So when I hear men speak as if agricultural adjustment were simply a government program, I am profoundly disturbed. It seems to me properly conceived as helping at limited essential points in the curative process represented by economic forces -- by the efforts of men in their individual ways, their specific localities, to do what seems to them wise. The best doctor is not the one who is required to be continually in attendance. He is the one who most quickly renders his attendance no longer needed. The best mechanic is not the one to whom the automobile must be brought again and again to be tinkered and retinkered with. He is the one who can put his finger on the particular things that are wrong, correct them, and then does not need to be consulted again until a new trouble develops, except for routine examination and lubrication. He does not have to be taken along on every trip, and we wouldn't hire him if that was the kind of mechanic he was.

Now no analogy is perfect, and these are not; yet I believe there is some point to them. A genuinely successful relief program will be largely self-perpetuating. It will meet the emergency needs of a great emergency, disentangle the permanent relief needs from the emergency relief needs, provide for putting permanent relief requirements on a more suitable permanent basis, but do nothing to perpetuate the emergency or emergency relief demands. A rational, really successful adjustment program will in my opinion do the same sort of thing, and in large measure eliminate the need for continuous adjusting.

When I said that it seemed to me that the adjustment program had been conceived in over-ambitious terms, I meant somewhat more than what I have just said. In some measure I believe it is attempting not merely to supplement but to overpower economic forces, unaware of their power and of the resulting complications; not to seek their reinforcement in a readjusting process, but to create a new adjustment against their pressure. Perhaps that situation is analogous to that of a doctor who is not content to have his patient's temperature reduced to 98.6° but wants to stabilize it at 95°; or to that of a surgeon who in repairing a broken arm sets himself the task of making it an inch longer. Those seem very slight margins, don't they? From 98.6° to 95° isn't much. An inch added to the length of an arm is a very small addition. Yet such tasks are enormously difficult, and they make difficult complications. In striving for the goals of parity prices and parity income on the current



formulae, the adjustment doctors are doing just that sort of thing.

What kind of a permanent agriculture do we want for the United States? Some years ago, when I was president of the American Farm Economic Association, I did my best to get some representatives of the Department to discuss that subject, but in vain. I have read with much interest a recent pamphlet, quite informative and interesting, "Planning for a Permanent Agriculture," and somehow I don't find the answer there. It needs to be thought through, and I am disturbed by what I infer from many public statements. For it seems to me that, assuming success in the various elements of the program that are set forth here, we should not have arrived at, so to speak, an integrated adjusted whole. I happen to believe that if we could insure parity prices and income parity to those who want to farm, we should inevitably have not merely an excessive farm population who would have to be paid to be idle more or less of the time, but excessive production in spite of severe efforts to keep production down. To get even a close approach to parity prices over a period of years and to income parity under the present formulae seems to me to make for larger production and larger farm population than society wants or can find a way to use. In other words, there are, it seems to me, some inherent contradictions in the intermediate objectives that have not been thought through.

I recognize the fact that one of the most difficult problems in continuing a program of agricultural adjustment is to make modifications in basic assumptions and in legislative requirements, once they have become widely accepted, and particularly when they have become established in law. They get proclaimed and advertised in numerous speeches and press releases and pamphlets, and the desire for maintaining consistency of position makes it difficult to modify or abandon concepts. "Face-saving" may not be as vital a matter to Americans as it is to the Orientals, and yet I am quite sure that it has prevented the reports of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration from being as frank and informative as they might otherwise have been.

The Bureau staff, I take it, is in a difficult position in this respect, because one is in danger perhaps of being considered a traitor if he becomes a doubting Thomas on some of the accepted fundamentals. I believe that it calls on the part of the leaders for an attitude different from that which I mentioned earlier in regard to the ever-normal granary plan. I believe there is no time at which a real desire from intelligent members of the staff for reconsidering the question of whether should be throttled and the discussion confined merely to the question of how.

Economic forces are powerful. We can ignore them at our peril. If Congress does, the Bureau cannot afford to. There is a limit to what political legislation and administration can do to over-ride those economic forces. The effort to distinguish between what might be called "economic parity" and "political parity," and their counterparts in many other phases of this work, calls for courage, insight, persistence, tact, and breadth and depth on the part of many of the Bureau staff. If my appraisal is at all reliable, some of the basic assumptions underlying the present act and present program, particularly as they concern these two things I have mentioned, are not sound. I believe that devotion to those intermediate objectives is responsible for several of the

features of the present program that seem to me not to be working well and not likely to work well. They seem to necessitate expansion of regimentation, sweetened by huge subsidies. They have led, contrary to the Secretary's announced convictions, to loans that have been excessive; in turn to huge stocks of cotton in government hands; to export subsidies; and to excessive problems of surplus disposition. I don't know how the Bureau staff members can deal with these matters. I do feel that here is one of the challenging problems before you: how to give suitable reconsideration to basic assumptions, even after they are translated into law, before something in the nature of wreckage or over-multiplication of controls becomes an intolerable burden. One of the serious problems in any political party is how to modify a strongly taken position, even under some circumstances to find a basis for reversing itself instead of having its reversal effected at the polls.

I am sometimes answered with the statement that after all these parity prices are not taken very seriously, that the members of the Department essentially agree with me that they are hopelessly uneconomic as defined by the present formulae, and that it really does not matter much that they are in the act. Yet I find in the latest report of the Agricultural Advisory Council, less than a month ago, these two paragraphs:

"The war in Europe will strengthen many farm prices here, but consumers need have no fear of shortage or runaway prices. Such advances in farm prices as may occur will tend to restore the balance between farm and city prices and help to bring about normal business and employment.

"It should be emphasized that the prices of most farm products are still too low, despite some recent increases, and that the general welfare demands that the prices of farm products rise to their proper relationship with other prices and wages."

I haven't time to go into the details of that discussion, but I seem to read between the lines of those paragraphs an idea definitely sponsored by the farm leaders -- that the parity formula describes fair and proper parity prices, those which reflect a balance between the farm and the city -- an idea that seems to me definitely false; and apparently the idea was either held by or sold to the other members of the Agricultural Council. I don't believe that sound end results of a program can be achieved by nourishing fallacious concepts of this sort at the heart of it.

There are some of the more specific aspects of the program planning and building on which I want to touch before I stop. It is an amazingly complex and comprehensive program that is being undertaken -- as I have intimated, at some points I think needlessly complex and comprehensive. But there are some points at which I believe the government has made enormous, constructive strides.

Erosion control, soil conservation proper, seems to me to have been belatedly recognized as in need of an action program; and I am distinctly gratified to see a good deal of effective research, planning,

and action in that direction. There are undoubtedly in the midst of that program instances of irrational waste, partly due to the very speed with which the program has developed and the effort to provide almost every section with its example of demonstration or other work; but those, it seems to me, are limited blots on the scutcheon of that program.

I believe that one can speak with sober enthusiasm of the development in land-use planning under the various names that it has gone by. I was a little surprised to see in this bulletin, "Planning a Permanent Agriculture," one paragraph touching this, which runs as follows:

"Habits of farming are hard to change. Ours were born in a day when land was abundant and cheap. When this land wore out, families picked up and moved farther west. There is no incentive to conserve land when it is cheap and plentiful. The incentive to conserve is born of approaching scarcity. We have reached that stage with land. There are no longer new territories to open, new frontiers to cross. From now on we must live on what we have."

That is a correct condensation of a good deal of what has been written. But it seems to me that one of the impressive facts of recent years is that, while there is no longer a frontier in the sense of an east-west or north-south line, abundance of land considering our present need for it, cheapness of land compared with the prices that farmers think it ought to command, and absence of prospective deficiency in quantity of land, are three very striking facts. And it was not at a time when land prices were going up and up that we tackled the problem of correction of soil erosion and soil depletion; it was at a time when we were disturbed by the depletion of land values, by the abundance of land, that we sought to correct these inherently wasteful practices or omissions that have depleted and are threatening further to deplete the soil of the nation. But for whatever motive, under whatever pressure, the land utilization program has developed, I am delighted to be able to say here under Dr. L. C. Gray's chairmanship that I congratulate him, a pioneer worker in that field, and I congratulate the country, on the progress that has been made and is in prospect in that field. I think one of the important aspects in which the democratic procedures are being developed appropriately, effectively, and honestly, lie in that field of land-use planning. It is one phase which is likely, I think, to be with us indefinitely, and to be of expanding importance for the constructive adjustment of agriculture.

I think we have been improving under the adjustment program some of the rehabilitation techniques, of which I haven't time to speak, and that some of the experiments in that field are at least promising. In respect to tenancy, I have not been quite so sure that we were on the right track in the present program. I am not sure what the present track really is, or whether it is fair to put into the forefront of it the land purchase and transfer to prospective new owners who had been tenants. I think the largest hope for the future lies not so much along that line as in improving the basic conditions of tenancy, regardless of what the statistics may show as to the drift to or away from tenancy.

But these things, important though they are, have not loomed in



the public mind -- or perhaps in the mind of the Department -- anything like so large as the several control and subsidy features of the program which seem to me to have much less to be said for them. I sometimes think that if one could project the trends as one could infer them from the minds of the leaders of the program, we should arrive at a thoroughly regimented agriculture to which, by conviction, the present leaders are opposed, as I understand it, just exactly as we have arrived at an export subsidy for wheat and an extension of it in cotton despite the fact that these ran counter to the convictions of the Secretary of Agriculture and were definitely against the principles and practice of the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State. I believe that it has not been shown that the acreage controls with which experiments have been made in the last few years can be wholesomely, usefully applied, even with the efforts to adapt them to particular situations in the individual counties. I haven't time to recite little bits of evidence that come to my attention now and then. I couldn't begin to cite evidence that would be considered adequate by those of you who have to deal with that subject. But I put out for what it is worth the question whether we have arrived at a mode of adjusting acreage, a mode of determining an acreage or production goal, that we could expect to apply wholesomely in the calculable future.

I wonder if we have begun to learn how to make the commodity loan system our servant, so to speak, instead of our master. It is in connection with both of these that some of the strongest tendencies arise to warp the research, or to warp the public expression of research, in the interests of supporting what is at the moment accepted as public policy; and it is in connection with this that you members of the Bureau have, as I have suggested, a responsibility.

It is true that the controls are made palatable to the farmers themselves, in a fashion, by the huge grants that are made under various names to the agricultural population, in larger amounts today than in the depths of depression. I wish I knew quite how to interpret one passage in "Planning for a Permanent Agriculture": Speaking of the list of the public programs, which included "only a part of those administered by the Department of Agriculture" and left out many others, the statement is made: "The list is sufficiently long to show that our traditional attitude toward farming and farm land is rapidly passing. We are undoubtedly coming to look upon farming as an industry requiring direct assistance from the Federal Government and upon farm land as national wealth entrusted to the care of an individual..."

If this means merely that the national government needs to do something for agriculture and the farm population, we have been doing that in increasing measure for a hundred years, quite extensively since the Civil War, markedly in the past 50 years. We have not been recently coming to that point of view; we have had it. The new thing in the situation, as I see it, is that we are coming to look with equanimity on direct and indirect subsidies to farmers in the amount of a billion or more a year. I don't believe that is in the interest of a permanent agriculture. I don't believe it is in the interest of a prosperous American farmer. At least the question seems to me prominently before us, Is this kind and degree of direct assistance to farmers part of the thing that we are coming to recognize as essential? And if it is to be politically possible to get and keep it for the farmers, why not for any

other groups? There are plenty of them. Those over 60 or 70, for example. In my state we are voting next month on \$30.00 every Thursday for anybody over 50 who does not choose to hold a job. Labor? Why not a billion or so a year for labor? And who is going to pay the bills when we thus subsidize all sorts of groups of the population?

I haven't time to go into the matter of commodity purchase and surplus disposition, in which there is an interesting new experiment which seems to me quite promising by contrast with the surplus commodity disposition which it tends to replace, or the export subsidy which I shall touch upon tomorrow. I merely want, in closing, to emphasize my views that some of these broader issues, some of these basic assumptions underlying the planning and program making, are on your doorsteps. They need to be faced by you not as if they were closed and dead issues, somebody else's responsibility, but recognized as not dead even if they seem to be sleeping, and needing consideration -- casual on the part of some of you, intensive on the part of others -- in the hope that a workable, practicable, not unduly ambitious, but fundamentally successful program of agricultural adjustment shall be carried through.

# REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

## CULTURE AND AGRICULTURE Horace Miner

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: Your minds may well be filled with questions - what is anthropology and how can it relate to agriculture or this particular topic we are discussing this morning? I assure you we will get around to all of these in one form or another.

In the first place, anthropology is a relatively recent social science - although I can hardly call it a social science inasmuch as it does involve biological sciences as well. In fact, the definition which is usually accepted is that anthropology is "the study of man." The nature of the discipline is one which involves various aspects of man which are not studied by other disciplines, and among the various interests in man have been those concerned with his culture, his social organization. The earliest of those studies were more or less descriptive, called ethnology, and historic, where one tried to build up the history of the American Indian, or some other group. More recently the anthropologist has taken the general framework of approach to society which the sociologist uses; in other words, he is interested in generalizations about social structure.

How does the anthropologist differ from the sociologist? Simply in this, that the anthropologist traditionally has been working with primitive people and the social organization of primitive people, so that when he comes to consider these propositions relating to institutions and social structure in modern society, he has a comparative framework which does give him something that other social scientists usually want and read the anthropologists for. The primitives have these advantages: they have a simpler sort of social organization from which we can more easily start learning about society than by studying the most complex organization of our own culture, and in addition they do offer, because of their mere diversity of cultural background, a lot of different cultural data.

Basic to the ideas I want to get over this morning is the relative equality of all of these institutional forms from the point of view of the social analyst. In other words, the polygamous society is just as significant and is worth just as much as a cultural item as a monogamous society. All of us tend to evaluate the customs, the institutions of other people in terms of our own. We say, "Well, this is pretty much like ours; these people are pretty advanced," or, "This is very strange in comparison with those things with which I am familiar, and it seems pretty barbaric, pretty primitive." In other words, all these institutions are not popularly conceived as being of equal worth, but all of these societies are of equal worth as data for the social scientist.

When we come to a comparative study of these cultures, what do we find? I might say it is possible to put in a comparative framework an Australian aborigine and an Iowa farmer. Let's say a word about this term "culture" we have used. We obviously don't mean the type of culture which we are always striving to attain in the form of esthetic appreciation and that sort of thing. By this culture we mean, as one



definition gives it, "a body of mutual understandings," in other words, those things within a social group which are common to the group. An automobile is part of our culture. The automobile in our culture represents a lot of understandings between yourself and myself, involving locomotion, pleasure, status, the manufacturing of automobiles; and all of those go to make up our concept of automobile, and the way we relate ourselves to this element of culture is pretty much determined by this consensus of opinion. If I thought an automobile gave me status and nobody else thought so, obviously it wouldn't make sense in terms of the culture.

When we come to look at these cultures comparatively, we find that there are not any absolute values which we can say some of these cultures have and some have not. In other words, you can't say having one wife is the best arrangement and therefore the people having two wives are better than those having three wives. But we find the only way to deal with these questions of values and institutions is in terms of the particular culture itself. In other words, in a society where a man has several wives, would it be more advantageous to that society to have only one wife? Would the values that those people have be better achieved if they had this other sort of institution? You judge each element of culture not against some arbitrary system of values which you have, but against the culture itself.

I might point out how some of those things can be possible, if you need conviction along that line. The Tibetans have a rather strange sort of family. In mating, they evolve strange sorts of families, strange to us. In some areas of Tibet, agricultural areas, you find that several men, usually brothers, are married to one woman. Now, you may be shocked or you may think it strange or you may think it is foolish, but let's look at these people themselves. We find that they are in an agricultural area where the arable land is limited and that the farms are already cut down to a size which will just support one household. Now, let's assume for a moment that these people had a monogamic type of society such as our own with no other economic outlet. What would happen? Say they only had two sons. In the next generation they would have to divide a farm which is indivisible - a problem which we are facing, although I am not suggesting that we try polygamy as an answer. What these people have done is, you see, to make an arrangement whereby the inheritors of a particular piece of land, which will support only one household, marry one woman, have one household, and have one set of inheritors instead of two. They keep on and keep a constant relation between the size of the family and the size of the land. In other words, the system works for them.

One society has even gone so far as to not have any fathers in the family at all, and strangely enough there are advantages even in that type of society. In the Naier of India we find a group of people where the children are brought up by the mothers and their maternal uncles and they are in constant relationship with these people. The adjustment between the people who are rearing the child is part of a relationship which was not made after puberty but one in which they grow up. In other words, the people who are rearing the child are brothers and sisters and all their personal adjustments have been developed since childhood. Obviously, in comparing this type of family with our own, there are disadvantages in the situation where the individuals have to

make this adjustment late in life.

I would like to make one further distinction before I start bringing some of these 'primitives' a little bit nearer home, and that is between two types of things in culture. One we might call the utilitarian and the other the satisfactional. The utilitarian aspects of culture are just what the terms imply, types of activity, types of social forms which can be measured in terms of efficiency. In fact, when we think about the problems of agriculture and farm machinery, we are usually thinking of the utilitarian aspect. It will produce more or it will serve the land better. Then the satisfactional. Satisfactional values are those things for which there is no absolute comparative scale - simply things with which you grow up and are taught to like and appreciate; and somebody in a different sort of culture grows up perhaps to abhor those particular things. You can't say which one is right. Is Oriental music better than Occidental music? There is no basis for comparison. Of course, the real satisfactions which we derive in life are from this sort of thing. And the utilitarian aspects of culture are merely to try to achieve for us these satisfactions. I might as well say what you have probably observed yourselves already, and that is, of course, that the particularly striking thing about our own culture, America, is that we are so involved with these utilitarian things that we don't get around to the satisfactional ones. In other words, we are continually working on these things which are going to bring us satisfactions to such an extent that very frequently we don't get the satisfactions at all.

Now there are some things about culture which perhaps should be brought out. In the first place, there is a thing which we call integration. The term simply refers to the relationship between the various customs and institutions of a society, and the extent to which a culture is well integrated depends upon the extent to which these customs mutually support and fit into one another. There, for example, is a very fruitful basis for comparison of various societies. In other words, within a given society, whether they are Iowa farmers as part of the national society, or whether they are Indians on the northwest coast, to what extent do their forms of education, their forms of religion, their forms of family life, their forms of exploitation of natural resources dovetail in with one another, support one another; and even more basically, to what extent do these social forms make achievable the desires, the values, the goals which the society itself sets up in these people? From what I have said so far, you can see that I think, as a social scientist, it is much more important to see these people set up certain goals and then achieve them than it is to see that these people set up what you consider to be much higher goals, which 75 percent of them can't achieve. The point is, that saying some goals are better than others is fallacious when we see it in a comparative framework. A society must be considered in terms of its own functions. In other words, what are the goals it sets up and does the organization make possible the achievement of those goals?

Now I would like to run through for you a rather brief description of a culture called "peasant." You might use all sorts of derogatory terms toward it - they frequently are used in Canada talking about the French Canadians. The French Canadians have a type of social system which we think is far behind the times, but let's look at it for a moment. In the first place, they have a large family system. The average

number of children in the community where I lived for some time was ten. It is a patriarchal family. Given a particular situation where one person has to make a decision, the father will do it. Nonetheless, I found that the women usually had pretty good control of the purse strings. They are, however, a good strong patriarchal family. What I am trying to do is to get us away from the common idea of what a patriarch is. They love their children just like anybody else.

Their economy is on a basis of non-mechanized agriculture. They obviously have the hands to be able to do that sort of agriculture. They have then, four or five boys, maybe not that many, but at least two or three in addition to the father. They can do that sort of work by exploitation of the children. Well, that is what you think of it. The point is, what do they think about it? Does it achieve satisfactions for them? Does it work in terms of their culture? It has for a long time. Right now they are finding that the frontiers have disappeared - as we are. The adjustment which they have made is a short-run adjustment. As long as there was land for these additional children to move on to, they had a very nicely integrated culture, but on a short term run, and some of our own problems are certainly being considered in that light. In other words, we don't want short term adjustments, but we do want long term adjustments.

Let's go on with the French Canadian for a moment. They of course are highly religious people. There is one religion in the whole community. Religion is not simply something which is dragged out on a particular day and moralized on to small children; it is something which is involved in everyday life. In other words, you know about manuring your crops, you know about the seasons, you know something about the selection of good seed grains, but nonetheless, you employ also prayer, masses, and so on, to assist these crops. Well, now you say, what is the particular significance of that? The particular significance is, that in so doing, in associating the economic activities with these religious activities, the very success of the economy emphasizes the actuality of the religious values, and those in turn reinforce family structure, moral structure, etc. In other words, the whole thing dovetails. Economic success fortifies religious ideas, and they in turn operate with other aspects of the culture.

Perhaps one of the best examples illustrating the interrelatedness of elements of culture comes again from a primitive, and we can see a situation of culture change. These people are also agricultural, they live in Madagascar and there they had a dry land rice culture. The family system was somewhat like the French Canadian, it was in terms of very large extended families; in fact they were more extended than the French Canadians'. The patriarch conducted his business through several generations, so that brothers would stay together in the same community and work the land together, and there was an advantage to this because they had to fell the jungle, burn it over, and they could do more collectively than they could individually.

They had ancestor worship. You see it fit into this pattern very nicely. In other words, you had this big joint family. The man who ran the whole thing was the person to whom you were all related. It might be your great grandfather. Now, when great grandfather died, maybe one of his sons, probably his eldest son, in other words, the eldest of your



grandfathers, would take over the managership and the family would still remain as a unit. Why? Well, because you were all related to great grandfather. The great grandfather is just dead from a biological standpoint. The great grandfather is still very much socially alive, alive in terms of this family organization, economic organization, and religious organization. That is the type dovetailing customs that I am talking about. So we have this ancestor worship, where the person passed from a position of terrestrial control to celestial control.

Similarly, you had a marriage system which involved people of particular types of kinship marrying one another, and these people were automatically from your own village. Perhaps that is enough of the elements of the culture.

Then there came a change in terms of another type of crop, wet-land rice, the difference being that wet-land rice could be cultivated in small plots which could satisfy the need of an individual household of parents and children and could be done with the efforts of that group. What happened, of course, was that when this new type of economy came in you got these small family units isolating themselves from the rest of the family organization, and another difference was that new property concepts became developed. Under the old system you burned the jungle and planted it two or three years until the fertility gave out, then you burned another section of the jungle, and finally when all the area around you was exhausted, the joint family would pick up and move somewhere else. With the wet rice paddies, you had constant relationship, not seasonal relationship between the workers and the soil, and therefore new ideas of owning a particular piece of land developed, and you could keep up the fertility of these areas. So, what happened was that with the first people who took on this type of agriculture, you got half of the extended family who wanted to move because they were farming exhausted land and they wanted to follow their old cultural pattern, and the people in the family who had their wet-land rice didn't want to build new dams and so on; they wanted to stay where they were. So you find a beginning of disintegration. They were more integrated before they got wet-land rice. Now, is wet-land rice a better type of agriculture? Of course it is. You maintain the fertility. You get several crops a year, whereas you got one before. You are less dependent on the hazards of nature, and so on, but in terms of that culture, what does it do? Obviously, it breaks up that family system. It went on further to the destruction of their values with respect to ancestor worship, and these people whose cultures had been shot and were grasping about for new values grabbed Christianity. Americans in Madagascar say you can always pick out the Christian villages because they are the dirty ones. Why? Simply because the Christian forces are not as potent as the old great grandfather who was sitting up there. He knew you pretty well anyway, and he was still up there judging and he would judge you a lot more harshly than the devil, I assume, if your village got dirty. You see the importance of recognizing values in terms of the local group.

Well, with that picture of change from an integrated state to one in which the integration has been lost, let's look at the modern scene. Of course, our own culture is probably more disorganized, has less integration, than any other society. Now, when we compare societies in terms of integration, we find that those where there is integration, where these various parts fit together, are usually those in which the people

are the happiest. In other words, the French Canadian. He may have long hours of work, and so on, but if he can, in terms of those long hours of work, achieve security with them, which he has done, then it is successful for him.

Societies sometimes behave like animals in this sense. That is, when they get out of integration, when they lack integration, there is a sort of trial and error behavior. In other words, somebody will try this, somebody will try that. A group of people will get together and think they have more insight and they will try something else. The thing which becomes institutionalized, which becomes a new element in the social framework, is the thing which works, of course, and that is why I call it trial and error.

Now, returning to our symposium topic of yesterday, "what is the role of government?" I would say that it would seem to be to ease some of these growing pains; in other words, to try to make some of these adjustments a little more readily; instead of allowing so many false moves, trying to achieve this integration with a little more insight. As an agency which is to assist in integration, the government's role in many instances would be, as we were saying yesterday, to soon work itself out of a job. By the time it achieved any sort of integration, it would be out of that particular job. It may, of course, because of the very nature of the State, become involved in the integration which is evolved. Many of the comments made yesterday with respect to public facilities of various sorts, bring out that sort of cultural integration which grows up and involves the State or some such agency in it.

Now, what I am wondering is to what extent do we in the government as a whole, and the Department of Agriculture specifically, try to adjust our program to the culture we are considering? Of course we think we are doing it. That is what we are trying to do, but to what extent do we specifically do it? Almost anyone would be willing to sit up and say, "Well, it would be a wonderful thing for everybody to have a lot of conveniences. Let's let everybody have a Frigidaire," and so we set up a program which is going to give everybody a Frigidaire. Now, that is because you want a Frigidaire. The people with whom you move think a Frigidaire is a fine thing. What about the fellow down here in the Ozarks? What are his values? He has probably heard of Frigidaires. If you fix it so he can have one, he will probably take it. But aren't there a lot of other values which are more important to him which should be released first? In other words, if his culture is not integrated, shouldn't we pay attention to elements of that culture which specifically affects him rather than introduce new elements and complicating the lack of integration?

Of course in other areas, very definitely one of the things which is troubling the farmer is the fact that he cannot get a Frigidaire. Well, there I say "yes." There is a man who needs a Frigidaire, and if you can help him integrate his economy into the national economy so that he can get a Frigidaire, why, fine.

Similarly, we must, in putting into operation various programs, consider the fact that we are working with culture. All too often we feel that we are combating culture. We have various educational campaigns on, trying to get over some new idea, introduce some new element

into the culture of a particular region which is resistant to it, and we get into the frame of mind that we are combating it. It is a hard thing in some instances to introduce a new institution. I might say that there in itself is a tremendous problem for social scientists and one which has very real opportunities in the openings given by the type of study which the Department of Agriculture is beginning to carry on. Under what circumstances will radical cultural changes be taken on? You find, very definitely, a lot of differences. You find some farmers who will take over a whole new way of life, and you will find others who will resist to their last breath changing in even the slightest way. Is that just because they are cussed? No, it is because their cultures are different; the cultural elements in the situation are different. We certainly should study those situations because we can't assume that a particular program because it is successful in one place is going to be successful in another.

I can think of examples of cooperative resettlement propositions. People take on an utterly new way of life. Instead of managing their own farm, they are a part of a business, the gross benefits of which come to them. But nonetheless, they don't have control of it and they have been having control of their affairs. You go into some areas where the farmers wouldn't even look at it, and you go into another region and the farmers there are so badly off they will try it. You find among these people who try it, some of them will stay on the farm, and in another area they won't stay. Again, it is not because they are cussed in one area and not in another, but it may be that the pattern of not staying is a cultural element with them. In fact, that is what the situation is - they are just habitual movers.

Now, I won't suggest it as a serious set-up, but you could think in terms of setting up some new sort of organization which will take into account their culture as well. In other words, if you get a group of farmers who, to satisfy their own desires, must be moving, it seems to me some set-up which will allow for that movement is sensible with regard to that particular group.

To return to this mention I have made of the fact that we find ourselves combating culture, this resistance which culture offers may be very strong. We think that this is a bad thing when we are trying to introduce some new institution, but the fact that culture resists new forms is the very strength of culture itself and means that, once introduced, patterns which are well integrated will remain and have a great deal of stability.

Again returning to the problem of the extent to which the government is going to stay in a particular job, I should say very definitely that its task would be to create new institutions rather than setting itself up in the form of some new institutional agency. In the latter way, it is just going to complicate its own mechanism ad infinitum. In the former way, it begins to achieve some integration within the group itself.

Take one example, not intended as a criticism or anything of the sort, but simply looking into a cultural situation - the ever-normal granary. Now, in terms of the farmers, what does it mean? Is it something new? Superficially, it is something new, but it has been interpreted by most of them in terms of, and much in the role of, the



speculator who paid you a little more than the grain was getting at that time and then hung on to it. It is new in that the farmer realizes that he is in a situation to benefit from this, whereas he was not in the other situation. But what about this pattern which is so familiar to all the people here in the Department of Agriculture - a long-term perspective of good and poor years, with granaries on the farm in which the farmers will keep their corn during the bountiful years until later years. That is a new cycle of behavior, a new cycle of thinking, and some of the people see it. Whether they would be motivated by it I would be hesitant to say. Now that is because they have been thinking and living in terms of rather immediate results from their crops right along. They comment, for example in Iowa, with something of amazement on the Kansas wheat farmer who puts his crop in every year and knows that some year it is going to come up, and if it does not come up, well, he goes along anyway. In other words, the Kansas wheat farmer has this long-run view and that is what makes him strange to the Iowa farmer. Well, I should say that when the ever-normal granary becomes a cultural element in the corn belt, then the Kansas farmer is not going to seem so strange; he is going to be following the same sort of behavior that the corn belt farmer is.

With respect to the introduction of new cultural elements, may I mention one other case? The farm loans which made it possible for people to hold on to their land did not meet solely an economic problem. If that land had been lost, if it had gone into corporate ownership, as some of it did, you would have had forced upon these people cultural changes which would have been even greater than anything which is contemplated for them by planners. Here again, of course, we have the fact that these people would not like the corporations either, but by force of absolute necessity they would have to take on these new cultural forms, which brings us again to the problem of under what social situations will innovations be accepted?

To bring all of this together in terms of regionalism, I hope you recognize that what I am trying to say is that there are regional cultural differences even within the same agricultural area. I went out and tried to study a farming area which is more or less characteristic of the corn belt. I selected, on the basis of everything I could find, one particular county, and we got into that county and found all sorts of cultural differences within it, cultural differences which make any type of broad program affect various people, who are all corn farmers, in different ways. For some of them it satisfies values which they have long had, and for others it further complicates life.

Now, these culture areas do not fall along State lines, they fall along more naturally evolved lines, which are probably basically geographical, botanical, and cultural, and from that point of view a national agency is better suited to consider these areal problems than is a State organization. But I should say that we must increasingly go to the cultures themselves, the people themselves, within these farm areas to find out what they want out of life, and then I should say we can try to assist them in getting that. Let us not assume that our set of values is perfect, what we want everybody to achieve, and then go and make it possible for them or stuff it down their throats, whatever it amounts to. So the program must be increasingly a set-up which will allow for rather limited areas being handled in different ways.

Now of course, I am not in the driver's seat. I don't have to worry about that. I can say these things very easily, because I see the relationship between an action program and a culture. Problems of how those broad programs, the programs of integration, can be put into operation so that they will actually aid the integration of a specific cultural region, is the problem of the Administrator. I might say that from the point of view of introducing a new cultural element, I think the well-known pressure cooker of the Department has been a tremendous success. Is the pressure cooker as efficient as buying canned goods? No. A woman has to spend a lot of time over the stove. It isn't interpreted in terms of broad efficiency that is good for everybody. A woman has to work with it but it gives her a nucleus around which cultural values have evolved. In most of the places where these people got cookers, they became interested in new foods, nutritive values, satisfactorial values, how much they canned, the quality of the things they canned, and so on.

In this respect I might say that when the social scientist comes in and says that the well integrated culture - the primitive - has satisfactions which modern civilization does not have, we are not asking to go back to horse-and-buggy days. Obviously, that would be flying right in the face of everything I have said. Go out into these farm regions and find any of these people who are aching to have a buggy. They would be awfully hard to find, I think. Stuffing a buggy down their throats would be just as bad as stuffing a Frigidaire down their throats, so that that is not what we are saying at all, but what we are saying is that where such non-economic culture values exist, it is to the best advantage of the integration of such a community to keep those things alive and to see that the innovations which we do introduce will not work antagonistically to them.

REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM AND  
INTERNATIONALISM

PROBLEMS OF CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN  
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Lloyd M. Short

I was extremely pleased in listening to the preceding speaker to note, from my point of view at least, how splendidly he set the stage for what I had hoped to say, and in consequence you may well accept what I say as merely a pertinent footnote to what he said and said so well.

The particular topic, a rather lengthy one, assigned to me is "The Problems of Centralization and Decentralization in Government and Administration." Certainly these terms, centralization and decentralization, are well known to all of us. I suppose there is no more controversial topic in the field of government in the United States today than this topic of centralization. We have been a people who place much store by the ideal of local self-government. We have felt that in our institutions of local self-government we had what we might call the cradle of liberty, that local self-government, home rule, was virtually synonymous with democracy. Yet as a people we have found government constantly being centralized, not so much as some have insisted, by way of direct transfer of power and responsibility from local units to state units and from state units to the national government, though such transfer has of course taken place, but rather in the marked accretion of governmental power and activity reaching out into new fields that were not at all thought to be the province of government in the past, and where these new activities to a very large extent have been undertaken by the larger units of government. So when we have looked at the total picture of government at any one time in recent years, we have been surprised, or alarmed as the case may be, at the evidences of growth of power and responsibility and size in the national government and in the States. Principles or tenets in the field of government and administration I feel are difficult to discuss, and perhaps too much generalization is dangerous, but at that risk I would like to suggest what seems to me a rather widely accepted generalization that has a great deal of merit and which we may use as a springboard from which to proceed in this discussion, and that principle of governmental organization and administration might be stated this way: The extent of governmental power and the limits of administrative jurisdiction -- please note that we are dealing here both with problems of government as a whole and with problems of administration in particular -- should be co-extensive with the problem to be dealt with and with the area to be served or in which the task is to be performed.

Now the application of that principle in the United States admittedly has been made difficult by two things: One, our constitutional system, providing as it does for a division of power between nation and states, has made difficult the adjustments of power to keep pace with trends in the problems with which government was called upon to deal. We, from time to time, are made particularly conscious of this difficulty of course when the Supreme Court renders a decision placing limits at least for the time being, upon the scope of national activity. But such decisions, while perhaps temporarily irksome to those who have a



task to do and want to be about doing it, can nevertheless be thought of in my estimation merely as representative of this governmental system of division of powers which must, so long as we preserve it, constantly raise the question as to the proper jurisdiction of nation and state. And in terms of the thesis which I tried to present yesterday we have a right to insist that the competence of government, not the competence of any individual or official or any agency, but the competence of government to perform is restricted by the constitutional system within which that government must operate. It may well be that at times those who are charged with responsibility of leadership in government should frankly tell the people of the United States that the existing constitutional framework makes improbable the effective discharge of a proposed activity. That may seem to the opportunistic person to be an unwise procedure. Rather it may seem desirable to do the best you can, cut the cloth as you are forced to, put the pieces together in some sort of fashion, in some sort of pattern, and then if the garment does not entirely fit, explain that this is the best we could do under the circumstances.

Since this is a School of Philosophy and not a school of practical operation, perhaps you will permit me an observation. I think our statesmen in the United States too often stand at one side of the public platform and engage in peroration about our constitutional system and its glories, and then move around to the other side in a very short space of time and suggest that we tackle a problem which admittedly is one that does not fit in with this constitutional system which they have praised so highly.

But let's pass on to the second reason why the application of the principle which I have stated is made difficult. It is to repeat what I said in the introduction, namely, the ideal of local self-government oftentimes suggests as political wisdom to our people that we should sacrifice measurably in terms of efficient and economic operation in order to preserve local autonomy, local control; and in keeping with what was said by Dr. Miner, it would appear that in taking such an attitude, unreasoning as it may sometimes seem to us in the light of the difficulties which we face in accomplishing something that apparently the people want accomplished, the people are not so far wrong in sensing that they have deep-seated institutions, cultural patterns, if you please, which must be taken into account, and that any program formulated along national lines, or even along state lines, must be adjusted to those patterns if it is to achieve happiness rather than to achieve perhaps evidence of successful operation in the narrower sense.

Some of you may recall that the committee on recent social trends appointed by President Hoover brought out that among the most significant trends in the United States was this trend toward centralization that was proceeding in spite of constitutional difficulties and in spite of this deep-seated desire to preserve local self-government. It probably represents, as one writer has put it, the major change from an administrative system originally designed for a rural agricultural economy to a type of organization better adapted to an urban industrial economy. Or we might put it this way, as a justification for this trend, that the services which Americans demand of their government cannot be secured by reliance upon old patterns, old institutions. We may have to admit that. We sense, all of us, that problems in the field of public health and

public welfare and agriculture have become national problems, and applying our principle, call for treatment along national lines.

Well, is there any way out of this dilemma? I think that there is. It is not the way that some of our most vocal political leaders occasionally rise to suggest, namely, a return to the good old days, a deflating of this large, national organization. The same sort of a speech will be heard in many a state, so far as the state governments are concerned. It is not that. It is rather by the development of new techniques. One new method is that of interlevel cooperation on a basis of mutual respect and trust, which admittedly is difficult to create and maintain; but that difficulty must not be allowed to stand in the way of our use of it. I said yesterday that the task of keeping administration responsible in our day was a difficult one but one which we had to keep striving for, and I make that same sort of a statement here. It is far easier, I readily admit, for the national government undertaking a problem that is national in scope to say, "We prefer to operate along national lines as a distinctly national undertaking." In some instances that is necessary, but in many instances I am convinced it is not necessary if the several levels of government in the United States strive actively to arrive at a stage of understanding and confidence and cooperation rather than one of distrust and of a tendency to belittle the other.

Now, with all of that, we need not gloss over the fact that the various levels of government each have their contribution to make, and there is no gainsaying the fact that, for example, the national government has resources, human, financial, material, which it can throw into a task which no state, no group of states or municipalities can marshal. But my plea is that leaders in the national scene do not then proceed to hog the show, rather to say that they will contribute those superior resources to the performance of the task, leaving the utilization of such resources in very great part to local and to state officials.

I have spent a good many years as an outsider looking on observing the operation of both national and state administration, and I have been impressed very, very often by the lack of respect held by administrative personnel in one level of government for the administrative personnel of the other, and in many instances I think that lack of respect is not warranted. It may be that often there is a different kind of competence present. If you please, the local official may be very crude, very homely in the way in which he proceeds, but, if I may again revert to my talk of yesterday, he is more likely to win the consent of the government than is his more competent smooth operating official colleague from the state or from the national level, and even admitting the weaknesses, the evident weaknesses of local and of state government, may I remind you that there are a few in the national government about which we seem to have been very much concerned of late? We need, I am convinced, more tolerant, sympathetic, cooperating, working together, between the several levels of government in the United States.

Now there is a bright side to this picture. I need not tell you of the many, many instances in which such cooperation is now proceeding, cooperation that you yourselves here are helping to promote. But let's not be weary of well doing, let's not allow frictions and evidences here and there of mismanagement discourage us from proceeding further along



such lines of intergovernmental cooperation. Your efforts towards cooperation may sometimes meet with what seems to you to be resentment on the part of local and state officials. If I understand them correctly, at least those with whom I have come in contact, that seeming resentment is oftentimes little more than an inferiority complex, a feeling perhaps of frustration and inability to do the job alone, and along comes a representative from Washington or from a regional office to tell how the job may be done.

May I use an illustration here, drawing upon another agency than the Department of Agriculture? I leave to you whether the illustration has any pertinency to your own Department. A regional representative of an important national agency in my state had occasion to talk with me over the telephone about a problem, an administrative problem, in an adjoining state, and that regional representative said in his telephone conversation, "I am going out there and tell those ignorant state fellows where to get off." He had reason to be mad, to be disgusted, but he had no reason to talk that way. I only hope that when he got on the scene, the tone and the attitude of his conversation changed materially, because if it didn't one can very readily understand why there emanates from that state now and again a blast against arrogance in Washington.

Well, there is, I say, hope in this possibility of interlevel cooperation. There is another hope that I have, and that is that where we find interlevel cooperation impossible or unwise from the standpoint of getting the work done, and there are tasks which no doubt will have to be assumed in their entirety by the larger levels of government, that assumption will not result in a high degree of administrative centralization. If there is any one complaint, ladies and gentlemen, that state and local people make against the work of the national government, it is that Washington officials seemingly have no confidence in their own regional and field officials, that you go into a regional director's office and seek action, and the best he can tell you is that, "I will take the matter up with Washington," and that "taking the matter up with headquarters" oftentimes leads to what to the citizen or the local official seems an endless amount of time.

Now these generalizations which I am making are admittedly dangerous and they are open to many, many exceptions, but if time permitted I could cite a considerable number involving a variety of agencies in which petty, inconsequential details of operation were of necessity referred to Washington, leaving no room for initiative and judgment and discretion on the part of your own -- and when I say "your" I am speaking of the national government -- of your own officials. Just recently one particular illustration came to my attention, where one large federal agency, for example, was extremely reluctant to sanction an experiment in the field of employee training, emanating from employees and officials in a regional area. "No, we want to know what is going to be taught and how and when." Well, I don't deny for a moment that there are occasions when such control in the interest of uniformity and the interest of effectiveness seems to be desirable, but may I repeat what I said earlier, that we may have to sacrifice something of uniformity and of effectiveness as it is judged from the top in order to achieve that adjustment, if you please, which the preceding speaker alluded to as being essential. People do look at things from different vantage points. They do have different standards of value and we must make allowance for



them. Lines of authority must be cleared in such fashion that if the task must be controlled in the last analysis from Washington, or from a state capitol, and much that I am saying applies with equal force to the relationship between the states and their own local subdivisions, although they were not inhibited by this constitutional framework of which we spoke earlier, there is at least a willingness to rely upon the good judgment, the administrative ability, and the superior knowledge of local conditions possessed by regional and field officers who come to sense the reactions of the people to be served and governed.

I think, and this by way of conclusion, one of the happiest illustrations of this sort that we have had in our American governmental experience has been contributed by your own Department through the work of the Extension Service and the work of the county agents. I know of no governmental institution where such a desirable combination of national direction, national planning, and local adjustment, local autonomy, local administration, has been achieved. Whether that is being maintained when it comes to the carrying out of your great action programs I am unprepared to say. I have my doubts. There may be reasons for that. To the administrative officer here charged with getting the task done, those reasons may seem to be compelling. My conclusion would be that we had better think again. We had better try and keep on trying to keep administration adjusted to the local environment in which it operates just as far as that can possibly be done in harmony with the achievement of what are justifiably state-wide or nation-wide objectives.

• There are areas in my state of Minnesota, as you all know, cut-over areas, where this problem of resettlement has been a very large issue. Sometime ago one of our graduate students on leave from your own Bureau, one of your field representatives, made a study of the cut-over areas in one of our northern Minnesota counties, and the study was directed primarily to an accumulation of data as to the present costs of maintaining in isolated settlements some seventy-five families. When that task was completed and several members of the faculty were sitting in judgment on it as a graduate thesis, the discussion of the committee, a very informal and delightful one, turned to the question, "Granted that it costs more to educate the children in one of those isolated families, are we certain that the family should be moved to a more productive and more livable farm homestead? Are we certain that the costs of education and of roads in return for a mere pittance for taxation, if anything at all, are justified?" Well, I submit, ladies and gentlemen, the answer is not an easy one if we are really searching for the happiness of our people. That is not to conclude that the program of resettlement in the long run, and considering all the problems involved, is not a justifiable governmental undertaking. All I think it suggests is that it gives pause, ought to give pause, to those who are responsible for the administration of a national program affecting so many different kinds of people and with so many different standards of values.

REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM AND  
INTERNATIONALISM

A DESIRABLE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY FOR AMERICAN  
AGRICULTURE

Joseph S. Davis

Mr. Chairman, and long suffering friends, old and new:

I really have deep pity for you, accustomed to be lords in your own domain, forced to come here and sit for three hours straight, four mornings in succession.

Today I accepted the topic assigned. It would have been made a heavier burden for me if it had been worded, "A Desirable and Feasible Foreign Trade Policy to American Agriculture." Whether the desirable policy is also feasible I am not too sure, but that some of the policies or types of policy easier to adopt are not desirable, of that I have no doubt.

Yesterday I talked to you somewhat intimately as members of an organization directly concerned with the problem with which I was asked to deal. Today I shall be more in the position of some of the other speakers on the program who talked about something, which however germane to your work, lies to a considerable extent outside your immediate tasks.

"America must choose," said Secretary Wallace in one of his most widely read speeches, between isolation, well-nigh complete economic isolation; free trade, virtually complete free trade; and a planned middle course. The Secretary, as you know, believes in making dramatic utterances, and this, I think, is one of them. They are not all literally true, and he would be the first to admit it. If this statement were literally true, I do not believe I would have been asked to discuss this morning a desirable foreign trade policy for American agriculture. There is, I think, no prospect that America will choose, or can be persuaded in the calculable future to choose, either of the two extremes. And if there were a single planned middle course, it would probably already be chosen.

Actually, between the two extremes the number of middle courses is legion. The practical questions are: Which of the legion middle courses shall we choose? With what rational or irrational basis shall the drift or trend be on the whole -- in the direction of more and more isolation, or in the direction of increasing freedom of trade? Why is this decision important for our agriculture, our farmers? With how much or how little planning should we proceed? And what are the criteria of desirability from the standpoint of American agriculture?

On some of these questions I suspect there is little disagreement among us here today. Our irreducible problems of agricultural adjustment have been magnified by the potentially reversible contraction of foreign outlets for our farm products as well as by the practically irreversible contraction of domestic outlets for some of them. The contraction of foreign markets was variously charged to war -- the World

War of 1914-18, the fear of its recurrence, the great war that is now seven weeks old -- or to the worldwide great depression of the 1930's, to technological progress, to self-sufficiency measures, and multifarious import restrictions in foreign countries, to tariff and agricultural policies within our own country. Whatever the cause, the fact of contraction is, by and large, too obvious to require detailed elaboration. And, I venture to say, no competent students see any satisfactory way of readjusting our agricultural economy to the contracted and perhaps still contracting export markets. Certainly the task of agricultural adjustment will be far less complex, much more manageable, if substantial outlets for our farm surpluses, which nature makes to vary from year to year, are readily available, and if the nation evinces a larger willingness to devote abundant productive power to satisfying the world's vast needs and wants instead of restricting production, distorting it, or devoting it to destruction. The desirable foreign trade policy for agriculture will be one that, among other things, opens consumption channels abroad and here at home and that promotes increasing satisfaction of needs and wants.

The elements of such a policy, as I have intimated, lie largely outside the field of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, in part outside economics. They lie in the fields of far-visioned statecraft, what I am sometimes inclined to call in a broad sense "social engineering." You may have no obvious opportunity to determine or even influence the decisions. Yet those decisions, individually and in the large, will have a profound influence on your detailed planning, and I strongly suspect that your own research, planning, education, and action may have more influence on the outcome than you may now appreciate.

Foremost among the elements of this policy, I make bold to say, is peace. I don't mean peace right away, peace at any price, a peace that is no peace. I mean real and durable peace, such that the world may have reasonable confidence in its continuance. That is not the kind of peace we have had these past twenty-one years. Instead, we have had a brief period of reconstruction, rising insecurity, later accelerating rearmament, and recurring crises. For a year and a half, indeed, we have been "in the second world war," to quote a speaker at Chatham House, London, last June. This war was at first conducted "by threats, by propaganda, by alliances," until finally resistance burst into open hostilities still so restricted that some have foolishly dubbed it a "phoney war." Of the immediate issues in Europe and of our own issues in relation to them I forbear to speak, beyond expressing a personal conviction that the importance of assuring a genuine lasting peace even overshadows the importance of keeping the United States out of war. The important issues are: What can we do to bring and securely maintain the kind of peace that most of the world sincerely craves, and all the world desperately needs?

There are those who argue that the United States should emulate Switzerland, a nation of four million people in the mountains of central Europe -- pursuing a pure and strict neutrality in thought as well as deed; guarding that neutrality by united man power and strong defensive armaments; reluctantly providing a home for the League of Nations lest that neutrality be compromised. Whatever leaves we may wisely take out of Switzerland's book, I submit that we cannot pursue merely such a policy. A world power of major importance, we must seek peace and pursue



it, and make apparent sacrifices to insure it, for the sake of the larger gains that it will bring us as well as the rest of the world. Pacifistic as we are, our pacifism should be intelligently active, not foolishly passive. It involves more than just keeping out of war, more than giving our empty-handed sympathy to those who are taking a stand against aggression. It involves finding what we can contribute toward removing or reducing the frictions that make for war, and toward oiling the machinery of peaceful intercourse.

Now, in the early stages of another great war, the duration and outcome of which none can foresee, we need to concern ourselves with the terms of peace and the conditions on which the world may go forward with fresh confidence when hostilities end. I do not share the cynical pessimism of those who feel that a victory of the "democracies" would be almost as great a tragedy as a victory of the "totalitarian" aggressor, proud of its role. The opening weeks of this war have already clearly revealed that many lessons of the war of 1914 to 1918 have been well learned. Some have said that the new war started ahead of where the last one left off, as regards the experience brought to bear. Is it too much to expect, as well as to hope, that many of the lessons of the so-called peace that followed it have been learned also? We, who are being spared active participation in warfare, may well devote some of our surplus energies not merely to adapting our policies and our economy to a period of warfare or to the problems that our possible direct involvement might bring on us, but to the problem of getting and holding a better kind of peace.

Parenthetically, let me say, venturing into Professor Short's field, that the time seems to be more than ripe for a study of the weaknesses in our governmental structure and functioning that have seriously weakened our ability to play a part in world affairs commensurate with our economic strength, our comparative unity and remoteness from Europe and the Orient, and our national interests. I venture to think that our political scientists have devoted relatively too much attention to current affairs, and relatively too little to providing basic and specific ideas for the modernization of our government, to enable it to discharge its present-day task in this field and others. Our reformers in the field of public administration have scratched the surface, but structural and functional reconstruction is called for as well.

Specifically, it strikes me as shamefully foolish that while we lavish funds on our War and Navy Departments, our Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior, the State Department has been relatively starved into falling down on its job of being a Department of Peace. Its functions as a research, planning, and action agency, its personnel for these purposes, might well be materially expanded; and upon their progressive success the planning and action agencies in other departments, including the Department of Agriculture, must heavily depend. I venture to think that an appropriate bureau built up in the State Department, roughly comparable to this Bureau of Agricultural Economics, might conceivably do even more for American agriculture than this Bureau can. We can well afford, it seems to me, to devote annually to such purposes the cost of a battleship, or the amount of money that is being spent on the four new regional laboratories under the recent Agricultural Adjustment Act.

The alternatives of failure make one shudder as he faces them. If willful, ruthless aggression through unscrupulous diplomacy, backed by armed might, wins its way in Europe, we shall presumably have to pay a frightful price in arming as never before. If the present war ends otherwise, only to be followed by an interim of half-peace, and then a third terrible conflict in another 20 years or so, we shall not go unscathed. We cannot hope to fulfil the dream of some of our proud isolationists that we stand serene and aloof and prosperous, almost alone, in a world racked by war, war fears, and war devastation.

Among the elements of reorientation that we are evolving, of thought and action, is an answer to the cry for "Lebensraum," "vital space," "living room," that comes from Germany, from Italy, from Japan. It is no doubt partly a propaganda cry, based on fiction rather than fact, but it takes hold of lands densely populated with proud, ambitious peoples; and fictions, when commonly believed, are potent forces in world affairs despite their lack of foundation in fact. The United States is a fair target eventually, if not yet. Here we are, a mere 130 million on a huge area richly endowed with natural resources. We keep out most of those who want to come in from abroad. We restrict our own population. We limit the ability of foreigners to buy from us, by tariffs or occasional quotas on their goods, by subsidized competition with their services. Given trade with areas outside, the inhabitants of a city don't need to concern themselves over the fact that their acreage per capita must be measured in square feet, that they cannot feed themselves from their own fields and gardens. Given effective freedom of trade, the inhabitants of Belgium, Britain, Italy, Germany, and Japan will not need to worry over the fact that they have to rely on the outside world for a great percentage of their foodstuffs and raw materials; but without such outlets they do worry, whether they should or not. With outlets here for their goods, with markets for more of their services, we can offer the crowded population of other nations an opportunity to make better livings while they remain far more densely populated than the United States. That is the sort of answer that can be given to this cry for "Lebensraum."

The end of the present war may conceivably afford more favorable opportunity for reorientation of foreign trade policy than any time since a similar opportunity was lost in 1919-21. The autarky that has undergone such extensive growth in the past decade was only in part a desperate attempt to cope with depression and some of its specific impacts. It was partly an expression of fear of war and a form of preparing for war. The terrific storm may clear the air and render possible a fresh start on a more promising road.

I have no hesitation, in this company or any other, in urging that we prepare ourselves for making fresh strides of major proportions in reducing our own barriers to international trade as soon as the opportunity can be found and seized. Secretary Hull has asserted that that is the intention of his Department. The reciprocal trade agreement which the present Administration initiated, and has pursued, represented and represents a significant turn in this direction. It is a credit to its leaders, and to the evolution of the program itself, that it has won a large measure of support from the country despite its vulnerability to petty politics and local attacks. But it has thus far gone only a painfully short distance. The tangible gains from it have been largely obscured in the dust of other developments. More progress of a greater



degree is essential in a desirable foreign trade policy for American agriculture.

In my opinion, we have not fully awakened to the obligation upon us to buy from abroad if we would sell abroad. Our coffers bulge with gold and silver. Over huge hoards of both we stand miserly guard; and we need less of both, not more, even if other countries had much of them to send us. Our immigration restriction policy carried much too far, I feel sure, has all but dried up the remittances that formerly furnished foreign nations substantial quantities of purchasing power for our goods. We have been -- now necessarily perhaps -- building more ships at high cost to carry our goods at even higher costs, and so tending to deprive shipping nations (of which we are not one in the economic sense) of the opportunity to render service to us for which we can abundantly pay in goods. Our travel abroad, now seriously cut down, will doubtless revive, but it is almost the only sizable item in our international balance of payments that supplements our limited imports to create foreign purchasing power for our exports. Whatever restrictions Congress may impose or the executive enforce, our creditor position is likely to be stronger rather than weaker when the present war ends, unless fresh defaults of our foreign debtors be added to old ones. In the interest of industry and agricultural life, it is imperative that we take up as major problems to be solved the questions: What goods and services foreign nations can sell that we want and can use? And how can we open the doors to their purchase here? This is a matter not of generosity but of self-interest, contributing to a durable peace and international gain.

It has long been popular in agrarian circles to argue that American agriculture as a whole is the passive victim, and industry as a whole the active beneficiary, of our high protectionism. Students of this subject are well aware that this is not true. There are manufacturing industries as well as branches of agriculture that are handicapped by our tariffs; there are branches of agriculture as well as of industry that are given effective protection -- witness wool and mohair, flaxseed, sugar, butter, meats, fats and oils, fruits and nuts. There are probably numerous instances both in agriculture and industry in which tariff beneficiaries get apparent benefits but fail to attain a prosperity level comparable to that of non-beneficiaries. There are industrial tariffs as well as agricultural tariffs that have little or no effect except in certain periods or in limited regions, as with wheat and cotton. The actual distribution of burdens and benefits from the tariff is seriously obscured. My own impression is that the benefits are small, and that the chief effect of the tariff is to bring about and maintain a different distribution of our occupational and capital forces than would otherwise prevail, a lower level of national productivity and prosperity, and a still lower level of national consuming power. In my opinion, the broad gains to agriculture as a whole, which substantial enlargement of our imports would presumably bring, entirely justify our accepting more agricultural imports, even of competitive types, that are now kept to small dimensions by high duties.

It is especially important to agriculture that really large import openings be made. Here I warmly second the position frequently expressed by Secretary Wallace. For the most part, our agricultural exports today are exceptionally vulnerable, even in times of peace. In wheat, we are weak competitors, for the quality of our surplus is seldom



equal to that of Canada, Argentina, and Australia, and even in the absence of governmental restrictions it tends to be held at too high a price to compete on equal terms with these and other wheat exporters. In corn we are at a comparative disadvantage with Argentina because in peace, at least, the economic distance from our surplus corn fields to overseas markets is far greater, and because our ideas of competitive price are high. Our lard is subject to severe competition from tropical and marine oils, particularly since the technological advances of recent years. Our cotton is vulnerable to the competition of many foreign producers and to the more insidious competition of substitute fibers. Our tobacco, our fruits and vegetables, are regarded as luxuries or semi-luxuries, among the first to be cut down in depression or war. In general, our representative agricultural exports fail to possess the distinctive combination of exceptional quality and low c.i.f. cost in export markets such as characterize our automotive equipment, our agricultural machinery, our cinema films, and other typical industrial exports. To a considerable extent we can expect that foreign nations, even if they can sell more to us, will choose to buy these other things instead of our surplus farm products.

If you ask me how to moderate the political convictions that are predominantly adamant against imports of certain commodities under Democratic as well as Republican administrations, I frankly confess I cannot give the answer, but I believe it is cowardly and false to assume that none can be found. The stake of American agriculture in finding an effective answer is large enough to warrant devoting considerable energy to that purpose. I am convinced that the economic, political, and publicity talents needed are not unavailable and that they have been devoted with marked success to less worthy objectives; but I have no prescription, no plan to put into your laps.

There is, however, another important aspect. Even if we had no tariff or other import barriers, even if a much larger volume of imports created correspondingly larger foreign purchasing power for our exports, our domestic policies could diminish or even prevent this from opening foreign outlets for our farm products, even for quantities that we normally produce in surplus amounts. The notable restriction of our cotton exports in recent years is only partially -- I believe in very limited degree -- due to limitations of foreign purchasing power, to barter agreements of such countries as Germany, and the like. It has been due predominantly to our own cotton loans and our contraction of cotton acreage and production. It has been an unwanted consequence of these policies adopted for other reasons, an unwanted consequence of a price-raising, price-supporting series of techniques. In other words, they have been traceable to what seem to me uneconomic ideas as to cotton prices. If we had not had severe droughts in 1934 and 1936, the same might well have been obvious with respect to corn and wheat. In some degree at least, it has been true of corn in 1938-39, when Argentina, our chief export competitor, had two small crops in succession. The lower prices that might have enabled us, by ordinary economic processes to keep our share in the world cotton, wheat, and corn markets would have exercised some restraint on acreage and production, though not nearly so much as the A.A.A., the C.C.C., and the droughts did. In my opinion, our adjustment problems in the Cotton Belt would have been less serious, our progress in coping with them would have been much greater, if we had let cotton prices go and concentrated on other means of helping the South make appropriate adjustments to that price situation.

This brings me to the export subsidy, on which I have time to say but little. Years ago, one of the great farm organizations had as its major remedy for agricultural relief what was then called the export debenture plan, for an export subsidy camouflaged slightly by the term "debenture." It was not adopted, and on the whole the ideas as to agricultural policy and as to foreign trade policy in the Roosevelt administration were definitely opposed to it. Yet insidiously, little by little, year by year, the basic adherence to a price-raising, price-supporting policy, the initiation of loans without recourse, of surplus purchases, of accumulation of stocks in government hands, have gradually led to increasing resort to export subsidy. During the past year it was applied to the export of between 80 and 90 million bushels of wheat in terms of wheat and flour, this year it is being applied somewhat similarly, with slightly different mechanisms; and unless my information is out of date because of the coming of war, an export subsidy is being applied to cotton.

There isn't time to go into all of that subject. I want to emphasize the point that in considerable measure, as its advocates would readily admit, it has been designed to offset the obstacles to export created by the production restriction and the loan policy, and is regarded or at least represented as not constituting a form of unfair competition. Yet the judges are not impartial judges; the discretion rests purely with the American government, to which the agency in charge of operating the subsidy is responsible. In fact, there is nothing under present practice to interfere with our choice to regard our economic might as right, with ourselves the sole judge of consequences, almost parallel to the position that Germany has taken in regard to her objectives and procedures in recent years. I don't believe that peace can be promoted, or that the kind of normal international intercourse on which our future heavily depends can be promoted, by economic power pressure any more than by military power pressure; and I believe that the consequences of such export subsidy on the world price and its reflection back to the export subsidy on the world price and its reflection back to the exporting countries are such as to injure rather than promote the health of the world's economy. It does not seem to me that we can afford to adopt as a measure of national economic policy something which we have laws on our statute books and executive practices in vogue to guard against when some other country weaker than we are tries it on us.

If we are to bring about adjustments in the income of our farmers to levels that we regard as reasonable, even if they do not rise to the high level of so-called parity, there are other procedures that can be used rather than turning to power manipulations of the economic process such as are involved in export subsidy and surplus disposition procedures. Though I am not an enthusiastic advocate of direct subsidies to farmers, as you know if you heard me yesterday, I believe that there is a lesser evil in letting prices, so to speak, go where they will, letting trade flow as it will, and somehow meeting the urgent needs of the sellers at low prices by some form of subsidy that is not too deeply imbedded never to be given up.

To sum up, I believe that some of the most vital elements in our national policy that concern agriculture and its normal rehabilitation lie outside the province of the Department of Agriculture. They are insuring the return and persistence of real peace in the world, materially diminishing trade barriers of all sorts, and removing the brakes on

our enterprise and business expansion -- not merely in Wall Street, as someone suggested yesterday, but throughout the length and breadth of this land. A really desirable foreign trade policy is an integral part of all three. The parts of our agricultural policy into which we have drifted under emergency psychoses that are inconsistent with these should be modified; and we have more to gain in the long run from seeking, even under difficulties, the straight and narrow path of opening the way to freer trade.

Now I am aware that some of my old friends in the Department will regard me at this moment as an incurable old fogey, one who imagines that the world of yesterday or twenty-five years ago can and should be brought back. They point to the amazing trend in the direction of management--much of it what I would frankly call mismanagement--of the world economy and say: "Here it is. You can't get away from it. The trend will continue. You must find a way of fitting into that trend." Now I have given some study to commodity controls and currency managements, and this, that, and the other thing. I think there are probably some features that should wisely be retained. But by and large I think we are reaping the whirlwind to which that trend has led the logical fruits of the trend of the last decade or so. I despair of coming through to a really sound, durable peace with normal international intercourse by a multiplication of this type of thing. I doubt the possibility of accomplishing the management tasks involved in such a way as to be harmoniously integrated in this highly diverse world of ours. I am inclined to think that, just as at the end of the last war there was a cry for "de-control" and a "return to normalcy," at the end of the present one there may be a similar urge to drop a lot of the crazy devices that have been built up and that have led directly into this catastrophe.

In a long view of the history of the last two decades it may appear that we have been living through a crazy interlude, not pointing the trends that will dominate the future century. Trends have a way of turning. I suspect that the recent trend is doomed to turn, and believe that we shall do well to look forward to preserving the outstanding virtues of some of the earlier principles and combining them in suitable fashion with some proud virtues out of our recent experience.



PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT AND  
ADMINISTRATION

CULTURE PATTERNS AND THE SOCIAL NECESSITY OF ADJUSTMENTS  
Mark A. Graubard

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: We have heard a good deal during the last few days about self-interest as a force in human behavior. Before talking about culture patterns and their social role I would like to consider for a few moments the significance of the phrase self-interest and its meaning to some of us or to the speakers who used the term. When somebody utters the words self-interest, most of us, having been brought up more or less in a uniform cultural environment, have some concrete picture in mind of what a man does when motivated by self-interest. The rationalist philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries undoubtedly thought that self-interest was a concrete concept because little was known then about the behavior of man under different circumstances, in the sphere of different cultures. Consequently, they took the natural path and considered their behavior as typifying all human behavior. Behavior under other cultures was of course savage or lower on the evolutionary scale. It was only through the accumulation of knowledge, with the progress of biology or cultural anthropology, that people began to suspect that the principle of relativity has application to conduct more than anywhere else.

Let's consider what human beings do in the name of self-interest. When a hundred years ago you observed fifty million people living in central and western Africa, pursuing their life with the same vehemence and perseverance with which we pursue our own activities and interests, you would find them doing it all for the purpose of collecting cowrie shells--which are shells of small animals not unlike clams. These shells constitute their money. You couldn't buy slaves 150 years ago unless you came loaded with cowrie shells. The continent was filled with people who fought, who robbed, who raided and did everything people do in the scheme of savage life for the purpose of collecting cowrie shells. What did they use them for? For jewelry. Well, it must have been self-interest that motivated their behavior otherwise why should they steal, rob or murder to get cowrie shells? Observe next the Kwakiutl, a North-western tribe of Indians, who were more or less on a high cultural level among North American Indians. You will see them pursuing this same excited and active life for the sake of collecting blankets. That was their standard or unit of money, and a man was a good citizen if he had a few thousand of them. After he had accumulated many thousands of blankets he could climb a rung higher on the social ladder by buying coppers. These were big pieces of copper, worthless in the state you found them in nature, but considered most valuable when they had a few scratches on the surface and thus had a history. The scratches recounted that the copper had been donated by Chief so-and-so to Chief so-and-so after a defeat or victory in this or that battle. The more stories coppers had attached to them, the more valuable they became. They were valued from about 5,000 blankets -- and a blanket takes a long time to make, and much labor -- to as high as 22,000. After having accumulated blankets and coppers, a good Kwakiutl had to do something. Custom dictated that he throw a potlatch, or a party, and invite all the other Chiefs of his social status, prepare lots of food, build a fire and

start burning blankets in order to show off his wealth, courage and generosity. The other Chiefs would then have to match him and burn just as many blankets. They couldn't cheat because the audience was gathered closely around and invariably knew whether anybody tried to. And then after host and guests had burned their blankets, the host would smile and brag how well off he was and start throwing coppers into the fire to let them melt. That of course ruined their value and glamor. Then the visitors, to show they were really respectable members of the society they lived in, would have to throw in their coppers to match courage for courage. And they couldn't cheat. No two coppers were the same, of course, by the nature of their value and history, but the audience knew whether or not a copper of equal value was destroyed by the challenged visitor. In the end one person would destroy more than the other, and be declared the winner and thus gain the respect of the community. If he had more goods and kept on burning them, he would be Chief some day if somebody didn't destroy more blankets and coppers in the interim. And all that was done presumably in the name of self-interest. Unless you collected blankets and coppers, what was life good for? You might as well go out and live like an animal and merely satisfy your vulgar desires. But that isn't living like a human being.

Now if that may sound strange, look for a moment at our own society. You see people, for instance, who spend their time collecting money. Some time ago it used to be gold. Well, gold is not cowrie shells, but it is not much different. What can we use gold for? Presumably as ornaments for women or dental fillings. Cowrie shells were also used as ornaments for women. After people accumulate a lot of gold they decide to do something with it. Now consider canvas, a piece of cloth which is normally worthless. Yet, when somebody puts a lot of paint on it and then dies, and after 200 years experts discover it and declare it to be worth lots of money, it is almost as good as a copper, and you can spend \$250,000 for it and hang it on the wall. You feel then that you pursued an active life of self-interest and accumulated a lot of money, and you bought a work of art and hung it on the wall to show it to your friends. All that is done in the name of self-interest. About two million Frenchmen, let us say, right now are sitting or lying or playing cards along the Maginot line in willing readiness to fight a system of government -- or I should say, a system of grabbing and terrorization, when the representative of that system, Hitler, is telling them that he is not interested really in France. He is interested in just taking a few countries here and there, now and then, that can't manage themselves anyway, and he is therefore appealing to France not to fight. And in the name of self-interest these people are waiting there ready for their death. Such conduct has characterized man for thousands of years.

You see men like Andrew Carnegie, for instance, having no scruples about suppressing strikes, bargaining over five cents a day in order to accumulate money; not having any children as an excuse, he gives it to science, builds libraries in northern Scotland or Mexico which are never used by anybody, but have his name engraved on the building. Yet his actions were motivated by self-interest. Similarly with strikes. You see men striking for what they call a decent wage, when their earnings would be about twenty times as large as those of a worker in the same line in Russia, about ten times as big as in Germany or Italy, and three or four times as large as in England. Yet they are

willing to face the risks of battles of sorts, nothing compared to the European battles, but involving clubs, bats, gas bombs and what not, and all in the name, of course, of self-interest. In other words, my point obviously is that self-interest is as arbitrary as beauty or justice. We consider an act or event just or beautiful which we think or are obliged to think by our cultural heritage, and partly perhaps by biologic makeup, as beautiful, moral or just. The same with self-interest. It certainly is not the concrete or scientific term that people think they employ when they utter the word.

Similarly with the question of human nature. Somehow the problem of whether man is essentially good or bad has come up several times here, and it certainly was a problem that has bothered people ever since man began to think, because if nature abhors a vacuum the human brain abhors it doubly so. People don't like to live without an explanation. The primitive as well as the modern likes to have an explanation of any experience or observation of which he becomes aware.

With regard to human nature, the theory which has been adopted in the past and still is adhered to today, is what I would call the devil theory in history, which implies that basically all actions are either good or bad. God represents the good, of course, and the devil represents the evil forces. In social problems there is always a bad man, in philosophy as well as in Hollywood. There is always a villain and a hero, the villain representing evil that generates evil. In some philosophy it is a class. That vicious class does all kinds of things -- schemes, plots, hires agents and dominates churches. All evil is attributed to it. In other philosophies it is a race. Some blame it on the ignorance of the masses, others on the greed of the ruling classes. This devil theory prevailed in different cultures. We love this classification. It helps. You can always blame everything on somebody. That always makes us feel good. This devil theory has done a lot by way of satisfying our emotional demands for a while, but of course left the problems unsolved. The fact is that so far as explanation goes, man has an explanation for everything and easily manufactures any number when necessary.

If you take some of the customs of primitive tribes -- and we must always think of our culture as one of the many types in existence -- you will find that strange as they seem to us, as contrary to welfare as they appear to be from our point of view, the logical defense offered by any group is just as sound as the logic we employ in defending our practices. You may consider some of the most laughable customs. For instance, I mentioned last time that killing of twins was practiced by many cultures. Twins that were of opposite sex, were killed because if incest is bad, and incest is bad, and a boy and girl emerged from the same womb, they might have committed it and hence incurred the death penalty. Those people loved children but they killed the twins because that was the thing to do. You couldn't permit the perpetuation of incest. They did it not because they didn't know any better, but because that was the right thing to do, and they had a justification and philosophy for it.

Take an unusual custom like the fairly well known couvade practiced by the Basques until recent years, and also by a Brazilian tribe. This custom dictates that a few hours after a child is born, the mother has to get out of bed and go about the duties of the house, while the



husband takes to bed and pretends he is the mother. That sounds silly. It probably was. That might have been self-interest for the man because he got a good rest, but certainly not for the mother. This custom prevailed for many hundreds of years. The reason those people gave was very sound. They said there were very many envious people who cast evil eyes on mothers of beautiful children, or any children for that matter. And should such bad people chance into the house and see the beautiful child and mother lying in bed, they would no doubt cast an evil spell on the happy mother and cause her death or at least bring serious illness. Consequently, you have to fool them and the best way of doing it is by placing a substitute in bed so that the evil eye would be laid on the substitute and do no harm. That is as good a reason as any we offer for many of our beliefs, except that it sounds laughable coming as it does from a different world.

But the same thing is true of self-mutilation, flagellation, or of whipping children at puberty. It seems cruel to us, to take girls at puberty and lock them up for several months and give them nothing to eat but water and dry seeds. They then have to go through an initiation ritual which might be as much of an ordeal as an initiation into a fraternity. But the puberty ordeals were no play and pretty rough on the youngsters. And all that was done with elaborate justification. In other words, when we talk of pinching shoes and self-interest, we are really expressing a fairly subjective phenomenon. Moreover, whenever we observe something which seems unreasonable to us, we discover that those people who practice it have a good reason for it. Hence not only are some of our notions flimsy and relative, but our entire reasoning machinery may well be so too.

What it means is that man, besides being a culture making animal is also -- and that is where trouble brews in all our problems -- a culture-trapped animal. He is trapped by that culture, which on the surface he creates. Thanks to rationalization he thinks his way of looking at things is the only reasonable one. The mind, being the most flexible thing on earth, can defend and justify and rationalize anything, and logic and reason have been very poor catalysts for mutual understanding and have formed a very poor bridge between different cultures, different modes of life and thought. I don't mean to deprecate reason since it is the only thing we have. It is like your face; since it is the only one you have you might as well get used to it. In the same sense, reason is the only thing we have and we might as well be resigned to it, but that does not mean that knowing its limitation may not help us employ it more effectively. It is difficult to tell people that their reasoning is limited by their culture pattern. Such a warning is bound to meet with opposition because people don't feel guilty when accused of something they can't possibly understand. What I found useful instead was to submit a list of questions which most people including this audience feel they are competent to answer. The wrong answers are usually given and the subject is thus forced to question the soundness or reliability of his reason. I suggested a few questions at one of the group discussions. What is the origin of the day of rest, omitting for the time the Biblical account? About 99 percent in over 2,000 questionnaires to college graduates who happen not to have studied that particular problem gave the wrong answers. Naturally the answer which your reason tells you is that man worked pretty hard day in day out, until some reformer realized that primitive man was working hard and needed a

day of rest. Marxists claim that capitalist exploiters were impelled by their craze for profits to realize that their victim would become less efficient unless he had a day of rest, and they therefore instituted it. Well, the day of rest came about in a different manner, of course. It so happened that the Babylonians were people who developed astrology. They were the first to develop extensively magic and science, since the two went together in the past. They knew the five visible planets, Mercury, Mars, Venus, Jupiter and Saturn. Among the planets were also included the sun and the moon. They thus had seven planets. They had originally divided the day into twelve hours but later changed it to twenty-four, which system was used by the Egyptians. Each hour was given the name of a planet. Instead of meeting a person at six o'clock you met him under Mars or Saturn. The day was then divided into two halves because you had a noon hour and a midnight hour. If you take twenty-four hours and give each hour a name of a planet, of which you have seven, you will find that every midnight hour of seven successive midnights must necessarily have a different planetary name. You go from one to seven and eight begins a new series over again, so does fifteen and so forth. Then in the course of time the name of the midnight hour came to be the name of the day. In other words, we began to have Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday. Today we use names of days in the English language as changed by the Germanic tribes, who took over the custom but used the names of their own gods. Thus the week of seven days came into existence. Now it happens that seven is a bad luck number for all Oriental nations. The seventh day was Shabbatum which meant to do nothing, just as we don't do anything on Friday the 13th. Originally they didn't start anything new on that day, such as building a house or starting on a journey. In the course of time it degenerated into a day of doing nothing and then into an accepted day of rest, a useful institution which is now being extended into a weekend of at least two days.

The same is true of another question, the domestication of the cow. Everybody says, of course, it is easy to see what the cow was domesticated for. We know it is for milk. That answer can be ruled out because in nature no animal has enough milk to give to anybody else. Man had cows for many years before he hit upon the idea of using its milk, and long selection was required to produce cows that had enough milk. Similarly sheep in nature had no wool. Another answer given is for meat; that is a logical answer. Why should anyone keep a cow if not for meat? The origin of the domestication of the cow happens to be known since it occurred in Egypt, where it was considered a holy animal. Egyptians would rather die than eat its meat. Similarly modern Hindus would rather kill a Moslem than eat beef or see others eat it. Now, the leather wasn't used either by the Egyptians. The cow was used exclusively for sacrifices, and the true answer is that man domesticated the cow because he loved animals. Also he domesticated the cat. Primitive man domesticated every animal he could get hold of. As a matter of fact he very likely wasn't the originator of the idea of domestication. It was the dog who gave him the idea. The dog domesticated man because the dog was the first animal that came to man of his own accord. The dog was in the habit of running after man and lived at first as a scavenger. Man in all likelihood learned that he was not afraid of animals. It is certain, however, that the dog was the first animal to be domesticated. Remnants are found at first of dogs outside the family cave and later on inside the camp. We must not forget that in some countries of the world birds and reptiles are domesticated. The facts are then that man domesticated every animal he could lay his hands on, but he selected those in

the long run that were pleasing or amenable or useful. Others he discarded.

The same would be true for questions concerning the origin of the alphabet and the building of houses, the origin of science, the discovery of anaesthesia, etc. The wrong answers are given because we reason in terms of our experiences and our logic, both limited by our culture pattern. Moreover, these limitations of reason are not characteristic of social science. They dominate as well reason in science. People love to console themselves with the belief that in the domain of the natural sciences order, logic and truth rule unhampered. There people conduct experiments, live harmoniously together, search for truth and detect it readily when evidence reveals it. There are many notions concerning science in our society which differ from the way science was regarded in past societies, say, in the Middle Ages, or during the Greek or Roman periods. When the great scientist, Lavoisier, the father of modern chemistry, was taken out to be executed by the French Revolution in 1794, during Robespierre's reign of terror, he claimed he was only a scientist and was doing his best for his previous master Louis XVI. The revolutionary tribunal dismissed his plea with the curt adage "The revolution does not need science," and he was executed. That was only 160 years ago. Science was in a different position then. One of the commonest notions regarding science today is the view implicit in Paul DeKruif's *Microbe Hunters*. DeKruif expresses the St. George theory of science, the hero theory, which claims, correctly enough, that there may be many scientists but only occasionally does a brilliant man make his appearance. This rare person is a genius. He works hard, and he is misunderstood because he is a genius. But he has to struggle on. He has friends and colleagues who are envious and stupid and who misunderstand him and plot and scheme to keep him from coming to the top. But the genius works and perseveres. Yet if it were not for the affection of his wife who gives him love, hot tea or coffee, encouragement and kind words, he would never emerge victorious. But he does, and then he dies, and people realize that he was really a great man, and a step forward is made in the history of science.

Actually, of course, if you look at the facts you will find that they present a somewhat different picture. The hero theory sounds good and harmonizes with our devil theory, supplying both the hero and the villain. But if you examine the history of science you will find that the above picture does not tell the whole story. In the same way, the devil theory does not quite apply to social difficulties either. Let us consider the scientific tribulations of a man like Pasteur. Pasteur came forward with the microbe theory of disease, and no doubt that was a brilliant discovery. No doubt, too, there was continuity to his great achievement. People had somewhat similar notions before, but progress seems to take place in such a fashion. Somebody hits on something in some rational or irrational manner. Somebody else advances it more boldly, but the new idea is disregarded because it doesn't click with accepted notions. This process repeats itself, and sooner or later events happen in such a manner as to permit the new idea to penetrate the prevailing set of beliefs. The microbe theory of disease was opposed, but it wasn't opposed by fools. Bastian was Professor of Medicine and Surgery in the University of London and he had written several books on medical subjects. Bastian was a man of considerable achievements. He was a great practical physician, diagnostician, and a man who



understood anatomy and physiology. Pouchet was one of the leaders of the French Academy and also had many accomplishments to his credit. These two scientists were not mere idiots whose task in life it was to misunderstand geniuses. They couldn't very well understand the new idea, because, as they expressed it in a French Journal of 1860, "Dr. Pasteur, the world that you are trying to lead us into is too fantastic to picture." And this pathetic appeal rings with truth. Pasteur's ideas were too fantastic. Given the old notions which the medical profession maintained at the time, that diseases came from the miasma in the air, that they were caused directly by poisons and vapors in the blood and could therefore be cured only by bleeding, then obviously the notion that diseases came from microbes swarming in your system was so repellent, so out of harmony with unquestioned ideas, that it couldn't possibly find ready admission. And I think it was cruel of anyone to expect those people to accept the new theory all at once.

The same is true of any other relevant illustration. Let's take Peruvian bark. Malaria was a terrible disease in Europe. It counted its victims in millions every year. While the Count of Chinchon was stationed in Peru, he and his wife were stricken with malaria. He died but she survived because she put her faith in an Indian woman who gave her bark to eat. This was Peruvian bark. She survived and came back to Europe and brought a few pounds with her and distributed it to her friends for protection against malaria. Well, it cured many people, but the medical Faculty of the University of Paris, that most conservative and dictatorial, highest medical authority, backed by the guild tradition, called a special session to consider the value of Peruvian bark and voted against it and threatened to excommunicate every physician who used it. The Faculty declared it unworthy of medical attention for a curious reason. The malaria disease, they reasoned, came from miasmas and poisonous vapors issuing from bad air and entered the blood. It could therefore be cured only by bleeding whereby these poisons are expelled. Well, if you bleed a man, there are two things that may happen -- the same two possibilities that exist today when a physician treats a patient -- the patient either survives or dies. When the patient survived, then obviously bleeding worked wonders, and when he died it was too late. He just didn't call a doctor in time. Too bad. Incidentally Thurman Arnold uses this story effectively in his *Folklore of Capitalism*. It is one of thousands of similar incidents. To return to the medical Faculty. They claimed that when a patient is given Peruvian bark -- quinine, by the way, is an isolated chemical used today which is the active principle of the bark -- his temperature does indeed decline, but regarding this as a curative sign is merely taking the short view of the case. If you want to kid yourself and not look at the facts, you may think that the patient is really getting better. But this is misleading since his poisons are still in his blood, boring, multiplying and circulating, ready to undermine his health and kill him. On the other hand if you take the long view, you will realize that quinine does not cure him, although his temperature has declined. Sooner or later the poisons which the quinine fails to eject will get him. This is of course a sound argument since sooner or later we all have to die. From the point of view of the medical authorities, once their basic assumptions on the origin and cause of malaria were granted, their subsequent arguments were correct. The quinine did bring down the temperature. But the medical mind of the time didn't see how it could possibly kill poisons. The only way they knew of destroying poisons was to eliminate them by bleeding, which was the thing to do if you adopted the long view, the

philosophic view and not the nearsighted, empirical one.

The same type of opposition prevailed with regard to Harvey's circulation of the blood. It took about 2200 years after Hippocrates for people to realize that blood circulated and it took about 50 years of strenuous fighting over it until Harvey's view was really accepted. But the people who opposed Harvey's view were no fools. Some of them had made contributions to medicine in their own way that were equally great if not as dramatic. But their view was sound and logical within their accepted scheme. We all know that the mind knows no difficulties which it cannot patch up with explanations. That is one thing we don't need geniuses for. Everybody can produce an explanation. Just ask people for an explanation of this or that and see their readiness in producing them. It is an easy occupation since it merely involves diving into your own imagination, and who can stop you from doing that? If the result doesn't agree with reality, as you see it, you simply have to concoct another explanation, and if you like to be really scientific you add a fancy name, such as, psychosis, neurosis, complex or anything for that matter. People are impressed because they love explanations and high sounding scientific terms. You give them a new name and they feel satisfied so why use plain words? The defenders of Galen's scheme of the function of the blood were no fools or idiots. Their picture was sound to them and to all great physicians living before Harvey. The veins pulsed, the lungs cooled and purified the blood. The left ventricle was the seat of a vital fluid which flowed through minute, invisible pores into the right ventricle and there mixed with and refreshed the venous blood.

Now, let us consider a more recent illustration dealing again with Pasteur. He maintained that all fermentation, the production of alcohol from sugar, is brought about by living yeast cells. We know that it is so. This notion was opposed by as great a man as Liebig, the father of modern organic chemistry, of the science of soil chemistry and the originator of many agricultural discoveries. He was the first to call attention to scientific fertilizers, among other things. Liebig didn't believe in Pasteur's theory for a very good reason. He claimed that fermentation was produced by albuminous substances, or as we say proteins. He said that living yeast was the result of the degradation of proteins, that life was the result of decomposing processes, not the cause. He said sarcastically that to think that the living cells produced fermentation was like saying that the mills of Mainz, a town on the Rhine, make the river flow, rather than the reverse. But there was reason behind these views, because Pasteur believed that only living cells could produce fermentation and that you couldn't isolate an active albuminous substance from these cells. A few years after his death Büchner found that it could be done.

Occasionally emotions enter this conflict of reasons. Spontaneous generation bothered biologists for many centuries. It implies a belief that life originates from decaying matter. The liberals and radicals of the nineteenth century favored that theory because it freed them from the yoke of the Bible and the influence of the church, which they wanted to overthrow or at least weaken. They reasoned that if life originated from decaying matter, the story of creation was false. Proving the Bible false meant weakening the prestige of the church authorities. When some scientists claimed that spontaneous generation of life



was false, they paid no attention to such views. When Pasteur published his beautiful experiments to disprove the claims of the defenders of spontaneous generation, his testimony was disqualified on the grounds that he was a pious Catholic and his work was a Popish plot. Well, history proved that Pasteur was right and that there is no spontaneous generation. So you see how reasoning can be influenced by culture patterns, often by emotions; as well as by interests and by limitation of knowledge.

I would like to consider now the bearing of these conclusions on social problems as well as on social organization. Our national culture differs from previous cultures in that it is less uniform and more complex, in fact, a veritable patchwork. A primitive culture was uniform insofar as the group was small and the notions of the group as a whole were shared by every individual. Moreover the activities of the group were unified. There were no economic or social complexities. Our society possesses such complexity because it is composed of regional, geographic, economic and political isolates. Observe that economics still figures as a determinant in social events. Within the framework of a given culture, economic influences certainly operate. Groups formed by common economic interests obviously exist in our society. Whether it is legitimate or helpful to label them as classes and create a scholastic, labyrinthine philosophy around them I doubt very much. But different groups do exist each with its little folklore, axioms, imaginary rights and claims. The social consequence of their existence is that these groups function, or rather clash on a basis of their folklore patterns or ideologies in which different principles are taken for granted. Like independent tribal cultures they persist in their folklores though they often permit changes of varying magnitude to slip in. The complications which are rampant in our society right now, reduce themselves into problems of conflicts of culture patterns. Instead of dealing with culture patterns of different tribal groups, as I illustrated before, we are dealing with culture patterns of different sub-groups within one nationally integrated society. For example, we have in our national entity the folklore of capitalism and the folklore of radicalism, the folklore of the North and the folklore of the South, the folklore of tariffs and free trade, of the farmer, of labor and industry, etc. Consequently, the problem of coordinating or harmonizing these various cobwebs of belief, or these various patterns of folklore becomes the real task of government insofar as the government is elected to do just that. Agriculture, labor, industry, the South, North, the capitalist, the tory, the radical -- these are not merely words as the new prophets of semantics wish us to believe, but represent group patterns of thought, each with its folklore or philosophy. Therefore, the question of coordinating internal problems becomes in the long run the science of cultural or political anthropology, where, instead of dealing with isolated and independent cultural groups we are dealing with cultural patterns of different sub-groups within one political and economic national body.

Now, the question of change of social institutions is one that is paramount in the minds of all earnest social thinkers. So far as the results of anthropology go one thing is certain. Although man can cling to customs for a long time, change is a law of nature, by which I mean that it happens all the time in every culture, in all its aspects. Any solution of specific social problems involves directly the question of changing culture patterns. Our behavior is dominated by our notions how



to behave. Self-interest is not an absolute entity but what our folklore tells us it should be. The philosophy which states that necessity is the main stimulus -- hence, that man acts upon nature because of necessity -- is also based on a similar fallacy. The "materialist" philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth century, thought that necessity was a very simple problem to define, that if they thought something was necessary, everybody else would think it too. They overlooked the fact that while we may think it is necessary to have anesthesia at childbirth, the Catholic woman does not think so. She thinks it is necessary to endure pain, because the Bible says so. Hence, basing your hopes and philosophy on necessity, hoping that change can occur by giving people what you think is the thing they want, can mislead social experimentation. True enough, economic forces constitute an important factor in the social sphere. Nobody denies it, because when the shoe pinches -- and almost everybody here has been thoroughly familiarized with the pinching shoe -- it does pinch. Yet some people, whom the shoe pinches, may decide to go barefoot. Others may say, "Don't be a pampered baby, a little pain does you good." Others may say to the victim, "You will be a real man if you learn to take it." Others again may cut the shoe to suit their aching spots or make different types of shoes. Man can do many things by way of responding to one stimulus.

Now the matter of changing ideas within a group presents us with some real problems. I don't think much is known about this process although we do know what has been gleaned from anthropology about diffusion, that is, the mode of spread of ideas from one community to another, thus involving the penetration of new and the abandoning of old. That process is not an easy one to understand. For instance, the slogans of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the general concepts of democracy spread through Germany like wildfire a hundred years ago. Today the opposite idea is spreading fast through some sections of the European population. That a philosophy establishing man's dignity and extending him hope and opportunity should give way to the very opposite one is not easy to understand, and how it came to transpire is not easy to explain. Single track theories have not been difficult to concoct. We may also consider the acceptance of such simple things as coffee, tea, potatoes, that spread like wildfire throughout Europe. But there are other foods that people resist, Indian corn, for instance, didn't spread. Hygiene and hospitalization spread slowly. In other words, the question of breaking down established cultural barriers or of introducing new elements, hence the problem of change, is not an easy one.

Now, so far as the government is concerned, the problems it was elected to solve are in existence and must be tackled. Unemployment, low farm prices, foreign competition, droughts, etc., etc., are real enough and must be faced. In addition there are certain broad social objectives which many people want to see reached in their lifetime. By asking people what it is they want, it is possible to establish concrete social objectives such as security, old age pensions, unemployment insurance, etc., on a basis of statistics, rather than the moral prejudices of a philosopher. But reaching agreement on a broad social goal is relatively easy. The question of realizing that goal by way of harmonizing the different culture patterns that exist in our society is the real problem, facing that scientific organization which I think is gradually becoming identical with what we used to call government. In other words, the government is the elected experimenter whose task it is to

organize these different and often conflicting folklores of different groups in our society into a workable scheme, beneficial to the unit as a whole.

So far as I can see, the chief feature justifying the analogy with a scientific experiment is the fact that, as we have seen, reason can mislead anyone into a consistent philosophy. Consistency as already stated, is the easiest thing on earth, based as it is upon harmonizing explanations. Hitler is consistent to himself and his followers. Stalin is consistent to himself and his followers. No one has ever claimed he was not consistent. Everybody is consistent to himself because of that flexibility of the mind. It seems to me a government which makes a policy of not having too farsighted a philosophy is a government which works on a scientific basis. Such a government talks problems and solutions, but keeps away from philosophies. The New Deal to my mind has been such a government. I can readily believe that when Hitler, Lenin, Mussolini, Marx and other saviors armed with all-embracing philosophies will be as much events of the past as the millions of their victims, the achievements of the New Deal will still constitute a real benefit to the lives of all Americans and will form a solid foundation for further progress. If you make a statistical table -- do not argue when you can make such a table -- on the damage done by gangsters and thieves and highwaymen and the damage that has been done to humanity by philosophers in the execution of their farsighted and noble principles and visions, you will find that the one reaches a puny figure of a few thousand, while the second will reach hundreds of millions within the last few thousand years. Today, in our lifetime the victims of Marxism, Leninism, Fascism, Stalinism and Hitlerism alone reach geological figures.

\* Farsighted theories, even farsighted theories in natural science, are invariably modified and never live long. People think scientific theories are built on a rock and cannot change. That is not so. Make a list of them and you will find the death rate in natural science as high as in social science. Including even the Copernican theory, there is not a single scientific theory which has lasted more than fifty years without being modified sometimes only a little, sometimes considerably. This is so because of the limitations I outlined before.

Now, so far as the relationship between the government and the various constituent national groups are concerned, we are dealing with the relationship of the scientific experimenter to his material. A scientist starts with a problem which he wants to solve -- and about which he has certain notions. He is humble about his work and I think the present government is humble about its job also, so far as most points of its program are concerned. In fact, I would rather hope for more humility on the part of those people who talk about the menace of balanced budgets. Precisely where is the evidence for their gloomy prognostications? I would like to see a table of statistics with the exact correlation between balanced budget, standard of living, and national wealth and decline in initiative. Also what is the magnitude of the relation between a balanced or unbalanced budget and the effects upon succeeding generations? I don't think there is enough data to say definitely which is the correct view. This is a unique situation, because there have not been many cultures like our own in the past. Every situation is different. The solution of our current problems requires testing, because we



haven't got enough data. We have lots of theories and explanations, but these are easy and we had better keep them out because it is facts we need. Suggestions are very good, but let us be modest and easy about them because they have to be tested. Consequently a government more or less like the present administration which does not enunciate too many "farsighted" theories is always on solid ground -- and by solid ground I mean on scientific ground, on a terrain upon which progress can be made. And don't let emotional books tell you about the farsighted seers who, in the vision of their minds, saw great lights glistening ahead and boldly went forward and discovered great truths. Everybody has bright notions, and once in a while an idea is found to work. Hypotheses are of course valuable especially when they do not rest too much upon logic and so-called consistency, where an idea merely floats on billows of brain-spun explanations. A scientific hypothesis is based on the humility in your approach to the problem and your willingness to test its correctness. So long as you are willing to try that hypothesis and test its results, you are always on sound scientific ground. Nobody has yet been killed in such kind of social experimentation, while in countries like Russia, Germany or Italy millions have been killed.

To make the analogy between government and society correspond to the scientist and his experimental material, it is essential that government spend more time and energy in analyzing data obtained after a certain policy has been put into practice. One desires to know how a given hypothesis works, what is achieved, what difficulties it encounters and whether it should be at all modified, relaxed or intensified depending on the nature of its operation.

In other words, when the Department of Agriculture, for instance, applies a certain policy for the solution of a specific problem without the benefit of high sounding systems with a capital "S" and of a philosophy dealing with history, morals, pasts, futures, human nature, classes, the aim of life and what not -- as philosophic systems of the middle ages and modern socialism were wont to do -- it seems to me that at every step the Department must do what the scientist does. After performing certain experiments it must stop and examine the data and say, "Where am I getting in this experiment? Have I got the right results, and what do the results tell me by way of the next step?" So long as this policy of testing the results at each step and of examining your own hypothesis by comparing the results with the desired objective, is faithfully adhered to, you really have a fool-proof scientific experiment in every sense and eliminate all those evils into which rationalization and culture straight-jackets can easily ensnare you.

Now, by way of conclusion, I think that there is another element that is involved in this relationship between the government's approach to problems and the successful way of solving them. It seems to me that when the government puts through a certain farm policy, which in its estimation should work for the benefit of agriculture, it must always tap the opinion of the farmers and know what the farmers' response is. It is too costly to go through with an extensive program and then discover after the ensuing election that the public was not sympathetic. It is far more economical and democratic to check your hypothesis as you go along.

The culture pattern of the farmer, in this instance, is as much



part and parcel of reality as weather, soil conservation, crops or prices, often more important than all these put together. In checking the efficacy of each step the changes in the culture patterns of the farm population must be carefully observed and the policy in question modified accordingly. We cannot go by our opinion of the value of the policy or by our appraisal of the consequences. Merely living in the country is to a city person quite a terrible fate. In other words, we have to know whether our solution agrees with the feelings of the people, since in a democracy which must necessarily be free from the spiked chains of philosophies that enunciate "historic truths" and values, that is all that matters. Social philosophers such as Marxist theorists invariably are led to have contempt for the people. They talk of people being uneducated, talk about their ignorance, because the theorists claim to know the truth. If the people don't know it, then they have to be educated. The Marxist knows the worker is exploited. If the worker doesn't think so then obviously he is ignorant. These theorists always desire to educate others, they never have to educate themselves. But the problem is that when you are working with farmers and trying to solve their problems, you have to be sure that your feet are on the ground, and because the farmer is part of the experimental set-up, he has to be studied all the time, and his folklore is no more subject to your opinions than other folklore. What has to be judged is the consequences of his folklore in terms of his desired aims and objectives. In other words, some institution will be necessary to keep the culture pattern under surveillance in order to know whether a given policy which we know by calculation and economics to be scientifically effective and to lead toward better conditions, but which conflicts with the culture pattern of the farmer, is breaking down the resistance effectively, and what methods can be more effective in changing those culture patterns? In other words, it is blindness to stress economics alone, because of the role of culture patterns in human behavior and their power over such presumably biologic forces as pain, self-interest or necessity.

Consequently, the Department would have to have precisely that type of institution -- it may have it, I don't know -- for keeping in touch at every moment with the culture patterns, for studying the nature of these folklores in different communities, effective means for changing them, whether they are propagandistic in nature, whether they are economic, or whatever they may be. Many elements enter the process of changing culture patterns, and these have to be studied. Thus every experimental step taken must be triply tested.

First the policy must bring such results so that impartial observers would be inclined to say the results are satisfactory. Second, the new ideas must merge with the farmers folklore, and third, the results must ultimately throw light on the program and help decide whether the reasoning behind the program or policy was correct. In this manner the government fully justifies its role of social scientist and will perform its duty in solving problems effectively and work for progress just as the scientist works for greater knowledge.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT AND  
ADMINISTRATION

DEMOCRACY AND GROUP LEADERSHIP  
L. G. Nourse

There is an old saying that a guilty conscience needs no accuser and so you can imagine that I began to get a little restive during Professor Graubard's remarks when he started out gunning for people who talk about "self-interest" as a motivating factor in human conduct. I felt less impaled by his remarks when he went on to take exceptions to the way some people talk about "human nature," because, while self-interest is a phrase I used, human nature was Vance's phrase. And then I began to feel that I was in a still larger and constantly improving company when the last of his remarks seemed to be directed at Joe Davis' speech the other day. Now, Vance, I believe, has gone and Joe isn't on the program, but I am glad of the fact that I have the opportunity here --as I think should occur in the later addresses of a program of this sort--to register some reactions to the remarks of previous speakers. As Professor Graubard noted his exceptions to some things earlier speakers had said, I now have the opportunity to take exception to the exceptions which he mentioned.

Self-interest as the basic motivating force in human conduct is my story, and I stick to it. But I don't think there is any real inconsistency between that and what Professor Graubard has been talking about with reference to the culture pattern. If he cannot agree with me, I at least take some comfort that I can agree with him. Furthermore, I don't believe, particularly in the light of his later remarks, that he really takes exception to the view which I was trying to advance the other day.

It is, of course, a commonplace of social science that the struggle for self-interest depends on the character of the "self." And the "self" does reflect and is conditioned by the culture in which the individual grows up, attains his intellectual and spiritual growth. Now, if we have the privilege of taking exceptions, noting the finer discriminations of thought, it seems to me that Professor Graubard himself hardly did justice to his own theory in one phrase which he used in that connection, and I hope you will not take that phrase as a fair epitome of his own doctrines. If so, if he really meant that phrase in the literal sense in which he expressed it, then I definitely take exception, and I hope that you do also. The phrase he used was that man is not only a culture-creating animal but also he is a culture-trapped animal. Now, the sense in which he meant to use that expression I think is not that of a trap from which there is no escape. Animals do escape from traps. I don't believe that "trapped" is really the happiest phrase for describing the condition that Professor Graubard was explaining. Man is conditioned by his culture, often impeded by his culture. But man also is, to a very large extent, balanced and governed by the culture in which he lives. The fact that one is, to an extent, under the control of a culture--to which he himself is a contributor--has both its constructive and its destructive aspects.

I recall very well the time when I first became acquainted with this way of looking at social affairs. It was as an undergraduate in

Cornell University, more years ago than I like to count now. In a course in "Greek Politics" a book was assigned which was called "Physics and Politics," written by Walter Bagehot. His other principal work dealt with "Lombard Street," the financial center of Great Britain, which reveals the fact that he was primarily a banker and a dabbler, somewhat of an amateur, in social science. Now the thing that Walter Bagehot was emphasizing in that book, "Physics and Politics," was that in the development of civilization the initial difficulty was the developing of what he called a "cake of custom," what we generally called mores now. That phrase of his, "cake of custom," has pretty largely disappeared from our literature, but still is one which is quite vividly descriptive.

Then, Bagehot goes on to say, after painfully having built up and implemented those group customs which would keep the individual more or less in line, then you have the terrifically hard job of breaking that cake of custom so that you would not be trapped literally in the culture which has been building up. In order that you should have a growing culture, that you should have the opportunity for reasonable amounts of experimentation and for constructive types of innovation, that cake of custom must not be too rigid. There must be opportunity for experimentation with new ways of doing things which, if they worked successfully, would gradually be absorbed to the modification and enlargement and growth of the culture.

I think Professor Graubard has performed one of the most valuable and vitally distinctive services of any lecturer I have heard on these programs. This is the first time I have attended a session in which anthropology was included--rounding out that mystical number of seven which we include in the social sciences today. He and Dr. Miner contribute to a well-rounded view of what it is we are trying to do in this general field of social organization in the agricultural field. And the point to which their talks brought us is that of emphasizing the great importance of knowing what the conditioning mass of a given rural culture is and of studying it that we may help to break it down at points where it is acting as a bar to progress rather than contributing to future progress. No less important is it that we take advantage of this culture where it has a sort of balance wheel function. But either way, we must understand the role of culture if we are to deal intelligently with the forces of human nature in that milieu in which we have to work with human beings to accomplish particular results.

In deference to Carl Taylor, I want to call your attention to the fact that I have pretty generally been talking in terms of social science and social organization and social effort and social goals, and not merely economics. At times I have illustrated what I wanted to say by saying, "Here is a concrete illustration which naturally I draw from my own professional field." That does not mean, by any manner of means, that I minimize or that I think you should minimize the very large area which lies outside the field of economics and think that we "cash economists" don't know about these other things or are not interested in them. It is simply because of the need for a professional division of labor that we economists are concerned with the techniques of that pecuniary process under which our society operates. Because they condition productivity and determine the quantity of the social dividend and the individual distribution of cash income, they become the broad foundation on which other social activities are to a considerable extent necessarily resting. The economist is frankly materialistic in the technique



of his job, only because it is his specialized concern to show how human beings can organize themselves in the pecuniary sort of society we have, or that we may evolve. He seeks to learn how we can conduct those pecuniary affairs in such a way that we can lay the broadest material foundation out of which to build a richer culture. Many of these values, many of these activities go far beyond the economic sphere.

But let us come back to what was said about culture and man as a culture-trapped animal, or a culture-balanced animal. Both these aspects perhaps could be comprehended by saying that man is a culture-conditioned animal. I think it was very proper to put our emphasis first on the importance of establishing a reservoir of culture. But you don't want to stop there and I don't want to stop there. While we must be acutely conscious of and practical about this great reservoir, our attention must also be focused very vitally, and in creative ways I think, upon the way in which that culture is being currently fed. We are not concerned merely with the reservoir and the maintenance of the reservoir, but are concerned also with the springs from which the reservoir is fed. That, it seems to me, is what in agricultural adjustment "all the shooting is about." We are trying there--and I laid some emphasis on this in my previous talk--trying very definitely to change our economic institutions. We are trying to envision larger goals and to find practical techniques for reaching those goals.

Here I want again to indicate some little disagreement with some of the other speakers who have been talking here, or if not actual disagreement at least some discrimination of views. I think there is a good deal in what Professor Graubard said about the unwisdom of government indulging in large philosophies. I take it that a world which is struggling with ideologies and having ideological wars, would be a pretty good illustration of some of those difficulties. On the other hand, I am somewhat puzzled about this matter of government philosophy, and I want to talk with you about some of the puzzlement that I have had. I am not quite sure as to the sense in which his words should be applied if we are talking about our national philosophy or those larger ideals or remote objectives as applied within a particular field of human endeavor, of culture making, culture modifying, culture stretching, growing--whatever you want to call it--which is embraced in a particular type of activities such as these which go broadly under the name of agricultural adjustment today.

Perhaps I shouldn't appeal to a philosopher to controvert this view in derogation of philosophy. And yet I can't help referring to some remarks of T. V. Smith that I heard him make one time addressing a farmers' conference at Ames, Iowa. He was talking about the nature of the thought process, of course relating it to philosophy. First, he put the type of thinking which we get under the head of "day-dreaming," of turning your mind loose and seeing where it gets you, letting it roll and seeing how far it will go, of getting the most adequate, the biggest view of human life and of things desirable to humankind that we can. It is in this phase of our thinking, he said, that we develop our broadest philosophy, or, as he put it, our highest ideals. He stressed, and I am inclined to stress likewise, the thought that for civilized, intellectual, educated human beings, this kind of thinking--or philosophizing--is not to be shunned but to be sought, to be cultivated. If, as I said the other day, God created man in his own image as also a creator, giving him mind, qualities, different from, and as we like to think, higher

than those of the other animals, then we should use them and press them to the limit to get this far horizon.

But then, Smith went on to say, you couldn't have a good society built just on that kind of human activity. It has its dangers. Just aimless "mooning around" is not quite what I am thinking of, although it is akin to it; it is perhaps the dangerous side of that type of activity. But even at its best, as trained thinking in that field of searching the far horizons, even so, that is not enough; and alone it might bring us to a worse condition even than we are in now. But there is another field of human thinking, of looking at the hard and stern and practical realities, looking at this trap--relatively speaking--within which our culture has us, looking at the human beings whom we have to work with, all that whole range of conditioning factors, and then getting out of these conditioning factors a set of nice comfortable, practical, closer fitting, working ideals.

Now there were a lot of good Methodist ladies and Baptist deacons in that audience who shook their heads a good deal at this idea of Professor Smith's--Congressman Smith now--in suggesting that people should have high ideals and low ideals too. But I think there is just that sort of a dualism in our lives. I was trying to emphasize something of that sort the other day in my two-fold division of the agricultural adjustment effort as ultimate ideals and working programs or techniques for attaining faraway goals. I don't believe that as workers in the BAE, as workers in the planning agency or action agency within this social field, we want to be limited to mere improvisation. We don't want to follow a mere policy of muddling through. We want intelligent formulation of both goals and procedures. One of the most distinctive things in the last few administrations, as exemplified particularly in work done in agriculture, is that trained people have been organized to do the best rationalizing that they can along these two lines: first, defining the larger objectives, the remoter goals toward which we are trying to work; and, second, on this plane of working ideals, devising actual means of bringing these hopes to pass.

The other day, I was emphasizing two ways of going at the practical problem of finding out how to move toward the goals which you set up today--the best you can set up in the light of your past knowledge, but recognizing that they will have to be modified as you go along. You will get new light, your fields of attention will somewhat change, and you will have a constant process of interaction between work on the practical details of programs and the refurbishing and reannouncing of larger objectives toward which you are trying to help your fellowman work. In this endeavor emphasis falls on two things. One is the importance of getting professionally trained staffs to work with as good scientific methods as we can develop, using the tools of statistics, of theoretical analysis, of social generalization, of anthropological work, of social psychology, all the tools which we have been developing, and to bring them to bear upon what may be called the technical aspects of working out these schemes of joint human endeavor. The other point of emphasis is on the general scheme under which this technical work must be organized. It was because I believe a special technique of democratic action is here involved, because of my belief that democracy does not have merely a political foundation that I stress this point. Not even in its anthropological or psychological background do we find the



justification or the rationalization of democracy. Practical, comprehensive democracy is sound economics. It is because of my recognition of this fact that I place my emphasis on this democratic scheme of organization.

What is the prime concern of economics? It is to make the most effective use of relatively scarce resources. That is the basic idea of all our economic research and theorizing. Now, the thing which I want to submit is that, certainly in any advanced stage of society, the only way to make the most effective use of a nation's resources is through a democratic scheme of organization. Obviously, to increase the productivity of a society, you must draw upon your whole labor force and especially the relatively rare qualities within that labor force, such as the scientist, the administrator, the operator (where the emphasis is on manual dexterity rather than on any thought process), the extravert qualities of the leader. You have to take your whole population and go clear to the bottom of it in sifting for people who have qualities which are valuable in building up the productivity of the complex sort of mechanism which is involved in modern social and economic life. And to find them is, of course, simply one part of the process. To give them opportunity is the other part. Any society which attempts to run itself by such personnel as it may get out of an aristocratic ruling class, or out of a group who come to positions of power primarily on the basis of hereditary wealth, is cutting itself off from a very important part of the labor skills (using the term in the broadest sense) that reside in human beings, cutting itself off from very important sources of energy, invention, discovery, business leadership, and what not. It is crippling its own productivity unless it provides a scheme of finding and training, and then of using, those abilities wherever they may be.

Of course the democratic experiment is a comparatively new venture in human society. But we have been trying gradually to broaden the base of participation in culture making. And to me it seems that, in spite of the difficulties that grow out of that effort, experience clearly indicates that the broader the base of participation is built, the stronger the economic society which is created, the greater the possibility of developing the full measure of productivity of which your civilization, your nation, is capable.

Now, that seems to me to be the essential thing which is being innovated from the administrative side in the organization of which you are a part. You represent the professionally trained group of people who are attempting to do the fundamental work necessary to develop the system of action programs to be applied in the field. But Mr. Short the other day, in his discussion of administration, brought out very forcefully the futility of attempting to feed down the results of such work from the top. The materials which your professional labors are making available for the potential service of agriculture must be assimilated into the thinking, the faith even, of the men and women who are to put it into practice. You must get in mental step with them and they with you. It is important to realize that you can't do your professional work, you can't get the theorizing, the working out of techniques, the elaboration of details of programs in such a way that they can be applied, that you can be at all sure of their soundness, except as you are drawing from that broad participation of all the people who are themselves part of the going concern of agriculture which you are trying to adjust.



In the natural sciences a man can study a problem very fruitfully and much farther on the isolated laboratory basis than he can in the social sciences. He there can isolate certain particular situations in order to simplify his problem. But you cannot do that in the natural sciences without doing violence to the processes which you undertake to study. I think we are coming to realize that the social sciences are, by definition, something basically different from the laboratory science of nature. You can't study in isolation the phenomena of a social process. The social process is a life process. It is human beings working together in a highly complex situation, working with particular techniques, on given resources, the human factor with the natural factor, presenting all sorts of marvelous and complex combinations. The generalization which can be made in isolation, insofar as it is true, is practically sterile as to those situations. Social science is organized knowledge with reference to human individuals, with their human peculiarities and their cultural background, in action. For the grasp and interpretation of such processes you have to have, as I see it, the participation of enough people to give an adequate representation of those situations, adequate to give you the necessary array of data in action. If you are going to do social theorizing which is of any great value, if the small steps which you undertake toward the achieving of somewhat larger goals are to be soundly conceived and to be timed and spaced and dimensioned so that they can be accepted by the human-beings-in-their-culture that you have to deal with, then they have got to be worked out not precisely in the terms of the natural scientist, who has an absolute criterion and pretty definite controls to appeal to, but by a process of conference and negotiation.

I happen to have been pretty active in recent years in the Social Science Research Council, and this is one of the central themes with which we have been preoccupied there. The question has not yet been answered as to what social science really is. The Council is trying to exercise some intellectual leadership toward finding out. Do so-called social scientists use rigorous criteria of logical thinking; have we used intelligently the methods of quantitative measurement which have been developed in the natural sciences, adapting them to conditions in social sciences in such a way as to make them useful, thus availing ourselves of tools of wide applicability? Or, on the other hand, have we, by mere mimicry of the methods of the natural sciences, by mere repetitive transfer of the pattern of natural science into the social science field, essentially misconceived the nature of our task? Have we therefore failed to get a social science which has validity, which has a measure of predictive value, which enables us to work systematically and effectively on our social problems? To my way of thinking, we have had too much of mimicry. We have not done enough by way of attempting to formulate our theories under the expert guidance of the professionally trained person, working with the complementary supply of data and the complementary thinking of these people who are "out at the grass roots" of the significant operative situations.

I say that advisedly because my faith in intellectual democracy is based on a disbelief that the thinking of many of the native intelligences that you find on the small farm is any lower than the quality of thinking that I find down on the floor of the Social Science Research Council or on the rostrums of class rooms, or in seminar sessions. Human brains are a funny thing. There is a lot of stupidity that is

dressed up to pass as scholarship, and there is a lot of homely phrased talk that goes on on the part of the operators of small farms which is capable of making a real contribution to the building up of that organized knowledge we call social science.

Take an analogy from the field of invention. The inventions have not all been made in the laboratory or by the specialized inventor by any manner of means. As you are perfectly aware, there is a stream of invention coming from the laboratory; and it is invaluable. It is organized and disciplined and works in ways which guarantee a systematic development of science, invention, and discovery, which we couldn't forego. But at the same time, down through the whole history of invention, we see the contribution of the mere machine tender, the lazy cuss who has some function to perform and says, "Well, that could be performed mechanically." He may put on the gadget himself or may propose it because he wants to save work. The star illustration relates to the early steam engine. A factory "hand" was set to open and close the valves in order that the engine would continue in its rotations, a purely routine and mechanical process. He got tired of it and attached a stick or string between two moving parts which he perceived were synchronized, and one moved the other. Then he had nothing to do but sit there and watch it work. That is one illustration of many; the point I want to make is that in science and engineering, the perception--it may not even be much of a thought process; it may be just a flash which opened someone's eyes and his brain--that leads to progress may come from the bottom of the human group instead of the top. It may be shrewd thought that goes beyond the obvious and discovers something; it may be purely stumbling upon some new bit of truth as Professor Graubard illustrated this morning. We don't know how a great many of these contributions in the natural field were made, but we know in a good many cases they were stumbled upon. Hence society can't afford not to invite and take a look at all that spontaneous mass of suggestion with reference to the developing of our social process which springs up among the rank and file of those who are operatives within it.

Well, that perhaps is an elaborate explanation after the fact of what has been done. It was because M. L. Wilson had worked with Montana farmers and, as he had worked, had seen all this, that he has been so much interested in the process of popular discussion, that he has sought to implement it into particular new devices, many of which you are experimenting with today. In spite of the fact that often we who are professionally trained get rather tired of messing around with local self-government in the economic field or with this broad participation in program making, I think we can't afford to forego it; there is too much pay dirt there. Administratively, of course, Professor Short's remarks showed very much better than I can the value of those devices which as a result of this comprehensive study in those complicated situations have been formulated to get programs suitably adapted and effectively applied back in the local areas.

Just one other point I want to make in that connection. This concerns the other phase of my belief in the economic foundations of democracy. As I said, we started out to try to run one economic system on an aristocratic basis, a small group of people running it and the rest taking orders. Gradually, experience has taught us that you have to broaden the basis of operation if you are going to have the thinking,



the planning, and the application effectively done. But likewise, in terms of return from the system, it has proceeded from aristocratic premises. Primarily, there has been a claiming of benefits at the top. Now of course benefits accrue at the top. If profits are made, the "big money" is there to be divided. And so we have built up distributive systems which have tended to be aristocratic in character, although we have now gone through some stages of democratization of the process of distribution.

The distributive issue that we are most accustomed to thinking of is that between capital and labor. In a capitalist society, it is the capitalist who gets the first cut-in from the returns of the business. By putting his capital in, increasing productivity, if he can hold labor down to where it was, there is a large strip of velvet for him, and the natural human tendency has been to retain it. Then labor unions came along and said, "No, we are parties, we are productive members." Sometimes they said, "We are the productive members in this proposition, you just happen to be in a place where you can take the jack-pot and run away with it and give us just bare subsistence." The labor unions, still out of self-interest--as they interpreted it, naturally, against the background of their culture--started the process of fighting to change the division of the returns. And because, or more or less in step with modifications in that division, the productivity of the system was enabled to grow. Those who happened to be in the more advantageous position, the aristocratic position, with reference to that control found that they had to give things up, they didn't give them up because they were trying to make the economic system work better. But you have to settle strikes by making concessions, and so broader distribution made the system work better even for the employer if it got people back to work.

In any broad sense, even labor didn't see the meaning of this development. It, too, proceeded on aristocratic lines, an aristocracy of labor. The scarce and highly marketable few who were in the strong bargaining position got their wages up as fast and far as possible. The Railroad Brotherhoods are the classic example in this country. There again the process of democratization took place and in time shop unions came in and got some of the gravy. Similarly from the aristocracy of the building trades, the labor movement got down gradually to longshoremen, waiters, and the great labor proletariat. Their wages were not perhaps increased in proportion to their productive contribution, compared to the scarce individuals, the aristocrats of labor. But their wages increased more or less, and the process limped along with these gradual and grudging concessions. And now you have a great conflict between the trade union A. F. of L. and the industrial union C.I.O., with certain still broader types of labor schemes for changing the basis of distribution.

All this has taken place through a series of very short and stumbling steps. But all told, we have made a lot of progress. Broadly speaking, it can be said that the sort of progress you make that way is pretty sure to stick. The sort of progress you make by rapid advances, by long rushes, has to be readjusted by retreats at points while gains are consolidated. That may be, I suspect it is, about the situation that we are in with reference to the New Deal. The New Deal, if I understand what Professor Graubard meant this morning, was too philosophical, it took up too large and grandiose schemes. I have said this



myself sometimes about the leaders of the New Deal. It seemed to me that they misconceived, or let us say overestimated, the rate at which a society, even a popularly educated society like ours, can absorb social changes.

It is very hard to judge what that rate is. Fortune took a poll the other day and started at the top of the list with the reforms of the financial system, the Federal Deposit Insurance guarantee, S.E.C., and various things of that sort, and asked the businessmen how many of them wanted to repeal these measures. There has been all sorts of kicking about these measures in the last six years. But, assuming that that poll was somewhat representative, it is striking that on those measures, there were only three, four, six, or seven per cent who wanted repeal. In other words, they have pretty largely digested the changes. As you got down to the bottom of the list, which was supposed to include the major New Deal measures, there were only one or two at the bottom of the list where even the businessmen showed a majority in favor of repeal. One was a high majority and the measure has already been repealed.

The point which I think is significant here, however, is that at the present time we are coming to the point of getting the fruits of that popular education which has been a distinctive feature of our culture. Today the typical worker is a high school person; the typical professional or executive noncommissioned or commissioned officer is typically a university person. We are beginning to get the fruits of so-called higher education so that we can do some thinking in broad theoretical terms on economic issues, which puts individual self-interest on that higher plane which tends to identify it much closer with the interest of the group.

I have had occasion recently in connection with my studies of industrial price policies to study a good many business executives as illustrations of this point. And I believe that the changes of outlook which have come about are greater than we ordinarily realize. Of course we are not satisfied with the present situation, but a social scientist has no business being an impatient person. It wasn't so long ago that industry was following a rule-of-thumb process in its technical practices and trying to get ahead through trade secrets rather than scientific research. In hardly more than a quarter of a century, the natural scientist, the industrial chemist, the engineer have come to a position which makes them a large factor in the rapid technical advance that industry is making today.

And so, as a patient social scientist I am reasonably content with the extent to which business executives are going to college to train for business and professionally trained people are finding careers in the research department, in the personnel office, in the marketing department, or even the advertising branch of business today. I believe that that trained thinking is coming to bear on the double process of conceiving the larger objectives and working out the practical details by which they can be accomplished. In industry, of course, democratization by which the concerns and the view and the brilliant suggestions emanating from the labor side may be fed in, is not as easy as is the economic democratization of a small-scale business like agriculture. But thinking in the several interrelated branches of industry must be put on this plane before we can get a stable economic culture.

And so, if I may end on the hopeful note I was stressing in my previous talk, it seems to me that the undertaking with which you are identified, these developments within the Department of Agriculture over the last ten or fifteen years, constitute truly the spring from which the reservoir of culture in the agricultural segment of our economic society is being fed, and that we are pioneers in something of wide social import. Accordingly, we should take our task with the utmost responsibility. We have distinctive new devices, devices that make a lot of trouble, that register a willingness "to do things the hard way." But in this combination of democratic participation by the whole and group leadership by the elite at several levels, selected to function from the local farm through to the marble palace across the street and the gigantic building behind it, there is something of deep social significance. It should challenge our best effort toward pruning away some of its defects--like the untenable parity formula that Joe Davis dissected the other day--pruning away the defects we find in practice, but keeping this stream of fresh growth and new development always free and active.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT AND  
ADMINISTRATION

THE RELATION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR TO THE FARMER AND THE EXPERT  
Kimball Young

Mr. Taeusch, ladies and gentlemen:

Our basic assignment, as members of the Department of Agriculture, is to serve the farmer, and indirectly the entire country. The farmer does not exist for us; we exist for the farmer, and our work falls largely into two classes, that of administration and that of scientific research. In the words of the statistician, we must keep in mind three variables: the farmer, the administrator, and the expert, including in this last category both the research man and the technical worker, although their functions are, strictly speaking, somewhat different. How to bring these three together into some working cooperation with the least strain on them and the greatest public benefit is a challenging problem. In discussing this matter, I want to draw on cultural anthropology and social psychology.

I

During this conference we have heard a good deal about culture. Permit me to comment briefly on the meaning of this concept. There is some evidence that many of you still think of culture as having to do chiefly with polite manners and somewhat inconsequential aspects of life. I was struck by the fact that the previous speaker, Dr. Nourse, referred to some difference between culture and the economic process. Now the economic process is a part of culture. For example, the price structure and the problem of getting the wealth of the country justly distributed is as much a part of the cultural process as anything else we have been discussing. Be that as it may, the principal criticism which the cultural anthropologist would offer the economist is that the latter has not gone far enough in his analysis to realize the significance of noneconomic factors in human behavior. Yet we are all gradually coming to sense the interplay of all these cultural factors.

Dr. Nourse was kind enough to mention social psychology, and I thank him for that. Social psychology has to do with the individual, but not as a social atom or a simple unit without reference to other individuals. It deals with individuals in interaction and in terms of their motivations and interests, and with the manner in which they find their satisfaction in the totality of social life. Graubard, Vance, and Miner have already stressed these factors from the angle of culture. Yet there are one or two other matters in regard to culture which I want to note in rapid review.

We must not neglect the importance of cultural integration and the problem of the balance between the individual and group interest. We should fully realize such factors as the continuity of culture, its persistence, its resistance to change, and its stability as well as the fact that it is also in the process of some kind of alteration. One of the crucial needs of our modern world is the resolution of the difficulties indicated by Nourse and Graubard, that is, just how fast may we



safely proceed to bring about cultural change without disrupting the stabilizing factors in culture itself. It may well be that the inertia in culture is itself one of its most valuable assets.

On the side of personality we are concerned with the qualifications of people for adaptation to the material and cultural world in which they live. We should never forget the fact that back of particular adjustments lie the constitutional or organic foundations of all behavior. In fact, most of the previous speakers have used the term "human nature" pretty largely in this sense and not in the way in which Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, or George H. Mead have employed it when they contend that human nature is acquired through living in society. This is a mere terminological difference, but it is important to call attention to the fact that underneath the culture of any society there still remain some basic and fundamental biological motivations. You have to eat. Don't ever forget that. You have to take care for yourself against the elements. You must protect yourself in order to survive in the face of danger. So, too, man's powerful reproductive impulses are not to be denied. Those things are basic to the individual and the race, and institutions and folkways in the end must be justified in terms of man's deeper and persistent needs for survival.

## II

Coming now to my particular topic, I want to discuss with you some of the cultural and psychological features of these three variables: farmer, administrator, and expert, and then try to see their functions in terms of our own particular democratic processes.

Our fundamental problem is to aid in devising ways and means for helping the farmer, and indirectly the balance of the country's population, to a more satisfying frame of life, a happier condition generally. We should not forget the important comments of Vance in this connection. In the end these basic long-time values have to do with the problem of human satisfaction and human happiness.

Let us look then, first at the culture and personality of the farmer. Since we have heard a good deal about these matters already, I shall touch on them very briefly. The farmer has a set of attitudes, a certain set of values or frames of reference--call them what you want--which reflect his general culture as well as his local and regional variabilities, such as types of farming. He has essentially the same basic desires that we all recognize in ourselves.

The historical roots of American agriculture lie in various quarters: many of the early colonists and settlers were urban folk, others had a peasant background. Among the latter, some moved into the country more or less as organized groups, as witness the Moravians, the Menonites, and the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch. But as our own American agricultural patterns developed--in terms of free land, expanding markets, and increasing attention to specialization of crops--the initial general, more or less noncommercial farming, gave way to a high degree of commercialization linked as it was closely to the profit system. Some of our present national and regional problems are partially an outcome of this division in types of farming between what is essentially that of the general, small-operator, chiefly subsistence, kind of agriculture, and that which has emerged with the great stress on cash crops

and specialization. Moreover, this difficulty did not arise in 1930, nor in 1920. The problem has been developing for some decades; in fact, with respect to tobacco and cotton it is an old, not a new problem in our country. A fuller recognition, in fact, of the implications of this difference in the culture of American agriculture might help us to phrase and to solve our farm difficulties a bit more rationally.

The general largely noncommercial farmer represents the traditional picture of agricultural life. We have heard a good deal about the rural way of life, and ideologically it is an outgrowth of the peasant way of life; but it has of course been profoundly modified in our own country. The frontier, the increased opportunity for accumulation of wealth and expansion of markets which would absorb agricultural surpluses, gradually affected the ideology and practices of the general farmers. There gradually emerged commercialized and highly specialized cropping. The influence of the speculative ideology of the frontier played a part in all this. The exploitation of land and resources became an important aspect of our American culture. The farmer simply followed the same pattern of action evident in mining and other extractive industries. Then, too, we had the emergence of the capitalistic ethos in agriculture, very early in cotton and tobacco, then in corn and wheat, and later in the fruit and dairy industries. All these changes altered the rural way of life, but in differing degrees. Sometimes the farmer knew enough not to over-exploit the land, but all too frequently he lacked the necessary foresight to realize the long-time implications of poor farm practices. Sometimes he tried to maintain what we now call a balanced agriculture, but in those areas where commercial farming was the vogue he could not ordinarily long resist the temptation to follow the economic fashion of his time and go in for specialization of crops and money-making at the expense of the older ways of life. These changes not only influence his economic patterns but others as well. The commercial farmer as a type sooner or later takes on the urban way of life--he identifies himself with the banker and merchant; he adopts bookkeeping and cost accounting as a symbol as well as device of efficiency; he loses the old values of neighborliness and thinks more in terms of his immediate profit than of any particular virtue in living on a farm. While there are, of course, regional variations in these matters, no one doubts that commercial farming changes not only the economic but the noneconomic culture patterns of rural people.

On the other hand, much general farming has remained, with its accompanying features of neighborhood and community life. And it is my belief that some of the confusion in our programs to aid farmers has arisen because we have not fully realized that we have been called upon to deal with what are really two types of farmers. On the one hand we have a series of problems connected with excess production, loss of world markets, bad droughts, and related matters, especially in reference to corn, wheat, cotton, and tobacco. On the other hand we have problems associated with the underprivileged farmer, with the effects of long attempts to get a living out of poor soil, and especially with the problem of excess rural population which has accumulated during the decade of industrial depression.

As to personality make-up, the general farmer--as a type--once represented an integrated, self-reliant, individualistic fellow. He had a very strong sense of security. He had very little debt and was opposed to gambling. He had all the ideology of thrift and saving; was



naive in the best sense of that word, and found integration in a healthy family and community life. As measured by urban financial standards, his level of aspiration was low and his achievement was not far out of line. In contrast, the commercialized farmer has been urbanized; he tends to be the impersonal type; money economy has come into the picture, and efficiency, speculation and intensive competition for wealth have entered his habits, attitudes, and fundamental values. (And in connection with the rise of the commercial farmer, I should like really to know how much the establishment of this Bureau itself was stimulated by the demands of the commercial farmer. Who first began to ask the Department of Agriculture to help them out in matters of marketing and economics generally? Was it the general farmer? I doubt it very much. The impress of commercial agriculture itself has affected the growth of your own BAE; it has affected the ideas and values of the Bureau personnel with reference to American farming.)

Today the farmer is faced with a serious crisis, and when confronted by a dislocation of habits and values the individual tends to be thrown back upon his emotions, upon primitive types of behavior. Let me mention just a few of these changes:

In terms of our traditional American self-reliance and initiative, many farmers are really losing their belief in their personal and class importance. Many have developed a sense of guilt and shame, and of inferiority for failure. There is a growing apathy on the part of some, and increased irritation on the part of others. Many are thrown back upon emotional reactions because they have long suffered frustration and sense of insecurity. Graubard mentioned the function of rationalization in these matters, of putting the blame on somebody else--government, banker, foreign markets, imports, tariff, and so on; of seeking new kinds of panacea, some Utopian dreams perhaps. The farmer is no different from anyone else in these reactions of his to critical circumstances. So we ask, what can we do? What kind of fellows are there in the government service who are in a position to help the farmers out?

### III

We come first to the administrator and his culture patterns. The administrative ideology and practice grew up in terms of certain services which the state could render to the citizen. The essential features of the administration have to do with rules and regulations which bring about more efficient action. One of the tragedies of administration, of course, is that in seeking for uniformity, regularity, efficiency, and predictability, we often develop an institution which at times defeats its larger societal purpose. There arises an administrative ritual or ceremonial with which the anthropologist could have a great deal of fun if he set out to examine it objectively. I refer, of course, to the familiar "red tape." You do not think of it as a ceremonial, but in many ways it is about as effective in getting real work done as are the gestures of the medicine man who tosses feathers in the air and prays for rain.

Administrators all too frequently become so bound to standard practices that they come to believe them inevitable. The social ritual of bureaucracy becomes more important than the social function for which the organization was set up in the first place. I am putting this



baldly, radically, and in terms of the extreme case, because bureaucracy does tend toward involved ritualism if it is not checkmated. At all times the administrator should realize his role in relation to the larger problem of serving the public and should be on his guard against the almost inevitable growth of the mechanics of executive action.

One of the most interesting things in this connection is the rise of organized concern for self-perpetuation. Once established, a bureaucracy sooner or later begins to devote its energy not alone to the public service for which it was set up, but to the end of retaining its place in the administrative hierarchy. This struggle for survival and status may in the end assume more importance than anything else, and rationalizations of one's significance are the cheapest currency with which to buy self-preservation.

We have problems to solve and actions to perform, and our rules and regulations should always be subject to review by those who honestly ask if such devices function to the end of public benefit. All too frequently the usefulness of these very rules and regulations is lost in the maze of intricate, meaningless detail.

Yet all this presents the worse side of administration. There are many features which are not only valid but without which we should be exposed on all sides to even graver danger from the "spoils system." I fully realize that administrative practices themselves have arisen in part as devices to prevent the interference by the politician in the work assigned to various agencies of government. Again I put the matter in rather extreme form for purposes of emphasis. But we must never let our worries over the "spoils system" serve as a mere excuse for entangling administration in so much "red tape" as to hinder effective service to the public.

Now, what about the psychology of the administrator as a person? In a time like this, when rapid action is demanded, we often find two types of administrator. We have the old-line executive officer and the new-line one, that is, the one who has been charged with developing the so-called Action Agencies. But I want to speak for a moment of the former, the traditionalist. He tends to follow in the pattern of the fixed formulae, the set rules and regulations. As a personality, he tends to be one who finds his satisfactions in well ordered living: stability, regularity of performance, adherence to detail, and caution regarding any departure from the bureaucratic folkways. Person-to-person relations usually follow the hierarchical lines; fixed status becomes a high value in his life organization. There is, in fact, a certain compulsive character about all this. One of the things often said about a man in a bureaucratic organization whom you do not like is that "he does not fit in." You give your own case away the moment you say that. Or, a traditional administrator may be afraid to make a novel decision because it might establish a precedent contrary to old practice. These items by themselves do not seem significant, but they are symbolic of the very inner life of the personnel who operate administrative machinery. There is thus a somewhat fixed culture of administration, and a certain corresponding type of person who works within this cultural frame of reference.

On the other hand, in the face of a series of overwhelming problems we often find that the established folkways of administration will

break down, and what happens then? We are likely to get the reformer into the administrative set-up, and he just raises all kinds of trouble for the old-line personnel. When a reformer becomes an administrator the shock to the traditional system may be tremendous, but it is such reactions which bring about changes in institutions. Thus, the institutions of administration themselves are profoundly modified by the coming of the reformer into the situation. He is another type of fellow who in order to effectuate action begins to reorganize the old order of doing things. This distresses the traditional administrator and brings about a certain conflict in the policies of a bureau or department. Moreover, some of the inconsistencies that have disturbed Mr. Davis have likewise troubled the old-line personnel.

But the interesting thing is that as time has gone on there has come to be more and more merging together of the old and the new. The out-and-out reformer and many of his cohorts who were here a few years ago have departed, and already another type of person has come in, and the whole operation is settling down to a new kind of bureaucratic organization. In fact, we are witnessing the rise of new institutions and agencies, designed--it is hoped--to offer more adequate service to the farmer and to all citizens.

#### IV

The expert represents a rather different sort of personality than the administrator. He symbolizes scientific research and high specialization of knowledge. I am glad Graubard has talked about science as much as he has because in the whole history of culture the rise of science is one of the most unique events known to man. It represents a frame of reference, a way of looking at the world of events, that is so much out of line with the rest of human history that hardly any of us can follow its full import. The man in the street may chatter about science, but he little realizes the significance of the scientific attitude and objectivity as a form of thought. He can and does benefit from the application of research, but he need know nothing of its logic or experiment. Thus, when people drive an automobile they may know nothing about the scientific principles underneath its operation. It is not necessary in order to be practical.

The whole ideology, the whole theory and procedure of science, is a highly specialized affair; science is a kind of esoteric cult reserved for only a few. Although the scientist may have public recognition for his discoveries, qua scientist he is necessarily remote and isolated from life. And that very isolation changes his relationship to the world around him. As a citizen he is no different than the rest of us, but as a scientist he is tremendously unlike us. As a person, his special work tends to build up in him a certain dissociated quality. He lives in a world of science so different and remote from his everyday life that he is almost a dual personality. He is supposed to produce a certain body of verifiable facts. But when we turn to apply what he gives us we are confronted with difficulties. Certainly most research men are incapable of, or disinterested in, applying their findings.

The high prestige of the research worker in the mind of the ordinary man--farmer, villager, or urbanite--is witnessed in the fact that for the latter the scientist is a magic worker, with status not unlike

that of the medicine man in primitive society. This is one reason why he can talk about anything in the world and be accorded serious consideration. The public usually believes the scientist to know everything. Yet his very specialization, of course, indicates that actually he does not and cannot fit this popular stereotype. Moreover, even his technical knowledge must usually be transmitted by others--with us usually through the administrator or educator--who can make it meaningful to the farmer.

In this connection I want to say a word or two about social science. While it has no such respectability as natural science, administrators and practical men are coming to ask its aid in the present crises, and certainly it has some contribution to make. The role of agricultural economics, in fact, is pretty well established; but certain of the newer disciplines are just now beginning to be recognized. Thus, in terms of anthropology and psychology we are coming to realize that the practices of land use are human matters. Land mapping and soil studies, and so on, are important only if they are related to the people who live on the land, and the very recognition of these factors at this conference demonstrates the need for a body of knowledge which these new sciences may and should bring into this picture. Or, to take another example,--the operation of the democratic process,--we hope to be able to provide some knowledge as to how farmer participation may be made an actuality and not merely a theory. Certainly if we cannot aid in revealing the human values in democracy in time, our people may turn to accept dictatorial forms of public control. Certainly before we have to make this sort of choice I should like at least to see if we cannot, with the aid of the human sciences, make representative democracy work effectively. This is no place to go into an analysis of differences between dictatorial and democratic forms of social interaction; but it seems to me we could begin with certain fundamental and expert analyses of the democratic way of life and learn from such an investigation how to relate these facts to the larger program of helping to solve the farmers' problems.

In any case, the expert is charged essentially with the task of fact-finding and analysis, and it is the duty of the administrator to draw upon the scientist for these facts and interpretations whenever he can, to the end that his service to the public may be more effective and realistic within the framework of our own democratic culture.

## V

Turning now to a consideration of the democratic process, let me say that this also represents a culturally accepted ideal or value and a set of everyday practices--the latter both those legally set down in the statutes and those which have grown up in terms of everyday procedure, such as executive regulations, the party system, and the like. The democratic process has to do, of course, with the participation of adult and normal people in the making and application of public policies in so far as this conforms to the general public good. The delegation of power should never occur until it is evident that ordinary men, as citizens, cannot handle the particular public obligation. It is upon this principle, in fact, that farmer participation in administrative programs has been projected, and though our practice may belie our ideals in many instances, there is a solid core of value and experience behind the practice.



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Put otherwise, we may say that individualism is a very important factor in the whole democratic process, and it reaches not only into politics but into private enterprise and private initiative generally. I think we all too frequently think of democracy only in the political sense. Yet in any case power and responsibility should go together. That is the thing I want to stress. Elected or appointed to public office, a man must be held accountable for his public acts. There is no place in our society for the "I-am-the-State" idea, whether it be said by Louis XIV or Adolf Hitler. And in order to help insure individual choice and judgment we have developed--over centuries--a body of cultural devices of great importance. I refer to the function of freedom of assembly and protest, free speech, free press; the protection of minority from majority and majority from militant minority. All these and kindred values are familiar to you, but they need reemphasis in a time when men so easily give up these values because for the nonce dictatorial procedures seem more valid and praiseworthy because they "get things done;" they reduce delay; they induce efficiency; and they produce a sense of completion--sometimes even when there has been no real solution.

I want to add a few words further about some other implications respecting political life: Graubard would have the state become a glorified Academy of Science, and Nourse took the position that the state was the most important or central institution in our society. Both of these statements bother me somewhat. Regarding Graubard's point, I am reminded of von Treitschke's famous remark that the state is not an Academy of medicine or science; but that "The state is power" ("Der Staat ist macht"). To him the most important symbol of the state is the army, because it represents power. We should be loath to foster such an idea in a democracy. To take the position that the state is always the dominant agency in our society gives a basis for the rise of an ideology which fosters the extension of political power.

Personally I prefer to have the state an Academy of science and letters to the kind of thing we observe in Germany, but I doubt that we in America need to make a choice between these two concepts. While the state has been very important in the history of mankind, we should realize that our own particular form of government is very recent. Certainly in terms of our own history the state is not coextensive and coterminous with our national society. With us the state is the servant, not the master, of the people, and there are many aspects of life which the state does not touch. Under totalitarian practice, in contrast, the state is coextensive and coterminous with society, and, in theory at least, it would and should control every aspect of man's daily life. While in our own America we do witness a growing expansion of state power over the everyday life of the people--in reference to economic activities in particular--we must see to it that administrative controls do not themselves undo our democratic way of life. One way to guard against this is to provide a method by which the people who are supposed to be benefited by the process will have a hand in its planning and execution. I stress that because I think the problem of extension of state power is going to be with us for some time to come. Many of our citizens are not just opposed to the actions of the government in terms of political or party differences, but are genuinely concerned with the great expansion of the power of the modern state in reference to ever wider areas of their conduct. And all too frequently the administrator himself in time becomes the most important factor in the perpetuation of the state in reference to practical situations. What about

this? How can we make representative democracy work in the face of complex society with its multitudinous competing groups and its endless problems?

In relation to our own Department's obligations, there are many good illustrations of efforts to make democracy operate by bringing the administrator, the expert, and the farmer together into a functional relationship. In passing I shall refer to but two of these since they are both rather novel: the Soil Conservation District, and County Land Use Planning.

First, the Soil Conservation District is one of the most interesting developments of a new institution. It cuts across old political boundaries, and it represents a growing recognition of certain economic and soil realities over against the traditional realities of the political state. If this program can be made a success, it may well oblige us to think and act more objectively with respect to regions, watersheds, soil, and culture as they are integrated together. In contrast to, and ideologically in conflict with the Soil Conservation District, stands County Land Use Planning. It represents one of the most curious anomalies I know of, but it also indicates the role of the political factor in our public thinking. And we must not forget that there are political as well as economic realities. When I think about county planning I remember the phrase, "The king is dead; long live the king." So, to paraphrase, one may say, "The county is dead; long live the county." If Land Use Planning becomes fully accepted we are probably going to revive and put new life into the county, and change its whole relationship to the State and Federal Governments; because, using the framework of a particular institution, we may make alterations in policy and practice even within the framework of an out-moded institution like county government. On the other hand, it may delay the growth of regional practices; I do not know.

The significant matter is that in both Soil Conservation Districts and in County Land Use Planning we have hit on an idea of trying to operate a new system of program making in terms of the interaction of the farmer, the expert, and the administrator. The latter in particular has a grave responsibility, ladies and gentlemen. He must make available the knowledge of the scientist; he must operate a somewhat elaborate administrative instrument; and he must serve as guide and friend--but not as dictator--to local leaders and participants in their efforts to set in motion and to operate these new political, economic, and sociological institutions. There is no healthier sign of a vital democracy than the effort to put these agricultural programs right back upon local responsibility. And every time an administrator worries or complains about rural inertia, human stupidity, or local failure "to go along on the program," he should not rush off to defend centralization and concentration of bureaucratic power. He should remember other necessary characteristics of those who would participate in a democratic society, especially patience and willingness to listen sympathetically to the other fellow's complaints and queries, and to tolerate his resistances.

Putting a body of factual material from the scientist into such workable form that it can be applied to concrete problems of the farm and farmer is not always easy. One of the great problems of the administrator is to communicate to the farmer the material which he gets from



the expert in such a way as to make it practicable in everyday life. This is a large order and a very difficult one to fill. There is no doubt that some of the changes which we have in mind might be brought about more quickly and effectively if we developed a dictatorship. We have all heard comments to the effect that it is much easier and simpler to do things for the other fellow by fiat, or to regiment him into some particular plan of action. In this connection there is some danger that we will fall into our usual American pattern of action. Although we talk a great deal, we Americans really love action. But if this action is not brought about by agreement and consensus of all persons concerned, it is likely in the end to lead to some form of externalized control from the top. In other words, again, we need patience and democratic participation, which, although they do not always make for efficiency, may in the end prove more beneficial to the public. The difficulty, psychologically, with action is that it always completes a certain cycle from desire to goal or end. Once we have committed an act we cannot change it except by another action. Too frequently we have been inclined to move rapidly into given programs only to find that a given policy was running counter to another, also set up to benefit farmers. Because of this confusion some people have become discouraged about democratic participation and have taken the view that we can proceed more efficiently by coordinating our work and indulging in what are essentially short cuts to solutions. But such a point of view favoring centralized domination implies in the end a certain rigidity and absoluteness not implicit in our system. Fortunately, democracy is not a fixed and final pattern. It is diffuse in feature, and loose in operation. As T. V. Smith once put it, it is "a way of ambling along," and it may be better to "amble" than to destroy the human values which have grown up in our struggle for individual initiative and personal choice in our public life.

There are a lot of practical problems involved in all this. Are we getting democratic representation in our programs? What about the submarginal, or the noncommercial farmer, who may not recognize the meaning of these new departures? Let us take an illustration from a frequent occurrence in County Land Use Planning. For the commercial farmers in a given county it became very apparent that some of the land that ought to be taken out of use was hill land. Yet the people in the highlands had been there for a long time; they are splendid people, who have sent their children to the public school, and these children in time have contributed to the labor supply of the country. What are we to do about them? That problem is not going to be solved by the County Committee alone. There is something to be done, some action to be taken, and what is done is, of course, of tremendous importance to the whole region or the entire country. And it is at this point that County Land Use Planning--or any other local or State planning, for that matter--must be linked up with a regional and national policy. Certainly, however, we must not fall into the unsatisfactory attitude of "passing the buck"--to use a slang expression. The idea of letting the "other fellow" settle such questions is a weak excuse for our failure to help solve our difficulties. All too frequently when local people are confronted with these larger difficulties, they retreat behind the remark: "That is not our problem." We shall never get far, however, with planning, until people locally or nationally get away from this type of reaction. We need education and agreement as to the relation of local to regional and national policies and practices.



In this connection it is also important to realize that uniformities have their limits in a complex society like ours. Unless we travel over this country with our ears and eyes wide open, we little realize that we are actually a patchwork of a rather heterogeneous culture. It is in relation to varied needs that discretionary powers of the administrator come into play, and this, in turn, leaves us in some danger of giving over too much power into his hands. The accountability, again, may well lie in the checks which the local citizenry may exercise, although such control must be integrated to the needs of the region and nation as well as to those immediate to the locality or State.

In the light of our own responsibilities to aid in these various programs, we must not fail to put some curb upon the tendency of the administrator to become more important than the job he is doing. We need certainly to put some check on the self-perpetuating tendency in governmental agencies, which would persist although their public service is done. As for the expert, he should never forget that his primary task is likewise to serve the farmer, and while no sane man would make him merely a technological errand boy to the administrator or farmer, his research--whether aimed at immediate or distant application--should at all times be oriented to basic problems connected with agriculture, be they physical or social-psychological. If the scientist does a good objective job on these problems, all of his sound findings will contribute their share, not only to practice, but to the growing body of general scientific knowledge, and thereby serve a still further, though more remote, social purpose. In terms of the farmer, there is need to bring him to a realization of his place in the total national picture. Every student of our current societal problems knows that rural and urban life are bound together, and that efforts to aid the farmer cannot long neglect the corresponding responsibility of our agricultural people to deal with their difficulties in the light of the total national situation.

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In conclusion, we may say that the basic question for us is how to delegate power and yet retain control; how to combine power and responsibility in our public servants. We should never forget that the ultimate decisions rest with the people. The "ten commandments" of our constitution--our fundamental ideals--are built on the fact that society and the individual are more important than the state, and that the state is but an agency of public service. The delegation of authority, then, must always be tied up with the insistence upon accountability or responsibility. It would be a sad day for us if an administrator, or expert, or anyone else in the government, came to take upon his shoulders power without responsibility.

This is obviously our challenge, and there seem to be at least a few important matters which should not be lost sight of: First, we must never forget that the final arbiters of policy and practice are the citizens themselves. Second, public power should always be closely linked up with public responsibility, and such a principle applies equally to the citizenry as well as to the administrator, expert, legislator, or judge. Third, we should at all times be jealous to guard those instruments of democracy--participation, free assembly, free speech and press, and the like--which serve to keep the national society, as distinct from the political state, always in a position of actual or potential final control.

The Discussion Groups - Summaries of their  
Proceedings as Reported by the Secretaries.

First Day - October 17

Group I

Mr. G. E. Farrell, Leader

Mr. Preston Richards, Secretary

Four questions were suggested by members of the group for discussion as an outgrowth of the morning meeting. These questions were as follows:

1. What is man as a culture making animal? (Man versus animals in development of culture.)
2. Does biology give any reason for support of either the autocratic or democratic form of government?
3. Does biology support the family type of government?
4. Do institutions and inventions change man?

Under the first question with reference to man and animals in the culture development it was suggested that the culture that man has is more distinctive than that of animals. As an illustration of this it was stated that if 10 groups of men were placed on 10 different islands and 10 groups of cats were placed on 10 islands that the 10 groups of cats probably would develop only 1 culture while the 10 groups of men might develop 10 different cultures. The reason given for this was that man would not go entirely by instinct but partly by experience and training.

It was brought out, however, that man can always prove that what he does is rational no matter how irrational it may seem to others. Cats on the other hand have no power to prove rational what is seemingly irrational.

Under the second question with respect to the support offered by biology for either a democratic or an autocratic form of government, several ideas were expressed. It was stated that the government in many forms of animal society was autocratic only in so far as the group leader would not go against the interests of the entire group. He might oppose the interests of single members of the group but that his leadership depended upon submission of the group as a whole. This was indicated to be quite similar to various autocratic forms of government that man had established. The second question, however, was discussed along with the third and a view was presented that the government established by animals was more comparable with the family type of government in man and that the animal rule was not comparable with political government as established by man. It was further stated that the making of a government was a distinctive form of culture of man which is not developed by animals.

Another view presented was that the government that man establishes

does not depend upon biology but rather that it depends at least to some extent upon environment; environment in this case meaning the climate and other physical factors surrounding man. In support of this view it was stated that in areas where the climate was severe and resources meagre the pressure of the population upon such resources might result in an autocratic form of government.

Under the third question with reference to changes in institutions and changes in man the view was expressed that institutions would not change man as much as might be expected. It was also stated that man does not change as rapidly as machines. That is to say, that man does not adjust himself rapidly to new inventions and new institutions. Another view expressed was that one of the speakers in the morning had indulged in circular reasoning in the course of his discussions in that he had said that institutions resulted in numerous changes in man while at another point he had indicated that man had been responsible for the changes in institutions. It was not agreed, however, that this reasoning was necessarily circular.

#### Group II

Mr. Frederick V. Waugh, Leader  
Mr. Ellery Foster, Secretary

The discussion on Tuesday concerned itself chiefly with self-interest as a motivating force. Early in the session it was decided to discuss the question "Granted that self-interest is a dominant force, how can government (and also what kind of government can) best serve the self-interests of the greatest number?" Most of the period was spent in discussing the nature of self-interest so that the question of government had very brief consideration.

The question of the extent to which, and the conditions under which, individuals will think of their self-interest in terms of group interest was considered. It was brought out that it is quite characteristic for individuals to align themselves with other people having similar special interests. This arises from the culture in which the individual finds himself. Thinking of self-interest in terms of the general group as distinct from any special group is a much rarer thing in our culture.

Dr. Graubard attended the last half of the session, taking an active part in a discussion of the cultural influence on what people assume to be their self-interest. In considering how government can best serve the interests of people, he said we should think in terms of what the people consider their self-interest to be and not what some official happens to think it is.

Perhaps the best government can be defined as the one which gives all the people the greatest possible amount of what the cultural pattern teaches them to want.

In order for government to help in getting more people to think of their self-interest in terms of the general interest, government should logically strive to change the cultural pattern.



It would probably be a desirable activity for government to attempt changing the cultural pattern so that more people would think of their self-interest in terms of general interest. There were 19 present at this first session.

### Group III

Mr. Wylie Goodsell, Leader  
Miss Wanda M. Johnson, Secretary

The first meeting of Group III was held in Room 105, 224 12th Street, S. W., on Tuesday, October 17, from 3:00 to 4:30 P.M. Mr. Wylie Goodsell, assisted by Mr. J. R. Rigglesman, was Discussion Leader. Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, School Staff Member, and twenty-two members were present.

More than half of the group participated in the discussion, which was opened with a consideration of the question "Do we need to improve human nature, recognizing the biological and environmental factors which enter, or do we need to improve our social institutions?" We must do both, taking into consideration, in the case of the individual, his habits and customs, his education and environment, and in the case of society, the changes in its institutions necessitated by inventions and other factors.

People desire certain satisfactions in life and are willing to work to a certain plan to gain them. Some people will do things well because they like the feeling of achievement which comes with a task well done. Some will work toward any goal which will give them an advantage over their neighbors. The farmer as an individual wishes entire freedom to produce as much as he pleases for his personal satisfactions, but he also wishes the collective security of the group. Is it possible to change human nature to the extent that the welfare of the group as a whole will be of stronger consideration to the individual than his own personal economic gain?

Man is a cultured animal in which environment plays an important part. In order to change his attitude from a personal attitude to a group attitude, an educative process begun early in the life of the individual would be necessary. In our grandfather's day, the problem of production utilization did not exist. There was less competition, and complete freedom for the individual to raise what he wished. Is it human nature not to cut down crop production or not to change the accustomed procedure? It is possible that the attitude of resistance to crop reduction may be partly economic and partly religious.

Following the brief intermission, the group considered the problem of the inefficient farmer who remained in agriculture because of the present agricultural programs. Is it possible to eliminate this type through legislation? Our entire agricultural program is too large. The AAA is not adjusted so that it can meet every local situation adequately.

To improve our agricultural program it is more desirable to change the type of control, rather than try to change human nature. It is possible through legislation to change social institutions, but it is not possible to change human nature through legislation.

Can human nature really be changed? Internal economy may be changed as in Russia and Germany, bringing about new habits and customs. Human nature has been changed in our day, or National Socialism could not exist as it does there, but is it possible to change human nature in this way without regimentation, or violation of civil liberty?

Social institutions can change the habits of the people, and mechanization in agriculture can change human nature.

#### Group IV

Mr. James O. Howard, Leader

Mr. Albert A. Thornbrough, Secretary

The opening problem for discussion group IV was: "If the ape procedure described by Dr. Graubard is characteristic of human nature, doesn't Hitler have the natural form of social organization?" The first objection raised emphasized the fact that human beings are subject to technological developments which influence their behavior and their social organization, and apes are not. This in itself would destroy the similarity of ape and human procedures.

The next step involved the definition of democracy. It was suggested by one member of the group that democracy was the right to discuss a problem before action was taken by the government. Another declared democracy to be government by the people. A third thought democracy to be the relationship which provided adequate development of the individual. An objection to the first definition raised the difficulty of getting action if prolonged discussion is allowed; democracy must act, and not destroy itself by endless haggling. The group decided leadership must be emphasized in the third definition. However, it was pointed out that this amended definition might not exclude despotism, since there is a conflict as to what constitutes the greatest worth of an individual in his relationship to the State; the exponents of totalitarianism might insist that the worth of an individual is greatest when he is subjected to the State. No agreement was reached upon a definition satisfactory to the whole group.

From a discussion of the relationship between democracy and human behavior, several points seemed to emerge. The main conclusion was that the economic status of individuals in society is important to the maintenance of democratic action. The recent war in Spain was used to illustrate this point as showing the conflict between the legal control by the poor and the economic control by vested interests.

What is the social philosophy of the farmer? This problem aroused much interest and, at the same time, scepticism. An objection was raised to the discussion group method of aiding the farmers to find some meaning in their social and economic problems. Does not this procedure presuppose an adequate background on the part of the farmers? Will not this procedure leave too many loose ends and fail to achieve any real results? It was thought that many farmers are trying to develop a philosophy, although the aims and economic security are confused. The Department of Agriculture should furnish solutions to problems that the farmers themselves recognize. Programs can work only to the degree that the people understand their

problems, hence the vital need for discussion. Attention was called to the proposition that present education is causing the failure of the family and lower birth rates. Urbanization is creating difficult problems for those in rural areas.

#### Group V

Mr. Paul L. Vogt, Leader  
Miss Gladys L. Baker, Secretary

The discussion started with the question whether "shoe-pinching" can be relieved for one group in our society without making other groups dissatisfied. The economic pressure resulting in an unsatisfactory standard of living for certain groups in our population was cited as an example of "shoe-pinching." The difficulty of helping the corn farmer without adversely affecting the hog farmer, or of helping either without hurting the consumer was given among the examples of the difficulties of helping one group without adversely affecting another group.

Mr. Vogt commented that the illustrations given by the group members bring out the fact that there is a conflict of interest between groups. The question was raised whether it is possible with human nature as it is to prevent conflicts of interest. Can the conflicts be resolved without violence? There was some disagreement on this question. Some members of the group contended that competition is an inherent part of human nature. One gentleman cited the Hopi Indians to prove that human nature is not necessarily competitive. Some disagreement followed concerning this tribe's activities and whether the tribe is a large enough part of the economic system to prove the point.

The leader suggested that before we can decide how to control conflicts we must settle some more fundamental problems about human nature. Some differences of opinion seemed to center around the question whether biological and psychological factors or institutions are responsible for competitive behavior? It was pointed out that institutions have brought out the competitive nature of man (have made him more self-centered).

It was also pointed out that the will to possess crops out early in children and also that not enough effort has been made to condition children so that they will become less selfish. Economic pressure was cited as a cause of selfishness in human nature. As opposed to the view that human nature is essentially selfish but capable of some modification resulting in a more social viewpoint, it was suggested that selfishness and competition may be caused by the environment of Western civilization which stresses competition.

For example, a good communist would hold that a man brought up in terms of cooperative activity might regard collective action to be as natural as we regard individual action. It was also suggested that studies of primitive groups show as much evidence of collective as of individual activity.

The assumption that human nature is the same in different environments was questioned, and it was pointed out that the variety and scale of selfishness depends on the individual. The problem is the cultivation



of ability to adjust the individual to the group, recognizing that there are conflicts of interest.

The discussion moved to ways of reconciling conflicts between individuals and groups - the ways of minimizing the conflicts of interest which create "shoe-pinching."

The suggestion was made that certain standards and values should be changed. The idea that a man who accumulates a great deal of wealth is a great man - was cited as an example with the suggestion that better standards should be set up.

The question was raised whether conflicting interests should be minimized by regulation imposed from outside the groups involved or whether good will itself would bring about the adjustments. Is human nature reliable for cooperation?

It was suggested that a way of minimizing conflicts is through changing the moves of the group. The example of setting up and teaching farm people a standard way of setting the table was given.

The leader noted that education was a possible way of resolving group conflicts, but queried whether education would take care of the type of problem faced by the businessman who would like to pay his employees \$12 or \$14 a week but found his competitors paying only \$10 a week.

It was suggested that we are operating in a social system which makes competition necessary and that conditions are more stable when we have government regulation. It was pointed out that education is not free of all suspicions, that education also tries to perpetuate itself. The leader pointed out that education is not enough, but that sound objectives are also needed.

Following a short recess, Mr. Vogt reopened the discussion with the question: How far shall we go with control once we get started and have we started? How far shall we go by passing a law? If we control the price of milk why not control the price of wheat?

A number of questions were raised by group members: Is it control of a commodity or control of an end such as the income for groups of individuals we are interested in? Is control the result of conditions which necessitate that the government intervene in favor of certain groups? The further question was raised whether this intervention was at their request or for their benefit or both. Do they request control of income? Is control the only way?

It was suggested that control is needed because of the lack of correspondence between pressure that groups exert and their place in society. The distinction was made between power and function in society with some discussion of the banker's relative power and function in society.

The point was raised that government control may interfere with the controls set up by an economic system outside the government.

There may be different types of controls. The leader asked if the members of the discussion group agreed that conflict of interest is inevitable. The case of the Hopi Indians was again cited as an example of cooperation as opposed to competition in our society. There was some disagreement on this point.

The leader queried whether the question had not become whether the Kingdom of Heaven is practical.

As another way of mitigating conflicts in addition to (1) education and (2) government and private forms of control, was suggested the development of cooperative communities. It was suggested that individual liberty has been maintained in these cooperative communities. Standardization of houses, etc. to make the lower classes happy was suggested. The questions were raised whether we would have progress or be happy without competition. One member of the group stated that our problems could be solved through intelligent selfishness.

It was stated that government action is needed in the field where voluntary action can't function. It was pointed out that desirable objectives and criteria should be set up before any group is helped. Protests should not be accepted at their face value.

The distinction was made between short-time and long-time mitigation of conflicts. Government control may offer the only method of short-time mitigation. It was suggested that a distinction should be made between control from the top down and control coming from local groups.

County planning was suggested as a fourth method of resolving conflicts. The question was raised as to how county planning differs from cooperation and how government control differs from cooperative control.

It was decided that at least in theory cooperative control is voluntary as distinguished from coercive. It was also suggested that the government isn't a producer.

In summary Mr. Vogt pointed out that the discussion began with the question of relieving "shoe-pinching." That this was followed by illustrations of "shoe-pinching." This was followed by a discussion of how conflicts can be mitigated if not eliminated. The group agreed that conflicts could not be entirely eliminated. Four methods for mitigation were suggested: Cooperation, education, control, and planning, and that a distinction was made between short-time and long-time mitigation of conflicts.

#### Group VI

Mr. A. B. Genung, Leader  
Mr. C. A. Burmeister, Secretary

Questions proposed for discussion:

1. For 50 years or more the Department of Agriculture was engaged in trying to change the production of farm crops, i.e. increase

yields, improve quality, develop new products, etc. Is it now trying to change the American farmer?

2. Having in mind the long story of the rise and fall of nations, is the conclusion warranted that the biological elements in civilization have changed much or can be changed much?

3. What are the chief biological and social adjustments that are necessary to make democracy a successful political system?

Discussion started on the second question by someone asking what is meant by biological change and what are some of the factors that cause it. Does it imply differentiation between races only or differences in the same race caused by differences in environment, food, etc.? Dr. Stanley, Chief of the Bureau of Home Economics, pointed out that her measurement tests showed marked differences in children as between regions and between different economic groups. Another member of the group mentioned that changes had occurred in the height and weight of Japanese reared in California in comparison with those living in the Orient.

The discussion was taken up by most of the group present, each citing something of his own personal experience or what he had read, but usually with the supplementary statement that he knew very little about biology and sociology and was expressing a personal opinion based on little study or intensive thought. Dr. Taeusch pointed out that there was a tendency on the part of the older scientific bureaus to look with askance on the efforts of the action agencies to effect changes. This led to the observation that regardless of whether biological changes have occurred or not, we are faced with the question: Can we go on from here and make progress? The general conclusion seemed to be that we could. The question was then asked: How about resistance to change? Is resistance lessening as a result of our discoveries and inventions, or is it as difficult as ever to get over new ideas and bring about change? Discussion of this topic naturally led into what had occurred since the World War and the trend of developments in the past decade.

In concluding the discussion the group gave some consideration to what can be done by group interests working together for a common objective, and especially the influence of such groups on the actions taken by Government agencies. This prompted the question as to whether there were differences in pressure groups resulting from differences in breadth of interest such as might be found in a group producing some specific commodity as contrasted with that of a much larger group comprising all types of farmers, and this was discussed at some length.

In this meeting almost everyone present took part in the discussion, some of course more actively than others. Occasionally there was a tendency to wander into bypaths that led to no particular destination, and there was considerable evidence that in fields outside of the work of those present the group was not particularly well prepared to go far in the discussion. Perhaps we need to broaden the scope of our quest for knowledge and give less emphasis to specialization. But in doing so, we encounter the difficulty of determining what is true and what is not true, especially when many of the theories and assumptions advanced are not supported by factual evidence or given a thorough test through actual trial.



## Group VII

Mr. Paul H. Johnstone, Leader  
Mr. Alva H. Benton, Leader  
Mr. James O. Babcock, Secretary

On the first day discussion of the group revolved around the nature of culture. The question was raised as to whether or not it was deemed desirable to attempt to change culture. It was pointed out that there were apparently many sound reasons for change but that there did not seem to be a unanimity of opinion in the various publics in the Nation as to what it was that they wished to have changed and how these changes should be brought about.

In this connection there was general agreement with Dr. Vance that any proposition or thesis could be logically substantiated if human nature were properly defined.

An attempt was made to define culture. It was pointed out that prejudices are a part of culture and that it has two general meanings; one being the customary artistic meaning and the other, "culture" as the term is employed by the anthropologists, that is, "culture is a complex of habits, customs, attitudes, and interrelationships." Another characteristic of culture that was brought out is that the very people who produce this ever-changing culture resist obvious changes at the non-material level. It was stated that people and groups in our society are so accustomed to the machine age that they accept readily the changes in material elements of culture while they resist the non-material, such as the social legislation which has been under discussion for the past two years.

It was next pointed out that one of the difficulties which we encountered in the attempt to change culture was what appeared to be an inherent dilemma in our American society. On the one hand we have extreme mechanization which produces a selfish individualistic and somewhat grasping set of ethics in which every man works for himself without regard to the results of his actions on other people. At the same time there are people in our society, and in many instances the very people who accept this ethic of a mechanical culture, who subscribe rather completely to what is known as the "Protestant" ethic. It is pointed out that by this term it is meant that old culture complex and set of ethics which were infused into our American society largely by the Puritans and have to do with our moral behavior and our more personal relationships with one another in our society. It was pointed out that the Protestant ethic is acceptable and possible of realization only when it is functioned in a society where people all have the same set of values. Unfortunately, our society did not seem to be composed of people who were thinking in terms of these uniform values. Some members of the group denied that there was any inherent conflict between the values which rest upon a mechanical situation and those which arise out of the Protestant ethic.

The question was raised as to how we can tackle our problems of county planning and how this problem relates to culture. The condition of the Great Plains is used as an example as to how the culture patterns have failed to adapt themselves to a new environment as people with these

historical culture patterns move into a new area. This failure to adapt, it was pointed out, is part of the problem which the county planners face in the Great Plains.

There was considerable discussion of the role of self-interest in our society. Someone observed that one could measure self-interest in terms of material rewards. Others of the group objected to this limited definition pointing out that self-interest may be tied closely with the desire for power which might not have any relation to material rewards. Sometimes self-interest was tied closely to the religious beliefs, as is well illustrated by the Children's Crusade in the Middle Ages. Other members of the group generally agreed that self-interest is basic in the actions of nearly every person and that if people would only realize it, cooperation is simply one of many techniques by which the areas of self-interest are widened for the benefit of the individual as well as the group. There seemed to be rather general agreement that self-interest lay at the root of our whole complex of culture patterns.

#### Group VIII

Miss Marion E. Wheeler, Leader  
Mr. Harold C. Larsen, Secretary

The discussion during the afternoon of October 17 developed from the three questions suggested by the leader:

1. Do you agree with the statement: The only one who sees the program as a whole is the farmer?
2. Are there interest groups within agriculture? Are they un-American?
3. Should there be a law about it?

It was apparent from the response of the group to the first question that most of those present felt that farmers were inclined to see a national agricultural program largely as it affects their farms and agree with the program to the extent of their self-interest. This self-interest is often not a reflection of his permanent well being, but is more often an appraisal of the immediate benefits for himself or for the group interest of which he is a member. The feeling prevailed that probably the farmer attitude in regard to national programs might have been conditioned by the fact that there are definite interest groups in agriculture organized primarily for the purpose of benefiting the individual producer whom they represent. It was this objective of group interest which they felt was not entirely conducive to successful operation of national agricultural programs, as the feeling existed that they were to a large degree competitive interests rather than parallel interests. The realization of these independent competitive interests led to the discussion of the third question, "Should there be a law about it?" Some of those present expressed the opinion that fewer laws with the resultant increased freedom of the individual to work out his own problems would be desirable while others reiterated the old adage that the welfare of the individual was not always the welfare of the group. It was recognized that individuals

desired laws to restrain others from interfering with their freedom, but objected to laws doing the same thing to them. The desirability of a law was, therefore, a matter of the degree to which it limited individual freedom for the interest of the whole.

During the latter part of the period the discussion turned toward the extent to which human nature has been or can be changed and whether progress results from improvement in the quality or quantity of thought. The idea was expressed that progress resulted more from the same quality of thought applied to the fund of knowledge built up in the past, than to an increased quality of thought.

## Second Day - October 19

### Group I

Mr. Herbert E. Denler, Leader  
Mr. Preston Richards, Secretary

Only one question was discussed at the group meeting. This question was: Are Present National Farm Programs Adjusted to Fit Local Cultures? Several points not directly related to this question, however, were discussed in the course of the meeting.

It was suggested that big differences in cultures did not exist within any major region of the country. This view was challenged later, however.

A statement was made that it was impracticable, if not impossible, to fit programs to all little differences in cultures that happened to exist in various sections of the country. It was pointed out that it might not be wise to try to adjust programs to "strip-farming" in certain sections of Louisiana when the practice itself might be desirable. Another question was whether it was necessary to fit programs to various local cultures. It was stated that the program of the Soil Conservation Service probably provided the greatest break of any program with accepted customs and practices and, at the same time, that this has been one of the most successful programs developed.

A statement was made that the A.A.A. and other programs were becoming a part of our culture. But in this connection another view presented was that the A.A.A. and some other programs as originally conceived were designed to meet an emergency which was of a temporary character and that, if such a program were to become a part of our culture, the emergency idea and perhaps the programs needed serious revision.

This brought some discussion of the objections stated by Mr. Davis to the A.A.A. program, and considerable discussion developed along the lines of the desirability of balancing the budget and Government spending versus private spending.

Near the end of the meeting, Mr. Miner joined the group and stated that studies that he and others had made indicated that there were marked differences in local cultures. He gave as one example



the position of tenant farmers in the South as contrasted with the position of tenants in the Corn Belt. He stated further that, even in single counties, there would be rather marked differences in cultures. In response to a question he reviewed some of the cultural developments over a long period of years in French Canada.

## Group II

Mr. Conrad Taeuber, Leader  
Mr. Ellery Foster, Secretary

The discussion started off with the question "Under what conditions, if any, would it be justifiable to dump agricultural products abroad?" The opinion was expressed that it might be justifiable in case of war conditions in order to aid allies. Another instance might be to compete with other countries who also have dumping policies.

It was generally agreed, however, that the first dumping should be done at home and should go on to the extent that there are people in need but unable to buy.

Dumping abroad might develop a resentment of local people against foreign people being able to buy our products cheaper than we can. Resentment might also develop among the people of other countries who have similar products to sell.

The discussion moved from here to the question "What circumstances make dumping necessary," and, of course, the conclusion was that it is the production of more than the effective demand can absorb. (The question was also raised of the extent to which "parity price" policies may encourage the continued production of more than the market will absorb.)

The question was raised of why there should be surplus production. Why not adjust internal production so that we produce the things we need instead of surpluses that can only be dumped abroad?

Then the question was raised of the extent to which the potential home demand could absorb our surpluses if the people had sufficient purchasing power.

The Department's new regional research laboratories were discussed as a possible means of finding new ways to utilize surpluses. The question was raised of whether this is a truly fundamental approach as long as so many people still need and don't get the things we already know how to produce. Do we need additional government controls or programs to actually shift people from the fields of surplus production into other fields?

Forestry was mentioned as one field into which surplus labor might be shifted to a greater extent. The question was raised of whether the cost of forestry could be justified. The answer was made that it might be, particularly if expenditures are made with the combined objectives of providing temporary relief to needy people and of building up natural resources as a long-time objective.

Group III

Mr. J. S. Sanders, Leader  
Miss Wanda Johnson, Secretary

The second meeting of Group III was held on Thursday, October 19, from 3:00 to 4:30 P.M. in Room 105, 224 12th Street, S. W. Twenty-eight persons attended the second meeting of Group III including Dr. Mark A. Graubard of the School Staff. The majority of the group present participated in the discussion.

The foreign trade policy for agriculture advocated by Dr. Joseph S. Davis in the morning session was the first consideration of the group. If wider imports are desirable in order to encourage wider exports, what methods should be followed? At the present time farmers are unwilling to accept imports, but their attitude might be changed if the attitude of industry toward home products could be changed. The continuation of trade agreements, with the necessary publicity and education of public opinion to make them generally acceptable, would help to balance the imports with the exports.

Did Dr. Davis imply that the State Department should have complete control of foreign marketing service, or did he imply that the Bureau of Agricultural Economics was unable to perform its duties effectively? It was believed that Dr. Davis had indicated that a planning section should be established in the State Department. Its purpose would be to bring about permanent and world-wide peace through trade. What should be our policy in regard to trade with European countries after the war?

Dr. Miner has said that we were the least integrated people in the world, culturally speaking. In working toward a more harmonious integration, should we attempt a unification of all aspects of the widely varied cultures represented in present day America? We do not know the answer to this question any more than we are able to say definitely why the cow was domesticated, or to explain the social implications of the Day of Rest. When different cultures have been in conflict in the past, war has generally resulted and both have usually disappeared.

We lack knowledge, but it is possible to make a scientific approach to the problem. The Bureau has collected valuable data concerning these various cultures. It should examine and analyze this data and make a new approach to the problem of social organization. A program based on this knowledge should be formulated, and then tried step by step. If it fails, no explanation should be given. A careful analysis should be made, the program re-shaped, and then carried on to the next step. A repetition of this method may lead to the answer.

Is centralization of Government compatible with democracy? Is the Land Use Planning Program of the Department of Agriculture democratic, or will it be formulated in Washington without regard to the wishes of the individual farmer? Every effort is being made to keep the plan as democratic as possible, and to fulfill the expressed aim of Secretary Wallace to let "the farmer be the boss." Individual farmers select their representatives in their own communities for the

county committee, and from these the State committee is chosen.

Lack of coordination is a great handicap to the present agricultural program. In the case of one county in Wyoming the Bureau of Agricultural Economics outlined an economic plan which held that there were enough sheep already in that county. Farm Security made loans to farmers there in order that they might buy more sheep, maintaining that the economic interests of the individual farmers was of greater importance. Who will decide?

#### Group IV

Mr. J. C. Ellickson, Leader

Mr. Albert Thornbrough, Secretary

What is the function, or right, of the government in agriculture? Can the government by establishing correct programs eliminate the need for extensive government activity in agriculture? These were the main problems for the second afternoon of discussion.

Difficulties in agriculture seem to be those of man-made processes and interrelations, and the government is the only agency which can act in such situations. The organization of production in agriculture on atomistic lines makes it difficult for any adjustment to be made without the action of large numbers at the same time. Some discussion was devoted to points raised by Dr. J. S. Davis concerning parity payments and their adverse effects on the businessman and urban employment.

It was thought that it is fruitless to create a dichotomy for governmental actions: those functions that should be done and those that should not be done. The content of and the need for government activity can change, and any attempt to set up universal divisions would be ineffective. However, there is a real point in that the government, as a servant of the people, should utilize its activity only to the extent and in such a manner that the self-reliance of the people is maintained.

Another question raised concerned the competency of the government to perform functions. What do the city people think of the farm programs? How can the government go ahead and perform its functions in the absence of public opinion? It was thought some effective means must be established to determine this opinion in order that government functions be carried out in a democratic manner.

#### Group V

Mr. E. Hjalner Bjornson, Leader

Miss Gladys L. Baker, Secretary

Leader: What impression do we get from social control - what does it mean? Does it mean more government or something else?

Replies: It is a national, purposeful control. It is a problem of techniques of social control.



Leader: Who is going to decide what control is necessary?

Replies: Heretofore we have been thinking of the philosophy of Democracy - should we not give thought instead to the methodology of Democracy? There does seem to be too much time spent on the study of its philosophy.

Any group of men and women trying to reach an objective common to all would have to give up some liberty of action and substitute therefor rules, regulations and control. If the group is a small, homogenous one so that it can supply its own control, it should do so, but if it is a large, heterogenous one - too large to make it possible to supply its own rules - then the government should do it for them. If, as time goes on, this group can learn to supply its own rules, regulations and control, then the government should permit it to do so, provided it does not injure the rest of the people. If local autonomy injures the best interests of state autonomy and so on up the line, then it should not be allowed to function.

Keep local contacts - or community people - advised through an elective body in order to get a better democratic understanding. Planning in a democracy can't remain long without the cooperation of a local unit. How far should we go in the United States in permitting local autonomy?

Group question: Is it possible in a population of 130 million people to have democracy on a national scale? Farmers object to programs handed down, yet the scope of the programs is too large for individual units to handle. Local units exercise control as they see fit for their interests.

Reply: AAA and SC become too ironclad. (This woman has her own farm and has had to buck this sort of thing several times.)

Reply: The Forest Service has a program whereby they control the use of Federal lands used by private individuals - no control of private lands, however. On their range work they have advisory committees and associations of stockmen who work with the Forest Service in the grazing of their stock on the forest lands. People, themselves, don't keep up interest very well, they must have help. It is necessary to continuously work with the associations to get reasonable satisfaction from the plans. It is difficult to keep advisory committees from looking at things without a superficial motive. It is necessary to have facts previously considered from the standpoint of public interest. We cannot rely on their willingness to take the time to properly study the facts for effective planning in the public interest.

Leader: How does the Forest Service function to apply this plan?

Reply: It has been our function to gather the facts, weigh,

formulate and consider what things are desirable. Then take them to local groups directly interested and present them for their consideration and suggestions and then consider such modifications as may be desirable in the light of the comments made.

Attention was then called to Mr. Miner's statement that we should take into account regional and local differences; but if the problem was on too large a scale, let the government take it over. Let the local government administer the problem as the Federal government plans it.

Group

question: Can you ignore local government by any stretch of the imagination? (In extension work they try to encourage better farm living.)

Reply: Local government could be ignored and Federal government could be developed if local government stopped continuously fighting it. There tends to be an increasing centralization in banking control. The Federal Reserve was set up on a regional basis with 12 banks throughout the country. Some men are fighting control of too rabid enforcement by Washington. That is why we have state banks - local people are too suspicious of just one national banking system.

Reply: With strong local unit objection the government institution could be overthrown in a short time. For instance - what may be considered abuse on the part of the Federal government begins to be oppressive to an individual - this feeling goes on and spreads until they overthrow the institution that has been trying to help them.

Leader: Then you mean to say that we can't have an effective national program without government?

Reply: It all depends on the type of service demanded.

Group: In a democratic form of government how can you ignore local government?

One discussant then stated that he had attended a County meeting and watched work. He said it was interesting to observe that the farmers themselves classified soils - he also discovered through them a new school of classification.

Leader: How does the local unit operate where people from the hills and depleted soil country are moved to better land? I know that in some states, for instance, Wisconsin, they have zoning laws in which areas have been taken out of cultivation completely.

Group

question: How are County committees selected - replied to his own question, I believe, by saying that - they seem to be "aristocratically" selected - that only the "top ones"

seemed to get in on them.

Reply: They change their committees from time to time and hope to reach all people eventually for membership. However, it is a question of social control and the selections should be those best qualified for this.

Question: You say you get your best men at the top, but one discussant claimed that when she sought information that she was sent from one to another and finally referred to a farmer in the community as the best source of that information.

Reply: It is only natural that when you set up an institution you get confusion at first - and out of that confusion you get order through the method of trial and error.

Leader: Regarding the question of Social Control - we haven't disposed of the question of its limits - if there are limits - to national control?

Group: In time of war every State, no matter how small, is willing to sacrifice something for protection the Federal government will give them. Why can't they do it in time of peace as well?

Reply: The reason you can do this in time of war is that you have just one objective which makes it relatively simple, whereas in peacetime you have a diversity of objectives which makes it much more difficult.

Group question: Everybody talks about - "should the Federal government do this and should it do that" - but the question should be - can they do it?

Leader: Is it because local government has broken down that the Federal government must step in. Perhaps the general public has realized that the States have not taken adequate concern of all individuals, the State and the social thinking that has come within the last few years is caused by the Federal government.

Group: Some of the larger cities are complaining that they must bear the heaviest load of relief. This may be because the big problems of relief have been in the big cities. It seems now though that the government in a clever way is shifting the burden to the farmer as well.

Group question: Have the rural people been getting more than they should and is that why the larger metropolitan centers have been complaining about their contribution to relief?

Leader: The big cities have not yet really been taxed heavily for relief because the Federal government has gone on with borrowing, but has not begun to collect. Most of



WPA has been borrowed money and we haven't taxed very much for any of it. To whom will the bulk of the tax be passed? Revenues now are about what they were in 1929. We are spending more out of the public contribution whereas the collections from the industrial cities have gone down.

Group: Our government is not a sovereign organization in itself, nor is the government of any state a sovereign organization. We only do what the Congress of the U.S. wants us to do. After all what is the government? It is nothing but a bunch of men and women and typewriters. The people are the government and the people elect the government to represent them. If what we do is not to the liking of the people who have ordered it done, then it is due to lack of contact between them and the people they elected! Many people refer to it as if it were a sovereign, independent institution of its own!

The government is made up of large interests who sometimes conflict and also often mediate and compromise. If we had but one issue on which the people voted it would be simple, but there are multitudinous questions, so that it is very difficult. Many lobbyists resent Gallup's polls in that they interfere with their lobbying.

Leader: What has been done about tariffs - have they been reduced?

Group: There has been a revision of the tariffs. I think that the changing of Congressmen and Senators is not so much that the people took them away, but because of the growth of special organizations and if we had a similar growth of consumer organization it would affect the personnel in Congress.

Leader: Let's have some remarks on farm management and soil conservation. We have, of course, the zoning laws in which land is taken out of agriculture entirely.

Group: We may be working toward regulation of land use. Switzerland does have land control because it was a solution to their special problem.

Regulation of land use may eventually come - such as CCC work is now doing - we seem to be getting more and more control of individual use of land.

Leader: Does any state control terracing?

Group: There are S.C. District laws in some states. They do not compel terracing, but in some cases they elect a board to decide restrictions and regulations on land use.

Group question: But what if one S.C. district votes for this practice and another against it - what is to be done?

Reply: It does not seem that we should be concerned about differences of opinion on the merits of this process. Why not instead work with those who are agreeable to terracing and through the benefits derived by these farmers we can hope to educate eventually those who now do not believe in this type of soil conservation. In cases where refusal to terrace has a damaging effect on the soil to other farmers, there is likely to be community pressure brought to bear on those held guilty of this damage.

#### Group VI

Mr. Arthur Peterson, Leader  
Mr. C. A. Burmeister, Secretary

#### Questions proposed for discussion:

1. A few years ago some families were persuaded to move and some were evicted from their long established homes in the Blue Ridge Mountains and resettled in an entirely new environment. Did this improve the welfare of these people?

2. There are 13 counties in an area of about 50 miles square in Tidewater Virginia that were established more than 200 years ago. Would it be better to have fewer counties and/or less county government in this area?

3. The Federal Government has undertaken price supporting measures for cotton in recent years. Has this brought about a net improvement in economic and social conditions in the Cotton Belt?

In the discussion of the first question it was soon decided that some facts were needed before conclusions could be reached. No one present could say what had been accomplished in bettering the economic and social welfare of those involved. The action itself was somewhat akin to that of moving other minority groups from their long established place of abode. The younger members of the family probably welcomed the change and the opportunity for new experiences, whereas the older people probably objected strenuously and were made very unhappy. Probably it would have been better had the change been accomplished more gradually and thus made it easier for those involved to become accustomed to the transition.

In any experiment of this kind it is necessary to consider how other social groups will be affected, both from the standpoint of whether the experiment is undertaken or not. Will society as a whole be benefited or be placed in a worse position? This led to a discussion of how can these groups in the lower levels of the economic scale be stimulated to better themselves by their own efforts. Will it be done by arousing the interest of the young people and giving them sufficient educational advantages to make real progress? This raised the question as to whether or not these lower groups possessed the intelligence needed to bring about improvement. One or two members of the group who had had experience with some of these people were inclined to be skeptical. Others, however, thought that there was a true basis for optimism.

In discussing the second question it was brought out that some economies in cost of county government might be effected. On the other hand, these economies might be limited as the State has taken over some of the more costly functions formerly assumed by the counties, such as road building and repair, etc. So far as known, the salaries paid the local county officials are relatively moderate and if counties were consolidated to reduce the number of officials in public service it probably would be necessary to increase salaries to compensate for the extra work and responsibility assumed by the smaller number.

In the discussion of the third question it was brought out that the cotton program did get money into the South which was greatly needed. It may, however, have resulted in harm to the South in other ways. Only future developments will reveal this and even then it will be difficult to prove whether or not the policy followed was a factor, either directly or indirectly, in whatever occurs. Answering this question is like speculating on what an individual might have done had he followed another career than the one he actually did.

#### Group VIII

Mr. Marshall Harris, Leader  
Mr. Harold C. Larsen, Secretary

The discussion during the afternoon of October 19, led by Mr. J. R. Rigglesman, was considerably enlivened by the presence of two of the speakers of the morning: Horace Miner who discussed the subject "Culture and Agriculture" and Joseph S. Davis who discussed "A Desirable Foreign Trade Policy for American Agriculture."

The contention that the welfare of individuals in a society might be best served by the adaptation of a national program more nearly to cultural habits of social groups was attacked from the standpoint of the public interest. It was pointed out that to a degree the culture of one group is imposed on other groups to the benefit of all. Present at the meeting were two 4-H Club members who agreed that knowledge of other cultural groups and to a degree conformity with the habits of other cultural groups had enabled them to contact urban population without feeling uncomfortable or out of place. A poll of the discussion group disclosed that 8 out of the 15 persons were raised in rural communities. While it was agreed that the imposition of cultures on groups may be beneficial, the question of who is to determine what cultures are to be imposed remained unanswered. This particular problem was discussed in connection with the effect of moving farm families who have resided on submarginal farms to areas in which they are not acquainted. If the happiness of the individuals immediately affected is considered the goal, some question was raised as to the ultimate success of this type of a program, and whether the welfare of the individuals might not best be served by letting them remain on submarginal land even though, to some extent, at public expense. Here again the question as to public welfare versus individual welfare arose.

The second half of the afternoon discussion was centered about Mr. Joseph Davis' talk on a desirable foreign trade policy for American agriculture and the extent to which a desirable agricultural



situation be effectuated by an adjustment program such as now exists or by direct unconditional subsidies. The contention that more might be accomplished in the way of general agricultural welfare by direct subsidy, because of its tendency not to unbalance other interdependent relationships, was discussed. The unfavorable supply situation in cotton as a result of a conditional subsidization of cotton farmers was referred to as an example of the limitation to the present adjustment program. As the decrease in the demand for American cotton in foreign countries was a contributing factor to the domestic cotton supply situation the discussion shifted to the consideration of an export subsidy on cotton as a means of alleviating excessive domestic surpluses.

The discussion of the subsidy as a means of relieving domestic surpluses led finally to consideration of the practicability of free trade as a national policy and the consistency of various ideas in the light of methods by which a more desirable trade policy might be effectuated. A large part of this subject was developed through questions directed toward Mr. Davis.

A P P E N D I X A

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF VISITING STAFF MEMBERS

Dr. Mark A. Graubard. Born: Poland, Jan. 5, 1904. Education: B.S., College of the City of N. Y. 1926; M.A., Columbia, 1927, Ph. D. 1931.

Research: National Research Council (Genetics), Columbia University (Organic Chemistry), Clark University (Hormone Physiology and Development).

Member: American Zoological Society, American Physiological Society, American Genetics Association.

Dr. Rupert Bayless Vance, Sociologist, Author. Born: Plumerville, Arkansas, March 15, 1899. Education: A.B., Henderson-Brown College, 1920; A.M., Vanderbilt University, 1931; Ph. D., University of North Carolina, 1928.

Has taught in the public schools of Oklahoma, South Georgia College (where he taught English), University of Texas and University of North Carolina.

Has worked with the National Research Commission, Rosenwald Fund, Social Science Research Council.

Author: Human Factors in Cotton Culture, 1929; Human Geography of the South, 1932; Regional Reconstruction for South, 1935; South's Place in the Nation, 1936; How the Other Half is Housed, 1936; Farmers without Land, 1937. Associate Editor of Social Forces.

Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, Economist. Born: Lockport, N. Y., May 20, 1883. Education: A.B., Cornell University, 1906; Ph. D., University of Chicago, 1915.

Taught in University of Pennsylvania, Head of Department of Economics and Sociology, University of South Dakota, same at University of Arkansas. Chief of Agricultural Economics section of Iowa Experiment Station, Chief of Agricultural Division of Iowa State Experiment Station; Instructor in Economics, Brookings Institution.

Author: Agricultural Economics, 1916; Chicago Produce Market, 1918; American Agriculture and the European Market, 1924; The Legal Status of Agricultural Co-operation, 1927; The Co-operative Marketing of Livestock (With J. G. Knapp), 1931; America's Capacity to Produce (with associates), 1934; Marketing Agreements under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1935; Three Years of the A.A. (with associates) 1937; Editor of Journal of Farm Economics, 1925-27.

Dr. Lloyd M. Short. Born: Knoxville, Illinois, Feb. 3, 1897.  
Education: A.B., Knox College, 1919; A.M., University of Illinois,  
1920; Ph. D. 1922.

Taught Political Science: University of Akron, University of Missouri.  
Since 1935 Professor of Political Science and Director of Public  
Administration training center, University of Minnesota. Has taught  
four summers in Brookings Institution.

Author: The U.S. Stearboat Inspection Service, 1922; The Development  
of National Administrative Organization in the U.S., 1923; The U. S.  
Bureau of Navigation, 1924. Frequent contributor to political science  
journals.

Dr. Joseph S. Davis, Economist. Born: Freezer, Pa., Nov. 5, 1885.  
Education: Graduate State Normal School, West Chester, Pa., 1902;  
A.B., Harvard University, 1908; Ph. D. 1913.

Taught Bowdoin College, Harvard University. Director of Food Research  
Inst., Stanford University since 1921.

Has also served as statistician or adviser to American Shipping Mission,  
London; Allied Maritime Transport Council; Dawes Committee of 1924;  
International Committee of Bankers; Federal Farm Board; Brookings Institution.

Author: Essays on the Early History of American Corporations, 1917;  
Questions on the Principles of Economics (with Edmund E. Day), 1915;  
Stale Bread Loss as a Problem of the Baking Industry (with Wilfred Eldred),  
1923; The American Baking Industry, 1849-1923 (with Hazel Kyrk), 1925;  
The Farm Export Debtenture Plan, 1929; Wheat and the AAA, 1935; Three  
Years of AAA (with others), 1937.

Dr. Horace M. Miner, Cultural Anthropologist. Born: St. Paul, Minnesota,  
May 26, 1912. Education: University of Munich, Germany, 1928; A.B.,  
University of Kentucky, 1933; M.A., University of Chicago, 1935, Ph. D.,  
1937. Student Ecole Alsacienne, Paris, France, 1928.

Archaeologist for T.V.A., 1934; University of Kentucky, 1933; University  
of Chicago, 1938; Social Science Research Council, 1937. Teacher of  
Anthropology and Sociology, Wayne University, Detroit, 1937. Now with  
Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Member: American Anthropological Association, American Archaeological  
Association, American Sociological Society.



Dr. Kimball Young, Social Psychologist. Born: Provo, Utah, Oct. 26, 1893. Education: A.B., Brigham Young University, 1915; A.M., University of Chicago, 1918; Ph. D. Stanford University, 1921.

Taught: University of Oregon, Clark University, University of Wisconsin. Now with Division of Farm Population and Rural Life, Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Author: Mental Differences in Certain Immigrant Groups, 1922; Source Book for Social Psychology, 1927; Social Psychology, 1930; (with others) The Madison Community, 1934; Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda (with R. E. Lawrence), 1928; Social Attitudes (with others), 1931; An Introductory Sociology, 1934; Source Book for Sociology, 1935. General Editor of American Sociology Series (American Book Co.).

# A P P E N D I X B

## SUMMARY OF SCHOOLS FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS Held up to December 20, 1939

		<u>Attendance</u>
1935	1 Washington staff, Extension Service	75
	3 State Extension Schools (Ohio, W. Va., North Carolina)	425
1936	11 State Extension Schools (Calif., Wash., Utah, New Mex., No. Dak., So. Car. (2), Maine, Ark., Va., Conn.)	1,365
1937	7 State Extension Schools (Md., Kans., Iowa, So. Dak., Mo., New York, Wis.)	1,090
	2 State Extension-AAA Schools (No. Dak., So. Car.)	645
1938	10 State Extension Schools (Md., Wyo., Utah, Iowa, Mich., Tex., Neb., Ill., Colo., Miss.)	1,580
	2 State Extension-AAA Schools (New Mex., So. Dak.)	430
1939	8 State Extension Schools (Ariz., Mont., Iowa, Kans., Ind.*, Maine, R.I., Minn.)	1,185
	7 State Schools for Teachers of Vocational Agric., Domestic Science, and W.P.A. Rural Areas. (Ga., Va., Ind.*, No. Car., Fla., Va. W.P.A., Texas)	1,430
	2 Regional Schools (Southern Great Plains, Amarillo; Northern Great Plains, Billings)	345
	2 Sets of District Schools (North Dakota, at Minot, Bismarck, and Fargo; South Dakota, at Rapid City, Pierre and Brookings.)	690
	2 Washington Staff, U.S.D.A. (Farm Sec., and B.A.E.)	450
	1 State Farm Security Admin. (Iowa)	<u>250</u>
	Total Attendance, 57 Schools* .....	9,960

\*The Indiana School was for Extension Workers and Teachers of Vocational Agriculture; attendance of each given separately.

APPENDIX C

STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SCHOOLS FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

Held up to February 1, 1940

The following persons have served as staff members in one or more of the 59 Schools held to date:

G. P. Adams (Philosophy), California  
E. R. Alexander (Education), Texas A. and M. College  
J. Cecil Alter (Meteorology), U. S. Weather Bureau, Utah  
Eugen Altschul (Economics), Minnesota  
Oscar Ameringer (Editor), Oklahoma  
Don S. Anderson (Agric. Econ.), Wisconsin  
Wilhelm Anderson (Philosophy), U.S.D.A.  
Carl F. Arnold (Law), Wyoming  
James A. Atkins (Sociology), W.P.A. Adult Educ.  
George H. Aull (Agric. Econ.), Clemson  
Thos. L. Ayers (Agric. Econ.), A.A.A.  
Clarence E. Ayres (Philosophy), Texas  
O. E. Baker (Population Trends), B.A.E.  
Carleton Ball (Coordinator, T.V.A.), U.S.D.A.  
A. G. A. Balz (Philosophy), Virginia  
Louis H. Bean (Agric. Econ.), U.S.D.A.  
Arthur Beeley (Sociology), Utah  
Howard W. Beers (Sociology), Rutgers  
Earl H. Bell (Sociology), Nebraska  
J. Seelye Bixler (Philosophy), Harvard  
A. G. Black (Agric. Econ.), U.S.D.A.  
John D. Black (Agric. Econ.), Harvard  
Thos. G. Blaisdell (Pol. Sci.), Social Security Board  
R. K. Bliss (Extension Director), Iowa State  
Landrum R. Bolling (Pol. Sci.), Brown University  
Mrs. Ralph Borsodi (School of Living), New York  
Karl Brandt (Economics), Stanford  
Harold C. Brown (Philosophy), Stanford  
Baker Brownell (Sociology), Northwestern  
Arthur Bunce (Agric. Econ.), Iowa State  
Harry Carman (History), Columbia University  
M. P. Catherwood (Agric. Econ.), Cornell  
Frank M. Chapman (Philosophy), U.S.D.A.  
Walter Chivers (Sociology), Moorehouse  
Cully A. Cobb (Southern Division, A.A.A.), U.S.D.A.  
Walter D. Cocking (Education), Georgia  
Chas. F. Collisson (Editor), Minneapolis Tribune  
Roger Corbett (Extension Director), Connecticut State College  
Leonard Cottrell, Jr. (Sociology), Cornell  
J. R. Countiss (Minister), Mississippi  
W. H. Cowley (Educ. Psych.), Ohio State  
Alonzo B. Cox (Economics), Univ. of Texas  
Avery Craven (History), Chicago  
Raymond E. Crist (Geography), Illinois  
Edward E. Dale (History), Oklahoma



Jerome Davis (Sociology), Yale  
Joseph S. Davis (Economics), Stanford  
Frank T. De Vyver (Economics), Duke  
Allen Eaton (Art), Russell Sage Foundation  
Milton S. Eisenhower (Land Use), U.S.D.A.  
Colin English (Supt. Public Instr.), Florida  
J. G. Evans (Economics), North Carolina  
Mordecai Ezekiel (Economic Adviser to Secretary), U.S.D.A.  
F. D. Farrell (President), Kansas State  
George E. Farrell (Western Division, A.A.A.) U.S.D.A.  
J. Wm. Firor (Agric. Econ.), Georgia State  
May Foley (Nutrition), Mass. State  
C. E. Friley (President), Iowa State  
J. K. Galbraith (Economics), Harvard  
John M. Gaus (Pol. Sci.), Wisconsin  
Wilson Gee (Sociology), Virginia  
Harry Gideonse (Economics), Chicago  
John M. Gillette (Sociology), North Dakota  
R. K. Gooch (Pol. Sci.), Virginia  
Frank B. Graham (President), North Carolina  
Mark Graubard (Biology), Clark  
L. C. Gray (Land Use), B.A.E.  
Russell J. Greenly (Education), Purdue  
W. E. Grimes (Agric. Econ.), Kansas State  
Alvin Hansen (Economics), Harvard  
Clyde W. Hart (Sociology), Univ. of Iowa  
Walter Havighurst (English), Miami Univ., Ohio  
Richard B. Heflebower (Bus. Adm.), Washington State  
L. I. Hewes (Land Use), F.S.A.  
B. H. Hibbard (Agric. Econ.), Wisconsin  
Asher Hobson (Agric. Econ.), Univ. of Wisconsin  
Wm. E. Hocking (Philosophy), Harvard  
W. S. Hopkins (Economics), State Univ. of Washington  
L. Vaughn Howard (Pol. Science), Maryland  
John B. Hutson (Asst. Admin., A.A.A.), U.S.D.A.  
O. B. Jesness (Agric. Econ.), Minnesota  
Chas. S. Johnson (Sociology), Fisk  
A. Drummond Jones (Group Discussion), U.S.D.A.  
Charles E. Kellogg (Chemistry and Soils), U.S.D.A.  
J. B. Kincer (Weather Bureau), U.S.D.A.  
Frank H. Knight (Economics), Chicago  
Otto F. Kraushaar (Philosophy), Smith  
Paul J. Kruse (Psychology), Cornell  
Walter H. C. Laves (Social Sci.), Univ. of Chicago  
C. E. Lemmon (Ministry), Missouri  
D. E. Lindstrom (Sociology), Illinois  
Benj. E. Lippincott (Economics), Minnesota  
W. B. Lloyd (Western Division, Extension), U.S.D.A.  
Leverett Lyon (Economics), Brookings Institution  
A. E. Macdonald (Economics), Dartmouth  
J. E. MacDonald (Agric. Comm.), Texas  
Wm. P. Maddox (Government), Pennsylvania  
T. R. McConnell (Educ. Psych.), Minnesota  
Furman McLarty (Philosophy), Duke  
Gardiner C. Means (Formerly Economic Adviser to Secretary), U.S.D.A.  
Horace Miner (Cultural Anthropology), U.S.D.A.

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